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“The people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, 
and this has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is 
felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic or 
exaggerated; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and 
international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this 
condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual 
peace.”  
 
Immanuel Kant, Towards a Perpetual Peace (1795) 
 
 
“If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their power to 
reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not incurably 
cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human 
beings to live on the earth.” 
 
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999) 
 
 
“What has to be accepted, the given, is — so one could say —forms of life”  
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Pt II, p. 226 (1953) 
 
 





















COSMOPOLITAN EU? MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
 
 





The central purpose of this research is to investigate the main progresses in promoting 
European integration strategies, social cohesion and sense of belonging (both global and 
European citizenship) within and by the European Union, taking into account the new 
multicultural realities of our globalized world; promoting a new model of integration 
which does involve neither homogenization nor hegemonization, allowing for both 
protection of human rights and the preservation of cultural values. Integration is in fact 
considered as a key element of the European Union’s migration policy, as well as a crucial 
element for the future development of European societies, besides the very identity of 
Europe itself. To this end a comparison is made between the classic and contemporary 
cosmopolitan theories and the human rights theory, in order to discover if and in which 
way they may or should complement each other. The idea of cosmopolitanism is 
questioned and criticized in parallel with the classical Westphalian sovereignty model, 
which represented and still represents the dominant governance model of international 
law and relations, notwithstanding the recent rise and development of international global 
institutions and non-governmental actors, proposing an alternative and new model of 
“global governance”. I therefore analyze the relationship between two famously 
conflicting ideologies of human rights: universalism and cultural relativism, in their 
philosophical and metaethical meaning of the liberal-communitarian debate; in the 
historical perspective of the post cold-war scenario, which saw the rise and establishment 
of an international community based on a “common view and scope” and on allegedly 
“shared values and principles”. The main purpose here is the one of investigating whether 
or not those values and principles, certified and promoted by the UDHR and other 
important treaties and declarations since 1948, can be really considered universal and 
universally shared, besides all cultural differences and relativism. I consider these issues 
as historically and ideologically related to the actual structure of the international and 
European system of protection of minorities and cultural diversity, which developed on a 
parallel although different line. The main intention here is the one of investigating merits 
and faults of this system, analyzing the new concept and definition of minorities in the 
European Union context, the European Union competences in this field and the possible 
mutual cooperation between the EU and other international actors acting for the 
protection of minority rights. Following OHCHR indications, there is still “no 
internationally agreed definition as to which groups constitute a minority”, while it is 
always stressed the fact that the existence of a minority should be recognized as a matter 
of fact and that any definition must include both objective and subjective aspects (race, 
ethnicity, language or religion but also identity and sense of belonging). I eventually 
evaluate different models of integration and European mechanisms of protection of 
cultural diversity, suggesting a path for a new model of European integration and human 
rights protection. The role of both states and supranational institutions like the European 
Union in protecting those rights is considered as essential in this respect. 
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In an increasingly globalized world, borders and their meaning are becoming 
malleable and the world is shrinking in terms of place and time. Space, borders and time 
perceptions have changed and this has a strong impact on the relationship between place 
and identity, on the individual’s identification with and against the “Other”.  
While the challenges brought by globalization concretized a fast metamorphosis 
of the old concept of Nation-state, urging a reconceptualization of the theory of 
sovereignty; cosmopolitanism, with its claim to universality and new ethical-legal 
standards, became the philosophical perspective giving meaning to the universality of 
human rights, as opposed to nationalism and national particularities.  
In this thesis, the cosmopolitan theory is analysed in comparison with the classical 
Westphalian model, still considered as the dominant governance model, notwithstanding 
the development of international and supra-national institutions, like the European Union, 
proposing a new model of “global governance”, citizenship and democracy.  
The main challenge forward is the one of reconciling the universal claim of 
cosmopolitanism and universality of human rights with the appeal of minorities (often 
marginalized communities) to the defence of relativism and cultural diversity; 
conciliating the ambition to create a “cosmopolitan democracy” and global civil society, 
with the claim to a “local democracy”, against standardization and misuse of power.  
Assuming the fact that social conflicts and discrimination tend to take root and 
become stronger in a time of crisis, namely the current Europe’s migration crisis, 
increasing crimes and illegality; it is assumed that, a non-appropriate integration model, 
especially in a time of crisis, can lead to phenomena of racial and ethnic discrimination, 
jeopardizing social cohesion and threatening security.  
The main aim of this thesis is the one of analysing the role of a supranational 
institution like the European Union in dealing with the “threatening” of the universality 
of human rights and the new, contemporary challenges of the always-changing 
multiethnic societies of post-Westfalian nation-states.  
Is the EU a cosmopolitan entity in the making? Has it an effective impact on the 




I.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
The recent social and political challenges brought by globalization in European 
societies, the advent of new media and social networks, of new transnational political 
experiments such as the European Union, led in turn to a complete and fast transformation 
of the old concept of Nation-state, weakening the old Westphalian system, increasing the 
interdependence on common issues worldwide.  
It is therefore not surprising that cosmopolitanism has for the past decade 
significantly raised the level of attention in Western political thought, especially if, as 
some authors sustain, we consider it as a specific heritage of the Western (European) 
political discourse and liberal tradition.1 
In her book On Violence, dating back to 1970, Hannah Arendt’s was already 
referring to “the bankruptcy of the nation state and its concept of sovereignty”2, 
inaugurating a modern conception of cosmopolitanism, which seemed to be better suited 
for a contemporary world in which the sovereign state appeared as having lost his role as 
a guardian of citizen’s rights, failing in its task of protecting its own citizens.  
Cosmopolitanism, with its claim to universality and new ethical-legal standards, 
had therefore been considered since the beginning as opposed and incompatible with the 
concept of nationalism and national sovereignty, even though many attempts have been 
made in order to re-conciliate the two concepts, many authors sustaining the potentiality 
of human beings to reconcile the loyalty to their own nation and relatively closed 
collectivity with a feeling of global and multilayered citizenship and belonging.3  
There have been various conceptions of cosmopolitanism throughout the history 
of modern thought, some more “radical” (Beitz, Held and Archibugi)4, other more 
                                                 
1 Cfr. Beardsworth, R., (2012), Assessing Cosmopolitan Theory in World Politics. E-International relations, 
and Poulsen F.E., (2008), Element of an Archaeology of Cosmopolitanism in Western Political Thought. A 
Return to the French Enlightenment (1713-1795), Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science, 
University of Copenhagen.  
2 Arendt, H., (1970). On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, p.6 
3 Cfr. Sen, Amartya (2006), Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Issues of our time. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, and Voronkova, A. (2010). Are nationalism and cosmopolitanism compatible? E-
International relations. 
4 Cfr.  Archibugi, D., & Held, D. (Eds.). (1995). Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World 
Order. Polity Press; Beitz, Charles R. (2005), “Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice”, in The Journal of 
Ethics, Volume 9, Issue 1-2, pp 11–27. 
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“moderate” (Nussbaum, Sen, Habermas), but there is still no consensus among 
contemporary scholars about a clear definition of cosmopolitanism.  
Cosmopolitanism can in fact be considered as a multidimensional concept, which 
reflects historical and political changes of economic as well as social and cultural 
structures over time.  
In its extreme version, it can be considered as an ambition to the abolition of 
nation-states in order to realize a “world government”. However, this is only one of the 
possible perspectives of cosmopolitanism. 
The main purpose in this research is to consider cosmopolitanism as that 
philosophical perspective giving meaning to the universality of human rights, 
demonstrating the need for a more cosmopolitan approach to the human rights regime, as 
opposed to the dominance of states power and national sovereignty.  
This does not mean that cosmopolitanism is totally incompatible with nationalism, 
nation-state and “local democracy”, but only that states can and must collaborate in a 
more effective way to the common aim of protecting human rights and freedoms.5  
Different conceptions of cosmopolitanism are eventually compared with different 
ideologies of human rights, analyzing the opposed theories of universalism and cultural 
relativism in the framework of the liberal-communitarian debate. 
While the advocates of universalism and liberalism affirm that all human beings 
have natural rights by virtue of their humanity, belonging to every human being 
irrespective of cultures; cultural relativists sustain that any truth is relevant and that every 
single culture has its own moral values, which in turn lead to the right principles.6 
According to Taylor, for example, the particularism of the communities is the only 
valid remedy to their dissolution. Separations and boundaries are for Tylor the only means 
to guarantee differences, because not everything can coexist with everything.7 
It is not always easy to reconcile both theories and perspectives. It seems however 
of foremost importance to reconcile the universal claims of cosmopolitanism and the right 
                                                 
5 Giannolla, C., (2009), Vertical Cosmopolitanism: The Intergenerational Approach towards Human Rights 
of Future Generations, in Peace Human Rights, no. 3, p. 114-115. 
6 Cfr. Donnelly, J., (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2ndED., New York: Cornell 
University Press, p. 89.  




to a “local democracy”, representative of the rights of those minorities and marginalized 
communities, which appears to be excluded from a too centralistic approach. Such 
recognition leads to a problematization of the same concept of universality.  
It appears necessary to take inspiration from both theories: on the one side fully 
recognizing human rights as universal legal standards applying to all members of 
humankind; on the other hand, considering the importance of cultural diversity and 
minority protection, which must be always safeguarded against standardization and 
misuse of power. 
In a European context, the issue of the “europeanization of integration models” 
will be considered as converging with the issue of protecting minority rights and cultural 
diversity. The European Union itself recognizes “the need for a holistic approach which 
takes into account not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues 
related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights”.8   
EU policy is nowadays based essentially on policies of “soft coordination” and 
hardly any research activity has considered how European member states will use 
instruments and laws and how they will contribute to policy convergence.  
As concerning the methodology of my work I would like to underline its particular 
position “in between”, among moral and political philosophy and more effective links to 
legal philosophy and political theory, with some important references to sociological and 
anthropological aspects and to the latest development of International and European law, 
considered as relevant for the sake of my thesis’ general meaning and objective. 
The thesis (Chapter 1 and 2 particularly) is extensively based also on some of my 
previous published works and academic researches, such as  Robert Alexy’s A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights Critical Review: Key Jurisprudential and Political Questions 
(2012)9, and Behind the Charter: the EU Ethical-Legal Identity in an International Order 
(2013)10 and on some notes and conference papers presented at international conferences 
and workshops.11 
 
                                                 
8European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Immigration, Integration and 
Employment, COM(2003)336 final, p.18. 
9 DINÂMIA’CET- IUL, Working Paper n º 2012/01, Lisbon, available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/3883. 
10 Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, available at: http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783642324116. 
11 Please refer to my CV for further information. 
 
13  
I. 2 Outline 
 
 Four main objectives will be considered as constituting the main theoretical 
chapters of my PhD research project and will be analyzed considering the following 
structure:  
The first chapter (Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, from International to 
Cosmopolitan Law?) will recognize the necessity, in the era of globalization and 
multiculturalism, of a reconceptualization of the theory of sovereignty, considering the 
rise in the last two decades of “post-national constellations” of political authority,12 and 
especially the European Union, an example of emerging “global power” and experiment 
born to give shape to a post-national political identity. 
A new, inclusive definition of citizenship and national identity will be pursued, in 
order to recognize this change in Western societies, transcending the dominant framework 
of liberal individualism and nation-state.13  
The decolonization and globalization process led to new actors and issues which 
transcend traditional state-centered politics, leading to serious attempts to reconstruct 
both the notion and the practice of sovereignty beyond the state, to the transition from an 
international (post-Westphalian) law to a cosmopolitan law.14 
Globalization and mass migration especially during the 20th century in Europe 
have radically challenged the idea of a sovereign, territorial defined nation state, with a 
single cultural/social identity and a common language and history. Global challenges 
require global means in order to be solved, which go beyond particular, national interests.  
The European Union is in particular considered as one of the most uncommon and 
widest-ranging political actor in the international system, and claims to be considered as 
a borderless cosmopolitan entity, but is it a “cosmopolitan entity in the making”? Does 
the trajectory of constitutionalization in the EU and the new Charter of Fundamental 
Rights contribute to a cosmopolitan order with global effect? 
                                                 
12 Cfr. Habermas, J. (2001), The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press 
13 Cfr. Dobson, L., (2006), Supranational Citizenship, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
14 Cfr. Khan, L. Ali, (1996), The Extinction of Nation State: A World without Borders. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International; Archibugi, D. Held D. and Kohler M. (eds), (1998), Re-imagining Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Stanford University Press; Held, D., (2010), Cosmopolitanism: Ideals 
and Realities, Cambridge: Polity. 
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The second chapter (Cosmopolitan Theory and Human Rights Discourse) will 
address interconnections and affinities between the classical cosmopolitan theory and the 
existing international human rights regime, evaluating the contribution of the 
cosmopolitan theory to the conceptualization of the human rights discourse and to the 
diffusion of global justice’s theories.15  
The idea of cosmopolitanism will be considered as a theoretical perspective 
‘mainstreamed’ throughout the whole research, with the purpose of ascertaining the 
prospect of universal human rights within the framework of a cosmopolitan project. The 
history of the concept from the ancient to the current time will be retraced, investigating 
its complementarities with the existing international human rights discourse.  
The question of the theoretical foundation of fundamental rights and of the 
application of constitutional rights reasoning and norms in different legal systems will be 
analysed, as one of the foremost issues of all democratic constitutional States where there 
is a presence of a Bill of Rights, in continental European jurisprudence as well as in other 
common law jurisdictions. 
In this sense, as recognized by various scholars and eminent legal philosophers16, 
Alexy’s A Theory of Constitutional Rights17 (hereafter A Theory), constitutes not only a 
major classic of German constitutional theory but also, “a seminal contribution to the 
analysis of how legal reasoning on fundamental rights is intimately connected to the very 
foundation of democracy”.18  
A substantive, structural theory of fundamental rights is in fact essential in every 
contemporary democratic society, being crucial for the basic legal structure of any 
modern society. 
The third chapter (Multiculturalism and Human Rights: Anthropological 
Perspectives) will reflect on one of the biggest issues in human rights law: the conflict 
between universalism and cultural relativism in human rights theory, in its correlation 
with the cosmopolitan theory and the anthropology of law, with the final aim of 
                                                 
15 Cfr. Rawls, J.., (1999) A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Pogge, T., (1992), Cosmopolitanism 
and Sovereignty, in Ethics, Vol.103, No. 1; Pogge, T., (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights, 
Cambridge: Polity. 
16 Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, Neil MacCormick, Ota Weinberger, H.L.A Hart and Joseph Raz, 
among others. 
17 Alexy, R., ( 2002), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
18 Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.1, 5. 
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recognizing interculturality and pluralism as the key concepts in order to overcome this 
opposition and to realize a human rights dimension closer to the multiethnic reality of 
post-Westphalian nation States. 
Intercultural dialogue and pluralism will be considered also as the most effective 
instruments of social conflict prevention, for tackling racism and xenophobia, promoting 
non-discrimination and respect for diversity, fostering human rights and capacity building 
mechanisms.19  
While the debate about universalism and relativism is quite old in the history of 
philosophy, its applicability to the human rights theory is quite recent: it was in fact only 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 that the universality 
and inviolability of every human being was definitely stated, the UDHR representing the 
“frame within which the international human rights projects unfolds”,20 human rights 
meaning essentially “what is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”21  
However, as we will see, since its beginning the design and adoption of the UDHR 
was not at all immune of criticism and opposition, the UDHR accused of being an 
instrument of “Western cultural imperialism”, a “mere Trojan horse for the imposition of 
‘Western’ commitments upon ‘non-Western cultures.”22  
Final aim of this section is an effort to reconcile universalism and cultural 
relativism by taking inspiration from both ideologies: on the one hand fully recognizing 
human rights as “basic rights and freedoms that all people are entitled to”, as stated in the 
UDHR itself;23 on the other hand considering multiethnicity rather than homogeneity as 
the essential value that states need to take account of in multiethnic societies.  
                                                 
19 Cfr. An-Na’im, A., (2012), The Interdisciplinarity of Human Rights, in Gearty,. C./ Douzinas, C. (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law, (pp. 97-113), Cambridge University Press. 
20 Grear, A. (2012). ‘Framing the project’ of international human rights law: Reflections on the 
dysfunctional ‘family’ of the Universal Declaration. In C. Gearty & C. Douzinas (Eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Human Rights Law (pp.17-35). Cambridge University Press, p.19. 
21 Donnelly, J., (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ED., New York: Cornell 
University Press, p.22. 
22 Grear, A. (2012)., p.22. 
23 Cfr Article 2 UDHR: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the 
basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 




Cosmopolitanism can be referred as the philosophical perspective giving moral 
value and strength to the human rights doctrine but it does not represent per se a synonym 
of universalism. Even entailing a minimum level of basic rights, which are supposed to 
be valid for all human beings, irrespective of their origin or culture, human rights in a 
cosmopolitan perspective must be reinterpreted through discourse and intercultural 
dialogue, embedded in every single culture with its particularities and differences. The 
universality and indivisibility of human rights will be however finally reinforced and not 
dismissed. 
The final chapter (Universal Rights and/or Minority Rights? Towards a New 
Model of Integration) will eventually explore merits and failures of the international 
system of protection of minorities and cultural diversity, including the new concept and 
definition of minorities in the European Union context.  
It will analyse different models of integration and European mechanisms of 
protection of minority rights, concentrating on European immigration law and the 
Europeanization of integration models.  
What is the concrete response of the European Union to the always-changing 
multiethnic societies of post-Westphalian nation-states? What the response to the 
“threatening” of the universality of human rights? Which is the role of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), and of a supranational institution like the European Union, which 
the role of Member States and civil society in dealing with these new challenges? 
Charles Jones, among others, stresses that “the set of rights holders cannot be 
restricted to citizens of particular nation-states”.24  
The EU claims to intend to develop as a borderless cosmopolitan entity but has in 
fact been criticized for being extremely bounded when it comes to immigration and the 
rights of third country nationals.  
A non-appropriate integration model can lead to phenomena of racial and ethnic 
discrimination, social conflict, xenophobia and ghettoization, jeopardizing social 
cohesion and threatening security, as we will see has been in the special case of the 
Roma/Gypsies European minority, taken as a case-study example. 
                                                 
24 Jones, C., (1999), Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.57. 
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This has been broadly recognized by all European and international organizations 
such as EU, OSCE, UN and Council of Europe.  
The research concentrates on the existing mechanisms, at European and 
international level, to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might 
endanger peace and friendly relations between communities.  
A special focus is dedicated to the work of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 
the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, Council of Europe), 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as well as national specialized bodies applying 

























Chapter 1. Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, from International to 
Cosmopolitan Law?  
 
II. Multiculturalism and Globalization in a Postmodern Era. 
 
Around the end of the Seventies of the Twentieth Century, the perception of a 
crisis of paradigms and values is affirmed in the West. The concept of postmodern enters 
the philosophical debate, used by some thinkers to diagnose the end of modernity.  
The values of modernity disappear when the model of industrial society shared 
between the capitalist and the communist countries is broken. Postmodern philosophy is 
strictly connected to a series of historical and social transformations. Behind his 
contestation of the modern, we find a variegated set of historical events (the world wars, 
the horrors of the concentration camps, the failures of real socialism, the inequities of 
capitalism, the dangers of a nuclear conflict, the threat of an ecological catastrophe, etc.) 
that have undermined the main "myths" of the last centuries, beginning with that of a 
necessary and endless progress. 
The relations between post-modern and "complex" post-industrial society are 
particularly close. The mediating element is constituted by the pluralistic attitudes of this 
society, of which the postmodern wants to be the mirrored conscience.  
Against all forms of homogenization and planning, the postmodern strives to 
assert the demands of multiplicity and difference, to the point of becoming the 
spokesperson of the polycentric and diversified physiognomy of today's multicultural 
societies; accentuating those aspects that make it an effective or potential ally of policies 
focused on environmentalism, pluralism, multiculturalism, on the defence of minorities 
and on respect for all forms of diversity.  
Hence the postmodern project is the project of a “plural humanity”, able to 
permanently leave behind the dream of a certain modern universalism of a single truth, a 
single faith and a unique system of values.  
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Our world has proved to be complex, also because of the new forms of 
communication and we must take into account the various plans of our intervention: 
social, cultural, economic and political. 
In 1962, the Canadian sociologist Marshall McLuhan published The Gutenberg 
Galaxy, which states that the technological tools used by communication produce 
pervasive effects on the collective imagination, regardless of the contents conveyed, 
involving mechanization and homogenization. This thesis is summarized in the famous 
formula "the medium is the message". In Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
(1964), among his most famous works, McLuhan also fears the impersonality of modern 
communication and the extreme difficulty of controlling it by users: we are all immersed 
in the “global village” (expression coined precisely in this paper), far away physically but 
approached in the fictitious spaces created by mass media, which make any message 
easily accessible, usable by all without distinction and strongly persuasive. 
During the Seventies of the Twentieth Century we witness the global diffusion of 
the media and especially the advent of electronic calculators. The introduction of the first 
microprocessor (the Intel 4004) made available quite cheap computers, which could be 
purchased by individuals. In 1990, the world-wide computer network owned by the 
United States, and until then reserved for scientists and researchers, was opened to the 
citizens and in 1991 the World Wide Web was born (literally "web of global 
dimensions"), emblematic symbol of the new communication interconnection.  
The knowledge and behaviour of individuals are significantly affected by this 
formidable revolution. It is now possible to communicate instantly, interact with people 
scattered across the entire surface of the globe and spread content of all kinds anywhere. 
The new technological structure and the global techno-science that underlies it is not only 
the background or the precondition of the phenomenon of globalization, but it is also, to 
all intents and purposes, one of the causes. The term globalization has been coined quite 
recently. It appears for the first time during the Seventies of the last Century, in the 
English weekly "The Economist", a magazine of liberal economics. In the same period, 
the term "globalization" spreads in French culture, but it does not have the same fortune. 
In general, globalization, or mondialisation, contains a series of interconnected processes, 
which can be summarized as follows: in the economic and financial sphere, globalization 
has led to the intensification of exchanges and relations between an ever-increasing 
number of countries and the consequent breaking down of legal and economic barriers 
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that limited the movement of goods and people; the increasingly frequent use of new 
technologies for the exchange of goods and services; a marked competitiveness facilitated 
by the processes of liberalization, privatization and deregulation; strengthening the 
interdependence between the different economies, which influence each other in spite of 
geographical distances; the so-called "dematerialization", by virtue of which intangible 
factors such as the flow of information, scientific and technological knowledge, etc., play 
an increasingly important role in every sphere of human activity. In the political sphere, 
globalization has determined the loss of relevance of the State or of the national system 
as a fundamental reference point for the economic and political scenario. 
 If on the one hand this phenomenon tends to produce a crisis in the model of 
democracy that is suitable for the nation-state, on the other side it creates the conditions 
for the advent of various projects of global or cosmopolitan democracy. In the cultural 
sphere, globalization has promoted the diffusion on a planetary scale of increasingly 
homologated models of life and thought. This was possible precisely because of the 
diffusion and improvement of the mass media, as well as the now unlimited connection 
of computer systems. The habits and the mentality of the technologically advanced 
individuals of the whole world, in fact, tend to unify and conform. Although globalization 
can be analysed under multiple angles, which now focus each other on its basic traits 
(from the communicative interconnection made possible by new technologies to the 
contamination of ways of living and consuming, from the migrations of people to the 
sunset of the sovereignty of the States), there is a widespread tendency to place as its 
central and structural elements the irresistible expansion of capitalism, its subsumption 
of other modes of production and circulation, and the hegemony of its values on the whole 
planet. Indeed, the dynamics of capitalism has virtually transformed the world in a single 
production and distribution system, a single market whose exploitation is producing a 
global mass culture that is the result of global marketing and its constantly developing 
communication technology. Of course, globalization contains more than the totality of 
industrial capitalism, but this is its core and its defining element.25 The evaluations of 
global mass culture by scholars are multiple and discordant: there are those who interpret 
it as common ground that facilitates the understanding and dialogue between cultures that 
have remained distant and mutually inaccessible, and who instead denounces the 
                                                 
25 See C. Ake, Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalization and Democracy, in A. Hadenius, 
Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Cambridge 1997, pp. 282-296). 
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confused character, which implies the risk of cancellation of cultural specificities. 
Moreover, in this hybrid model, which is the symbol of the commercial multiculturalism 
of travel agencies, critics of globalization see the prevalence of the values of the capitalist 
West. More generally, there are at least three different and conflicting theoretical 
propensities towards globalization: 1) the first is decidedly negative and is concretized 
into interpretations that are also very distant from each other, united by the fact that 
globalization sees a world-space that summarizes all the evils of capitalism and its 
pseudo-democracy; 2) the second one is positive and intends globalization as the advent 
of a new economic order also beneficial for developing countries, which will finally have 
access to economic well-being and democracy; 3) the third, which also contains a 
variegated spectrum of interpretive models, tends instead to stand halfway between the 
first two, because it does not hide the benefits, nor the damage caused by globalization, 
but, considering it as an inevitable phenomenon, seeks to identify ways to maximize 
opportunities and to spread overall well-being.  
For the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, for example, the success of 
globalization requires the recognition of cultures different from ours. However, the 
greatest difficulty lies in the hermeneutical criteria with which to recognize such cultures: 
“The peremptory demand for favourable judgments of worth is paradoxically—
perhaps one should say tragically—homogenizing. For it implies that we already have 
the standards to make such judgments. The standards we have, however, are those of 
North Atlantic civilization. And so, the judgments implicitly and unconsciously will cram 
the others into our categories. For instance, we will think of their “artists” as creating 
“works,” which we then can include in our canon. By implicitly invoking our standards 
to judge all civilizations and cultures, the politics of difference can end up making 
everyone the same”26 
 
This means that our question of confrontation and our eventual acceptance of the 
"different" tend to reduce the other to our point of view, thus losing its cultural specificity. 
Despite this importance, Taylor does not prove to be completely pessimistic, provided, 
he points out, that the West knows how to make its own a form of anthropological and 
ethical modesty based on "a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story to 
accept the presumption."27 This does not mean that nowadays this "self-limitation" is only 
an ideal, facing the risk, much more concrete, that the same question of dialogue is 
                                                 
26 Tylor, Charles (1994), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton University 
Press, p.71). 
27 Ibid., p. 73. 
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resolved in a form, less aggressive but subtler than in the past, of cultural imperialism.  
On the other hand, the English sociologist Anthony Giddens does not share the 
idea that globalization is synonymous of "Americanization". The cornerstone of his 
speech is that, with the indiscriminate opening of the market, it represents, finally, an 
opportunity of growth for the developing countries. It is certainly impossible to foresee 
with certainty the tendency of this development, which does not follow a rational 
itinerary, but takes on anarchic and contradictory forms. One fact is however undeniable, 
according to Giddens: if, by exporting and spreading the Western model of economy, the 
predatory and irresponsible politics of the most industrialized countries has produced 
exploitation and misery in the less developed countries; it is precisely the globalization 
that can favour the entry of the latter in the international economic circuit, an entrance 
that has already partly taken place: 
“This is true of the global financial system, communications and media, and of 
changes affecting the nature of government itself. Examples of 'reverse colonisation' are 
becoming more and more common. Reverse colonisation means that non-western 
countries influence developments in the west. Examples abound - such as the Latinising 
of Los Angeles, the emergence of a globally-oriented high-tech sector in India, or the 
selling of Brazilian TV programmes to Portugal. Is globalisation a force promoting the 
general good? … Now it is surely obvious that free trade is not an unalloyed benefit. 
This is especially so as concerns the less developed countries. Opening up a country, or 
regions within it, to free trade can undermine a local subsistence economy. … Yet to 
oppose economic globalisation, and to opt for economic protectionism, would be a 
misplaced tactic for rich and poor nations alike”. 28 
 
These considerations lead Giddens to affirm that even the rich States must change 
their attitude, to adapt to the process of transformation under way and thus avoid being 
overwhelmed. All the old institutions, like the nation, the family and the labour market, 
have changed in depth and no longer have the same valences of the past. It is a question 
of establishing a new order, which is not determined by individual wills, nor by the rules 
of traditional politics, but by a complex of factors which at present is impossible to 
identify. Giddens, however, is optimistic: after all we are the first generation that moves 
in these unusual situations and for sure, with time, we will find a way to regulate and 
govern them.  
The Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, in his analysis of 
                                                 




globalization, starts from the conviction that there is a close correlation between free 
market and democracy. In fact, he points out that globalization has brought advantages to 
peoples who were previously excluded from the market and it has enriched the world 
from a scientific and cultural point of view. On the other hand, Sen does not hide that the 
most evident economic result achieved to date by globalization has been the increase in 
the inequality between rich and poor, both in the case of different countries, and in the 
case of different social groups within the same country. Suffice it to say that the 
percentage of global income of the poorest fifth of the world's population fell from 2.3% 
to 1.4% from 1989 to 1998, while the share forfeited by the fifth wealthier grew; not to 
mention that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in many countries the current per capita income is 
lower, in real terms, than in the seventies of the last century. The central problem, for Sen, 
is therefore that of an equitable, or at least acceptable, distribution of benefits. For Sen, 
moreover, both those who believe that globalization in itself favours the affirmation of 
human rights and the demolition of dictatorial regimes (still widely widespread in the 
Third and Fourth World), and those who believe that globalization destroys the current 
political equilibrium, undermining democracies, are wrong. It is consequently useless to 
try to uncritically favour the process, as well as trying to impede it. 
"The answer that must be given to global doubts is the global construction: there 
is no way out and no good reason to look for it, from the general process of globalization, 
of which the anti-globalization protests are a part. Globalization, in the best sense of the 
term, must at the same time face the ethical and practical issues of crucial importance 
deriving from it". 29 
 
As an irreversible process, which does not make sense to refuse or hinder (even 
in the light of the undeniable positive consequences it has produced), globalization must 
be regulated on the basis of common choices: to the extent that each culture will be able 
to safeguard its specificity, collaboration in this sense will be beneficial for everyone and 
not only unilaterally. According to Sen, it is therefore a question of finding the path to 
effective democratization of the economy, which must not necessarily correspond to the 
assimilation of all countries to the same political and institutional model.  
In The Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler predicted that the West would begin 
his decline when reaching its greatest influence on all other peoples, and at the same time 
posed the problem of a world history no longer Eurocentric: man of the Euro-Western 
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civilization, with their feeling of history, are not a rule but an exception. The “world 
history” is our image of the world, not the one of the “humanity” in general.30  In short, 
the idea of a universal history belongs, according to Spengler, to the culture of the West 
which, even when it tries to recognize the history of others, always does so according to 
a typically Western prejudice.  
On the contrary, in The Crisis of the European Sciences, Edmund Husserl tended 
to identify the philosophical rationality typical of the West with the rationality itself, 
while in the work A Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee strongly posed the problem of 
the pluralism of civilizations and of their lack of communication. Nowadays, the process 
of philosophical and historiographic deconstruction of the Eurocentric perspective has 
developed further. The attention towards the Asian world has made anachronistic the 
traditional repartition of history in Ancient history, the Middle Ages and Modern history, 
while the study of the Africa’s history has imposed a new model of historiography based 
on the interaction of traditions and cultures, blasting the same concept of "periodization". 
Moreover, chronological contemporaneity in some cases makes little sense compared to 
historical contemporaneity. There are in fact different cultures among them devoid of 
contacts, which have logics and times of development completely autonomous, which 
does not make sense to place on a chronological axis equal to the one adopted for Western 
history, or rather European. And speaking of "backwardness" of other civilizations 
compared to the European one, for example due to the lack of a science or technology 
like ours, is, once again, a typical value judgment based on the preconceived notion of 
the superiority of Western civilization. It is therefore necessary to renew not only the old 
historiographical modules but also the axiological ones. Especially since it is now clear 
to everyone, as Habermas writes, that "behind the shining facade of rational universality 
one can hide particular interests"31. In this sense, it is desirable what has sometimes been 
defined as a kind of umpteenth "Copernican revolution" of the rationality of the West: a 
"revolution" which, in our globalized world, correspond to a definitive epistemological 
and practical-moral decentralization of the Western vision of the world, in the direction 
of a fruitful dialogue between different civilizations, an “anthropological 
decentralization”.  
                                                 
30 Spengler, Oswald, 1880-1936, (1928), The decline of the West. New York: A. A. Knopf. 
31 Habermas, J., (2003) Fondamentalismo e Terrore, in G. Borradori, Filosofia del Terrore. Dialoghi con 
Habermas e Derrida, Laterza, Roma-Bari, p.48. 
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From what has been said, it emerges clearly that globalization must be read not 
only from an economic, political and cultural, but also from an "anthropological" point 
of view, that is to say with regard to our overall pattern of being in the world. For this 
reason it is absolutely necessary to keep in mind the negative aspects of this process, such 
as: 1) the tendency to compress and homologate the various lifestyles (Habermas talks 
about "colonization" of experience), with the consequent reactive production of those 
identity-against (as they have been defined) that are the various populisms, localisms and 
fundamentalisms; 2) the potential crisis of traditional forms of political democracy; 3) the 
various differences and inequalities in the distribution of goods.  
On the other hand, globalization does not involve only risks, but also opportunities 
(as Giddens and Sen underline). Seizing the chance that the processes of globalization 
entail means to act, as some scholars have pointed out, in the direction of co-responsibility 
and co-operation, asserting the will to face together, rather than unilaterally, the risks and 
opportunities of globalization.  In any case, it is now clear to everyone, at least to those 
who believe in the values of democracy and peace, that the urgency of a responsible and 
democratic process of global processes is not only a moral issue of justice, but it could 
even become a question of survival. 
The term multiculturalism was established in America during the 1960s, 
particularly in the United States and, even more so in Canada, in reference to some local 
problems, that is to say a series of conflicts that were determined by the presence of 
different cultures and languages in the same geographical area, which marked the end of 
the so-called “melting-pot”, namely the end of the peaceful coexistence of English-
speakers and French-speakers’ citizens. This meaning, important but limited, during the 
Eighties and Nineties has expanded considerably, following the profound political and 
ideological changes that have taken place throughout the planet.  
Currently the term "multiculturalism", which has become one of the key words of 
today's political lexicon, alludes to the problem of the coexistence of different cultures, 
subject to the same legal and political systems, as part of the same society. This problem 
is made even more urgent by the phenomenon of globalization, and therefore by the 
intersection, at the planetary level, of different peoples, languages, rights, religions and 
customs. 
Multiculturalism tends to be experienced, both by citizens and by scholars, in 
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different ways and, eventually, from two radically opposed points of view: on the one 
hand as a loss of the singular and unrepeatable identity of the different populations, and 
consequently as a matter of unavoidable tensions; on the other hand, as a source of 
enrichment and a vital opportunity to build a new kind of public sphere.  
In reality, the theme of the relationship with the other is not a novelty, because it 
has always been placed in history: from the relationship between the Greeks and the 
Barbarians, to the evaluations of the Europeans on the Amerindians at the time of the 
"discovery" of America.  
We must therefore understand if we can see the problem from a new, original and 
global perspective. In this regard, scholars are divided. There are those who argue that 
the multicultural issue is not a "new" issue, but it accompanies the political thought of 
modernity from its origins as a “karstic river”32; and there are those who say that 
multiculturalism is not, as many believe, the new phenomenal form of the old question of 
tolerance, but it rises from the end of the colonial empires undergoing an unprecedented 
acceleration with the ‘89 and with globalization.33  
The irrepressible reality of multiculturalism poses today's philosophical-political 
thought a series of problems that can be summarized in the following questions: a) is it 
possible to guarantee unity and social cohesion by making the differences survive at the 
same time? b) to what extent are cultural diversities combined with respect for the 
equality of civil rights provided by democratic institutions?  
Acknowledging that Western societies have irreversibly become multi-ethnic 
societies, multiculturalism implies, as Francesco Fistetti observes in the aforementioned 
book, the question of recognition of the other (of the different from us, the foreign, the 
stranger). This question is increasingly urgent in the current historical moment, marked 
by a twofold and contradictory movement: on the one hand the tendency to hybridization 
and intercultural mixtures; on the other hand, the fundamentalist withdrawal of cultures. 
Considered in the light of the "problem of the other", multiculturalism, according 
to a significant definition provided by Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, is  
“the radical idea that people in other cultures, foreign and domestic, are human 
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beings too, moral equals, entitled to equal respect and concern, not to be discounted or 
treated as a subordinate caste. Thus understood, multiculturalism condemns intolerance 
of other ways of life, finds the human in what may seem Other, and encourage cultural 
diversity” 34  
 
The question of the recognition of the other is raised when multiculturalism is 
accused of being "mono-cultural” and ethnocentric, accusing that set of State policies that 
during the second post-war period, led to privilege a certain culture, the one of the 
majority of the population, considering all the other cultures as marginal if not really 
inferior.  
The recognition of the value and the rights of the other, implies the irreversible 
crisis of the assimilationist model of the melting-pot, understood as the dominant scheme 
of social integration based on the so-called WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). The 
answer to monoculturalism can be, and has been, of two types:  
1) the first is a multiculturalism that seals every culture in the enclosure of its own 
borders (cultural "mosaic"), considering it as a heritage impervious to historical changes, 
susceptible of being rediscovered in its pristine essence. This form of multiculturalism 
leads, on the one hand, to relativism, since understanding cultures as closed worlds means 
undermining every effort of mutual understanding; and on the other hand, to 
fundamentalism, that is, an integralistic attitude of defence and preservation of those 
which are considered the constitutive traits of a culture. Such a view legitimizes, 
obviously, the desire to violently separate a community from all the others; 
2) the second response is a multiculturalism that, avoiding the absolutization of 
cultures, emphasizes the fact that there is a plurality of civilizations and that each one of 
them constitutes a historically articulated plot of beliefs, values and social practices, in 
perpetual transformation and hybridization. In short, it is a multiculturalism that, avoiding 
fundamentalism, insists on the necessity of a full recognition of cultural differences, seen 
as all worthy and bearers of a peculiar declination of the human race. 
Today's philosophical theories on multiculturalism have mostly a normative 
inclination:  they are not content to describe the present situation, but tend to identify 
measures and/or behaviours aimed at guaranteeing the recognition of differences (or 
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cultural identities) and minority lifestyles. For example, those who believe that these 
situations are not sufficiently defended, proposes to establish special group rights or 
"privileges" in favour of minorities.  
In this work of normative reconstruction, philosophy cannot help but be 
confronted with two basic orientations or paradigms: communitarianism and liberalism. 
Communitarianism, starting from the idea of an individual organically inserted in the 
social structure of his community, insists above all on the appreciation of differences; 
liberalism, focusing on the equal rights of individuals, tends to favour a universalistic and 
egalitarian view.  
In particular, the communitarians, bearing in mind the post-structuralist and post-
modern critiques of the "oppressive" universality of the moderns, accuse the classical 
liberal state of "abstract neutralism" and "blindness" in the face of differences. Such 
attitudes would also be at the basis of the explosions of nationalist tribalism and religious 
fundamentalism that found their emblematic figure in the tragedy of September 11, 2001.  
From this derives the inevitable clash between the philosophers of these two 
tendencies, but also the research of perspectives capable of keeping in mind their 
respective requests. For example, some liberals felt the need of a renovation of the 
traditional liberal-democratic ideology, which with its egalitarianism seems not to take 
into account the new concept of "difference" elaborated by contemporary philosophy. 
They have therefore come to elaborate a new form of liberalism “welcoming differences" 
(typical is the case of Habermas).  
This attitude implies not only the project of "letting the other survive", which is 
also the precious Kantian idea of the "equal dignity" of human beings, but also the 
typically Twentieth Century’s idea of diversity as an ethical and anthropological value. 
One of the most significant philosophers of communitarianism is the 
aforementioned Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, author, in 1992, of a fundamental 
essay entitled The politics of recognition.  
Moving from a communistic-organicistic conception, Taylor hopes that the multi-
ethnic society recognizes not only the rights of individuals, but also the rights of the 
various communities that populate it. In this way, in his opinion, the difference in values 
in a collective and therefore public area is safeguarded, in contrast to liberalism, which 
circumscribes the dimension of difference to the private sphere. 
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Taylor reiterates the opportunity represented by separations and boundaries, as the 
only means to guarantee differences, because not everything can coexist with everything. 
He therefore does not wish universal conciliation.  
For example:  
"For mainstream Islam, there is no question of separating politics and religion 
the way we have come to expect in Western liberal society. Liberalism is not a possible 
meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, 
and quite incompatible with other ranges”. 35 
 
It is therefore in the particularism of the community that Taylor sees a valid 
remedy to their dissolution in that meta-community that is the State.  
As concerning liberalism, John Rawls is one of the major representatives of this 
tendency. In Political Liberalism (1993)36 the American philosopher states that the 
contemporary society is characterized by a multiplicity of reasonable but incompatible 
juridical systems, which are unlikely to ever be unified.  
Since it is very difficult for the citizens of a state to recognize themselves in the 
same thought model, the practice of tolerance is the only possibility.  
In this regard, Rawls's theory is not very different from the traditional one, that 
dates back to the Sixteenth Century. In fact, it is an appeal to mutual respect and dialogue. 
On the other hand, without tolerance it would not be possible to extend the principles of 
justice to those who are external to the liberal system and its political tradition.  
According to Rawls, conflicts between political values (embodied in public 
institutions) and non-political values (embodied in the many cultural, linguistic and 
religious traditions that divide communities) can be resolved in the form of an overlapping 
consensus: an expression with which Rawls indicates the convergence of the various 
traditions around a core of shared values, that each sub-group justifies from its own point 
of view (as happens, for example, for the idea of equality, which everyone accepts and 
legitimizes on the basis of their own religious, ethical and philosophical tradition).  
In other words, it is a matter of finding a sort of "least common denominator" 
between different beliefs and values, in order to transform society into a fair system of 
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cooperation. For Rawls, in fact, we can mitigate our selfish feelings with cooperative 
incentives, thus ending up "intersecting” our intentions with those of our fellow men, 
aware of the advantages brought about by collaboration.  
Rawls’s reflection is a testimony of the North American’s neoliberal debate 
(which has been widely discussed also by other philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin 
and Joseph Raz): the problem of the reconciliation of the universality of values (on which 
the legitimacy of the State is based), with the variety of the ways in which they are still 
interpreted and put into practice by the various communities.  
Another Canadian theorist of liberal orientation is Will Kymlicka, (professor at 
Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario). His 1995 essay entitled Multicultural 
Citizenship has been translated into several languages.  
Kymlicka's approach gives ample space to the historical differences of States, 
distinguishing "multiculturalism", born from the absorption of previously autonomous 
populations, from "multinationality", arisen first of all from immigration. He takes into 
more consideration than other scholars, the concrete different areas of differences, 
integrating the abstractness of philosophical thought with ample anthropological analysis.  
In this way Kymlicka distinguishes a political reading and a cultural reading of 
multiculturalism, within which, in his opinion, at least three distinct questions are mixed: 
the difference, the rights of minorities, the recognition of identity.  
The scholar declares himself favourable both to the freedom of the individual 
within the group than to the freedom of the various minorities within the state, but in 
different ways according to the situation.  
If new forms of representation are to be introduced into the State, national 
minorities (such as the Native Americans in the United States or the Catalans in Spain) 
should be granted with decentralization and self-government; while ethnic groups will 
enjoy cultural recognition, but not special rights.  
In order to avoid solutions similar to the one proposed by Taylor, aimed at 
establishing a sort of separatism among the "different", Kymlicka proposes a "hybrid" or 
"pluralizing" model of multiculturalism (as he defines it), which should safeguard at the 
same time individuals, majority and minority groups within the state.  
On the other side, according to Amartya Sen, the attempt to understand the 
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multicultural components of our world entails a risk of “miniaturization of the 
individuals”: trying to attribute to a person or a group a determined and unmovable social 
identity, means to tighten it in a unilateral definition, that is to classify it according to a 
single criterion.  
This is the so-called "solitarist approach" to human identity, which Sen sharply 
criticizes, observing with humorous sagacity that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
"the same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizenship, of 
Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a 
long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, 
a believer in gay and lesbian rights (...) Each of these collectivities, to all of which this 
person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken 
to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category.”    37 
 
The problem of multiculturalism must be therefore faced in a perspective that 
values the multiple identities of the human being. The same relationship between global 
identity and local identity must be conceived in an open way, so that the feeling of global 
belonging does not replace our national allegiances (and vice versa). 
In his philosophical-sociological reconstruction of the postmodern, Jurgen 
Habermas also deals with the problem of multiculturalism in a wide series of essays: 
Between facts and norms (1992), The inclusion of the other (1996), The postnational 
constellation (1998).  
The intent of Habermas is to mediate the communitarian positions with the liberal 
ones, in view, as the philosopher recently reiterated, of a society "able to balance between 
"political equality" and "cultural difference".38  
 From the liberals, Habermas accepts the thesis of the universality of the law; from 
the communitarians (es. Taylor) he accepts the necessity of safeguarding the differences.  
However, while for the communitarians there are collective cultural rights that can 
be asserted in legal terms, for Habermas the diversity consists of elements that the law, 
as universal and valid for all cultures, is not able to incorporate, unless it becomes 
particularistic and contingent itself, thus losing its unique function as a super partes 
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In other words, liberals are right to warn against an identity policy that excessively 
"overturns" the legal system to the specific needs of cultural minorities, since such a 
policy would produce "parallel societies".  
On the other hand, the communitarians are right to warn against the dangers of 
eradication and forced assimilation, that is to say the dangers of an abstract politic of 
integration that programmatically aims at subjecting minorities to the cultural imperatives 
of the majority.  
It follows that the only way out is that of a liberal "inclusive" society capable of 
accommodating the differences without affecting the principle of political equality. 
According to Habermas, the inclusion of all citizens in civil society requires a political 
culture that safeguards us from confusing liberalism with indifference, but requires also 
the fulfilment of certain material preconditions: for example, a real integration into 
kindergartens and schools, which neutralizes the social disadvantages, giving equal 
access to the job market.39  
In this way, all the subjects, who are treated equally, are included in the political 
community, without exception, and it is not necessary to create differentiated strategies 
to protect minorities and preserve their characteristics (for example schools or classes for 
the exclusive use of a certain linguistic minority). 
It is only with this series of procedures that the demand for multiculturalism, 
recognition and pluralism, is compatible with the liberal theory of rights, operating within 
a democratic state which attempts to reconcile what the philosophical-political tradition 
has thought in a relationship of unresolved tension: private autonomy and public 
autonomy.  
In fact, Habermas argues, these two elements are not mutually exclusive, but 
complementary, since there is no real public autonomy when citizens are not guaranteed 
in their rights, and vice versa there are no citizens guaranteed in their rights if there is not 
effective private autonomy:  
“The two concepts are interdependent; they are related to each other by material 
implication. Citizens can make an appropriate use of their public autonomy, as 
guaranteed by political rights, only if they are sufficiently independent in virtue of an 
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equally protected private autonomy in their life conduct. But members of society actually 
enjoy their equal private autonomy to an equal extent—that is, equally distributed 
individual liberties have “equal value” for them—only if as citizens they make an 
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II.1 The Crisis of the Westphalian Model: the European Union and the 
Reconceptualizazion of Nation-State. 
 
One of the main effect of the era of postmodernism, globalization and 
multiculturalism, in the political sphere, is the loss of relevance of the State or of the 
national system as a fundamental reference point for the economic and political scenario.  
If on the one hand this phenomenon tends to produce a crisis in the model of 
democracy that is suitable for the nation-state, on the other side it creates the conditions 
for the advent of various projects of global or cosmopolitan democracy. 
In any case a crisis of the Westphalian model of nation-state must be recognized 
as well as the urgency of a reconceptualization of the theory of sovereignty and of a new, 
inclusive definition of citizenship and national identity.  
The last few decades have in fact been a period of constant cultural and social 
changes for the western world in general and for Europe in particular. Waves of 
immigration have dramatically altered the ethnic and social configuration of our cities 
and countries. Immigrants have been seen with diffidence at first, which has turned into 
open hostility afterwards.  
Diversity became one of the main characteristics of modern life and has been both 
resisted for its dangerous effects on national identity, and rewarded for its contribution to 
a truly supra national system. 
Concurrently with the process of globalisation of economy and markets, a new 
form of colonisation has emerged, imposing the western way of life to the rest of the 
population, fostering an increasing homogenisation among western countries, which has 
been certainly favourable to business, to the detriment of national cultures. 
While it has been acknowledged that the two processes of globalisation and 
migration are reciprocally interdependent, this consciousness has not been sufficient in 
order to resolve the conflict between the divergent forces of multiculturalism and 
globalisation. Conflicts resulting from both are often interrelated, so that it becomes quite 
difficult to establish their respective boundaries. 
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has been commonly regarded as the beginning 
of a new political and territorial order in Europe, assisting to the rise and consolidation of 
the modern nation-state, conceived as a formal political union with well-defined territorial 
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borders, one or several official language(s), a common currency and legal system; 
organized either by race or cultural background.  
In the nation-state, everybody usually speaks the same language, practice a similar 
religion and share a common set of “national” values.  
A new political order establishing the rights and duties of states was therefore 
initiated based upon the concept of a sovereign state, the related national identity being 
defined by its territorial and ethno-cultural characteristics rather than its religious or 
monarchical features. The “territorial state” system in international politics was finally 
formally recognized, defining the state as the basic unit of the international system. 
A working definition of Nation-State has been provided by Valery Tishkov, which 
defines states as “self-identifies deriving their political legitimacy from serving as a 
sovereign entity for a country as a sovereign territorial unit”.41  
The state is a political and geopolitical entity; the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic 
entity. The term "Nation-State" implies that the two geographically coincide, and this 
distinguishes the Nation-State from the other types of state, which historically preceded 
it. 
From an historical point of view, we have assisted to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the consequent end of the East-West conflict, to the recent EU’s enlargements 
(2004, 2007 and 2013) and the increase in mass migration and refugees’ movements, the 
blurring of state borders and the changing environment of international relations.  
All of that contributed to an expedited and complete metamorphosis of the old 
concept of nation-state, further undermining the old Westphalian system.  
The concept of sovereignty, based on this idea of “homogeneous” states and 
national identities, has been confronted with a profound reconceptualization, becoming 
one of the most challenged political notions.  
Various attempts have been made in order to build a new post-national political 
idea, contributing at the same time to a new, inclusive definition of national identity.42  
                                                 
41 Tishkov, V., (2000), Forget the 'Nation': Post-Nationalist Understanding of Nationalism, in Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 23.4, p.627. 
42 (Cfr. Habermas, 1998). 
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A thorough contestation of the concept emerged in correspondence with new 
phenomena usually considered as belonging to the general phenomenon of globalization: 
the increasing transnational interconnectivity between markets, institutions and people, 
as well as the changing ideas about human dignity, the results of technological 
developments, the intensification of regional integration, the increasing interdependence 
on common issues worldwide and last but not least, the new emerging global threats 
which transcend the state level (especially environmental issues and global security 
threats like terrorism). 
These are some of the events which characterize an entry into a post-Westphalian 
era, in which the investigation of possible post-national forms of politics, acquires 
growing importance, as well as a greater understanding of the fact that global threats 
require common action in order to be solved.  
New ideas of governance embrace, for example, the idea of a “world 
government”43, the building of a “cosmopolitan democracy”44 or the development of 
mechanisms of global governance as “multi-level governance”.45  
New actors other than nation-states (non-state actors) are therefore emerging as 
novel players in the international relations game, assuming a progressively more 
important role: actors such as regional and supranational organizations (e.g. the European 
Union), but also non-governmental organizations and multinational companies.  
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that a significant contribution to the 
evolution of this concept has developed from the role played by civil society 
organizations, which have commented and criticized both national and European policies, 
thus contributing to the emergence of a new European civil society.  
This is even more important if we consider that the last two hundred years of 
European political history have witnessed the rise and legitimization of a modern Nation-
State, which have a tendency to become an “ethnic State”, that is to say a “State which 
belong to an ethnic majority.”46 
                                                 
43 Lu, Catherine (2008). World Government. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  
44 Cfr. Held, D., (1995), Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press; and Archibugi, D., (2008) The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. 
Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
45 Cfr. Enderlein, E., Wälti, S., Zürn, M. (eds.), (2010), Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
46 Gheorghe N.; Acton T., (1994/1995), “Dealing with Multiculturality: Minority, Ethnic, National and 
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This idea of “state unity” was often put into practice through a policy of socio-
cultural homogenization and political integration of the population of a State, and 
frequently imposed by hegemonic political élites to subordinate social groups considered 
as socially marginal.  
The rise of Nation-States required the construction of a national identity that was 
supposed to be different from “others” not belonging to “us”, to the nation.  
The identity of a nation, in this way, was directly interlinked with the creation of 
“the Others”, conceived at the same time as a concern and a threat to the majority 
society.47 
Many scholars have however recently challenged the “homogeneity” of Nation-
states and the idea of a homogenous culture and language as the main prerequisite of 
every nation-state.  
By closer examination the idea of an ethno-cultural homogenous state where 
people speak the same language, have a similar ethnic background and share the same 
religion has always been only an illusion.  
“Homogeneous states” of the old Westphalian system were never all that 
homogeneous as it seems as well as the national identity has never been so exclusive.  
The advent of the globalization era has finally outdated the old idea of 
homogenous nation states, even though the majority of western countries are still 
reluctant in accepting these changes, while countless religious, ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural communities now inhabit European countries and cities.  
As explained by Edward Said in his classical work Orientalism (1978), it is 
possible to retrace the origin of negative stereotypes towards minorities considering the 
Western historical background of colonization. The age of colonization and 
imperialization contributed to the formation of an unfair and unbalanced view of non-
European people and cultures.  
In his book, Said underlines the term “Orientalism” as a collection of false 
preconceptions characterizing Western attitudes toward non-western-countries, arguing 
that a long tradition of romanticized images of Asia and the Middle East in Western 
                                                 
Human Rights”, in OSCE ODIHR Bulletin Vol.3, No. 2, p.29. 
47 Please refer also to: Anderson, 2006, in which the author reflects on the origin and global spread of 
nationalisms and examines the creation of “imagined communities” of nationality. 
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culture has served as an implicit justification for the European and American imperial 
ambitions. 
The contraposition between “us” and “them” can however become dangerous and 
create social conflicts when “we” are always defined as good, rational and law-abiding, 
and “them” are always defined as bad, irrational and criminals. Such contraposition can 
in fact lead to a general negative attitude towards migrants and foreigners, weakening 
social cohesion and solidarity with migrants. 
On the other side, as concerning the ongoing political debates on the possible 
power shift from traditional industrial powers to emerging post-national powers, the EU 
can be considered as an emerging global, international actor, which significantly differs 
from traditional forms of power (e.g. Member States).  
In a contemporary, “globalized world”, in which western nation-states are 
experiencing major political, socio-economic and cultural transformations, the European 
Union can be considered one of the most significant attempts to create a post and supra-
national political identity, exemplifying how, in the last two decades, the rise of “post-
national constellations” of political authority has led to serious attempts to renovate “both 
the idea and the practice of sovereignty beyond the state”.48  
Regarding the European Union as an outstanding example of regional 
supranational organization, it is possible to historically affirm that it has progressed well 
beyond a simple confederal-style union, developing exclusive competences over certain 
issues, especially through the development of the “acquis communautaire” over national 
legislations, and the supranational jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).49  
The question however remains, how and whether the EU can be regarded as an 
“effective” global power in world politics, one that makes a difference to both the local 
and global equilibrium, able to extend its values and exert its influence over an extensive 
part of the world, in what concerns both its impact on economy and development, its 
capacity to deliver external aid and its security and defence policy. 
Attempts have been certainly made in order to provide the EU with a symbolic 
legitimacy and “ethical identity”, for example through the stipulation of the European 
                                                 
48 Cfr. IFL, Institute for Philosophy of Language,  FCSH, UNL , (2011). Post-national Sovereignty: The 
EU path towards a political identity.  
49 Cfr. Weiler, J.H.H., (1991). The Transformation of Europe. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100, No. 8, 
Symposium: International Law, 2403-2483 
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Constitutional Treaty50 and the adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights which aimed 
to consolidate the European political identity through the recognition, promotion and 
protection of a common ethical and legal background, as well as providing a set of 
common rights and shared values, and in so doing, justifying a supra-national sovereign 
intervention.  
However, despite the fact that many achievements have been positively reached 
at EU level, namely the enhancement of peace and stability in the continent and the 
establishment of a common market and monetary union; many important “legitimacy 
deficiencies” have been pointed out and the EU has been often classified as a weak and 
divided entity, particularly incoherent regarding its role as a global actor in international 
politics. 51  
Problems related to the EU internal and institutional structure, its democratic 
deficit and the largely intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy have been often 
underlined.52 
The EU is therefore described as “a novel type of entity whose principled and 
constitutional status is ambiguous and incomplete, and whose underlying telos is not 
clear”.53 Many indicators have pointed to such weaknesses and internal division in the 
past number of years.  
For example, the lack of a consistent and effective intervention during the Balkans 
war, the exclusion of the EU from the final negotiations at the COP15 (15th session of 
the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference), the EU’s indecision concerning the US’s 
plan to intervene in Iraq each represented a rather weak standing of the EU in the global 
scene.  
It is certainly true that Europe has always had the ambition of playing a role on a 
global and international scale, recognized as early as 1937 by Young, who entitled this 
phenomenon “Europeanization”.54  
                                                 
50 Which was however rejected by the French and the Dutch referenda in May and June 2005. 
51 Eriksen E. O. and Fossum J.E., (2004), Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation 
Assessed. International Political Science Review, Vol 25, No. 4, p. 435. 
52 Cfr. MacCormick N., (2007), The European Superpower, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
53 Eriksen E. O. and Fossum J.E., (2004), Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation 
Assessed. International Political Science Review, Vol 25, No. 4, p. 435. 




Certainly, Europe has long been considered at the centre of the most revolutionary 
technological, institutional and political inventions and “Western values and assumptions 
have been internalized to a remarkable degree in almost every other major culture”.55 
The European Union’s presence in the world’s economy is still considered powerful. EU 
represents: 
 “the largest single economic entity in the world, with half a billion people and a 
gross domestic product (GDP) slightly larger than that of the United States […] The EU’s 
presence in the world economy manifests itself not only through trade, capital and 
migratory flows but also via an intense regulatory activity. It is, if not the main, at least 
the second most important regulatory power in the world in just about every area, 
including: competition policy, […], environmental protection, […]; money, with the euro 
being the second largest international currency in the world (behind the US dollar); and 
financial market regulation, with European markets also ranking number two in the 
world (again behind the US). The European Union is not only a global economic power, 
more or less on a par with the United States. It is also the undisputed regional economic 
power of a geographical area that encompasses Europe, the Middle East and North 
Africa (EMENA)” 56  
 
Yet, some authors still speak of a “European malaise”57 and the EU is considered 
to be consistently lacking all the essential characteristics that are usually associated with 
the notion of “global power”.  
Such characteristics are instead mostly associated with the concept of a traditional 
nation-state, which entails a clearly defined hierarchy and centre of authority, as well as 
extensive control over all fields of life of its citizens (in the political, economic, social 
and cultural sphere).  
Furthermore, such a perception relates to the classical conception of international 
security, which has been traditionally linked to the protection of physical and political 
integrity of sovereign states; consequently, requiring the protection of internationally 
recognized boundaries (if necessary also through the use of military force), the prohibition 
of the use of force between states and the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states. 
The European Union indeed has a peculiar role within the international arena, one 
that differs from any traditional form of power (nation-state), especially regarding both 
                                                 
55 Roberts, J.M., (1985), The Triumph of the West. The Origin, Rise and Legacy of Western Civilisation, 
London: Phoenix Press, p.278. 
56 Sapir, A. (ed.). (2007), Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, Brussels: Bruegel, p.1. 
57 Beck, U. and Grande E., (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe. London: Polity Press, p.1. 
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its institutional structure and the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy.58  
Such uniqueness is based on differing levels of policy, whereupon some areas of 
policy are dealt with at a communitarian level, while also respecting the different 
priorities and concerns of each member country as well as their respective foreign policies 
and the overriding intergovernmental framework. 
However, some authors (e.g Manners, 2006) 59 sustain that it is exactly what is 
commonly considered to be a point of weakness (at least compared with old-style power 
politics) that makes the EU powerful on the global scene.  
The EU power manifests not through the use of force or in a “traditional fashion”, 
but predominantly through its character of normative and civilian power and the use of 
soft-power instruments and legislative agendas, such as economic incentives and the 
prospect of membership that in turn attracts and influences the policy and behaviour of 
other states. 
For example, policies of conditionality and economic incentives made it possible 
for the EU to exercise a broad influence over potential candidate countries, which became 
deeply dependent on the EU’s trade services, policies and financial opportunities. 
In conclusion, the EU can be effectively considered as a “world power”, especially 
regarding its communitarised polices (namely trade and monetary policy), even though 
its effectiveness is largely based on specific policy fields and related to specific regions 
of the world.60 
On the other hand, the EU can be considered as less effective in other regions or 
policy areas and in particular, in regards to its capabilities in the security and defence 
policy, its soft-power measures having been often criticized as “too soft”, only reactive 
and ultimately ineffective. 
On a final note, it should be highlighted that the complex structure of the EU 
should not be seen as a detracting factor, but rather an important characteristic of the 
nature of the EU, particularly due to its crucial role in the destabilization of the traditional 
                                                 
58 Cfr. MacCormick N., (2007), The European Superpower, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
59 Manners, I., (2006). The European Union as a Normative Power. Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies 35, 167-180. 
60 Predominantly, this includes the “enlargement regions” of Central and Eastern Europe and recently South 
Eastern Europe. For instance, the EU remains highly invested in post-conflict state building and in bringing 
democracy and stability to the Balkans’ region. 
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Westphalian notion of power.  
The EU’s multi-layered structure and post-national governance model could 
instead be considered to be an advantage when addressing the complex and 
interconnected challenges of today, increasingly so if the EU continues to adequately 
meet the challenges expressed in its foreign policy objectives, namely the promotion of 
regional cooperation, human rights, peace and good governance, the promotion of the 
rule of law and the protection of minorities.  
The EU may therefore be “unlikely to be transformed into a superpower in the 
near future, but maybe it will become a trend setter for a modern form of foreign policy 
in a globalized world”. 61 
Despite practitioners contradictory definitions underling the sui generis character 
of the European Union, described in turn as an “unidentified political object”62, a 
“federation”63, a “normative power”64, a “super state”65 or a “strange animal”66, the 
EU’s historical aspirations to become a supra-national power from a global perspective 
can be recognized from the very beginning of the European project and has been 
reconfirmed by the final adoption of an articulated “Bill of Rights” for the EU, as a 







                                                 
61 Cfr. Guérot, U., (2009). After Lisbon: Is Europe Becoming a Global Power? European Council on 
Foreign Relations, (ECFR.EU). See also: Haas, C., (2009). The European Union: a global power? E-
International Relations, and Wetzel, J. (ed.), (2012), The EU as a 'Global Player' in Human Rights? 
London: Routledge. 
62Jacques Delors 1985, in Drake, H. (2000), Jacques Delors: A Political Biography. London: Routledge, 
p.24. 
63 Fischer, J., (2000). From Confederacy to Federation. Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration. 
Speech delivered at the Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. 
64 Manners, I., (2001), Normative Power Europe. The International Role of the EU. Paper presented at the 
biennal meeting of the European Community Studies Association, Madison (WI), USA. 
65 Morgan, G., (2005), The Idea of a European Superstate, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 




II.2 The European Union: is it a Cosmopolitan Entity? The European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
Does the European Union can be considered as a real cosmopolitan entity?  
We can certainly look at the European Union as an outstanding example of 
regional, supranational organization, and it is possible to historically affirm that it has 
progressed well beyond a simple confederal-style union. 
The adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights aimed to consolidate the 
European political identity through the promotion and protection of a common ethical 
and legal background, providing a set of common rights and shared values, and in so 
doing, justifying a supra-national sovereign intervention.  
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights can be therefore considered as one 
of the main EU instrument fostering the image of the Union on an international scale and 
as a global, post-national and supranational power.  
In implementing the Charter the EU has certainly made human rights’ protection 
a central aspect of its policy and relations, recognizing at the same time, their 
cosmopolitan identity. 
A consideration of the broader history which brought to the proclamation and 
entering into force of the Charter is therefore essential for an understanding of several 
subsequent issues. To have an idea about the reasons behind the Charter and its value in 
the global international scene, it is in fact necessary to expand upon its background and 
founding rationale, delving deeper into the justifications for its creation. 
I will attempt to clarify those reasons, further explaining why the Charter was 
considered necessary since the European citizens seemed to be already well equipped in 
this respect, in particular after the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in 1950, and the 
remarkable work conducted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg during the last sixty years.  
The analysis will show that, despite the fact that a common European “Bill of 
Rights” was already contained within the ECHR67 and that a corpus of Community 
                                                 
67 All EU member states are also parties to the ECHR, even though the EU itself is currently not. However, 
article 6 (2) TEU of the Lisbon Treaty foresees the obligation on the EU to accede to the ECHR. 
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fundamental rights could have continued to develop in the framework of the European 
Court of Justice’s (ECJ)’s law-making practice; the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was still considered necessary for the sake of legal clarity and in order to foster 
the image of the Union on an international scale.  
Additionally, the Charter operated to compensate the democratic deficit of 
European institutions, making rights more visible for the citizens of the Union. 
At first glance, the Charter does not seem to refer to the external relations of the 
EU, and the document is presented as a constitutional document for “internal use” only, 
in order to consolidate fundamental rights applicable at the Union level (European 
Council, Presidency Conclusions, 1999). 
However, as the Charter addresses not only Member States but also the institutions 
and bodies of the Union, there can be no doubt that EU institutions and bodies are equally 
legally bounded by it when acting in the context of EU external activities.68 
The Charter will then be considered in the context of its symbolic and practical 
link to the debate concerning the EU’s ethical-legal and cultural identity, which in turn 
attests to the Community’s gradual transformation into a post-national political entity. 
It will be therefore evaluated in the global international scene, especially in the 
light of its scope, limitations and applicability and in consideration of the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, which made the Charter legally binding 
for the EU and all its Member States, in turn reinforcing its external dimension. 
Starting with the European Council held in Cologne in 1999, it took a significant 
period of time, approximately ten years, for the Charter to gain the status of primary law 
of the EU.  
The Charter is also the first European legal instrument to include all categories of 
rights in a single text, those being economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and 
political, consequently reinforcing the international agreements on the indivisibility of all 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law reached at the United Nations Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights of 1993.  
                                                 
68 Wouters, J., (2001), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Some reflections on its external dimension, 




The aim of the Charter, to build and reinforce the role of “Europe as an actor on 
the global stage”, is explicitly declared and recognized by the EU itself when stating that 
such a role has to be achieved “by bringing together Europe's external policy tools, both 
in policy development and policy delivery” giving Europe “a clear voice in relations with 
our partners worldwide, and sharpen the impact and visibility of our message”. This will 
also bring “more coherence between the different strands of EU external policy – such as 
diplomacy, security, trade, development, humanitarian aid, and international 
negotiations on a range of global issues” and will mean “an EU able to play a more 
responsive and effective part in global affairs.”69  
From an historical point of view, the Charter is the end product of a lengthy 
discussion within Europe about the form of which recognition of fundamental rights 
should take, both within the European Community as well as in its external dimension.  
In their nascence, the EU Treaties did not include any reference to fundamental or 
human rights. The need for a codified catalogue of fundamental rights at the EU level 
emerged only in 1970 when, in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, the German 
court stated that a piece of EU legislation was infringing the German Constitution. 
Answering to the German court, the ECJ stated that respect for fundamental rights did 
form an "integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice" 
and that inconsistency with fundamental rights protection could eventually authorize 
judicial review and legal challenges to European law.70  
With this ruling, the ECJ developed a doctrine of “unwritten rights”, subsequently 
binding on the Community institutions. The ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence was 
eventually accepted and incorporated as hard law with a statement to that effect into the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, new specific human 
rights competences were created, especially in the area of non-discrimination.  
Human rights provisions were also incorporated during the accession process of 
new Member States, allowing for their suspension in cases of systematic breaches of 
human rights. However, the EU general human rights competences were only recognized 
in 1999 when the European Council in Cologne formally decided to initiate the drafting 
                                                 
69 European Union, Communication from the Commission to the Council - Reforming Europe for the 21st 
Century. /* COM/2007/0412 final */  
70 ECJ, Judgment of the Court of 17 December 1970.  
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. 
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of a codified catalogue of fundamental rights for the EU (European Council, Presidency 
Conclusions 1999). 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was officially 
proclaimed in 2000 during a meeting of the European Council in Nice (European Council, 
Presidency Conclusions, 2000). However, it was still considered as a merely “solemn 
proclamation”, while its tangible legal status remained uncertain and without full legal 
effect. It was only ten years later, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that 
the Charter assumed its current status as the Union’s own Bill of Rights.  
Although strongly criticised at its outset,71 the Charter, which was written in a 
very short time frame (only nine months), subsequently garnered considerable praise, 
particularly due to the innovative “Convention’s method”72 and the inherent allowances 
for broad participation by the civil society.73  
Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter became 
officially binding: EU bodies, institutions and member states of the Union must now act 
and legislate consistently with the Charter and EU’s court will invalidate EU legislations 
that contravene it. 
 The Commission further committed itself to elaborating annual reports aiming to 
increase public awareness regarding the application of the Charter and to measure the 
progress of its implementation.  
Additionally, a Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) was set up in 2007, through a 
process of revising the mandate of an existing monitoring centre. 
The Charter applies equally to member states, however only in situations when 
they are implementing Union law and does not extend the competences of the EU beyond 
the competences given to it into the treaties.74 
The Charter further places obligations and responsibilities on the EU’s institutions 
and provides citizens with effective means of enforcing their rights either in national 
                                                 
71 Cfr.  The Economist (2000), The EU and human rights – necessary? and   Weiler, J.H.H., (2000). Does 
the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights? European Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 95-97.  
72 Particularly if compared with the traditional method of the intergovernmental conference (ICG).  
73 Cfr. Deloche-Gaudez, F., (2001). The convention on a charter of fundamental rights: a method for the 
future? Research and policy paper, 15, Notre Europe, Paris, France. 
74 See: Article 51/2 of the Charter concerning the Charter’s field of application: “The Charter does not 
extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or 
task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties”. 
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courts or in the ECJ.  
While including in a single document all categories of rights, the Charter’s 
advocates have noted that the standard of human rights protection it provides may be even 
higher than that of the ECHR, usefully complementing it. The ECHR is mostly confined 
to civil and political rights whereas the Charter evidently contains a much wider breadth 
of rights. 
The Charter also reveals an innovative character that goes beyond the meaning of 
traditional rights, including some “new rights” or so-called “third generation rights”. 
These rights refer to modern trends in language and to issues of global concern such as 
the environment, bioethics, data protection and good governance.75 The inclusion of such 
rights in the Charter was the end-result of an intense debate on the adaptation of 
fundamental rights to the challenges of a constantly changing society.  
As underlined in the Preamble of the Charter itself: “it is necessary to strengthen 
the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and 
scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visible in a 
Charter” (Fourth recital of the Charter's preamble).  
Consequently, the Charter is considered as a far-reaching and up-to-date 
declaration of rights for EU citizens, containing rights that were not envisaged at the time 
of the ECHR in 1950, leaving the ECHR to represent rights goals on basic level and the 
ECJ free to further develop and go beyond the rights contained in the ECHR.  
In fact, as recognized in article 52(3) of the Charter, the EU may be afforded a 
higher standard of protection, since it foresees that “this provision shall not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection”. As a consequence of this norm, the EU and 
national courts may be able to develop and extend the rights contained in the ECHR via 
interpretations of the Charter. 
As concerning the Charter’s external characterization, which is also the primary 
focus of this paragraph, it is possible to assert that the Charter has an additional role in 
                                                 
75 See: Article 3, Right to the integrity of the person; Article 8, Protection of personal data; Article 37, 
Environmental protection; Article 41, Right to good administration. Cf. also Article 9, Right to marry and 
right to found a family, in which the right to marry and found a family is more in line with national 
legislations which recognize other ways of creating a family outside of the traditional marriage confines, 
while the ECHR speaks only of the right of a man and woman to marry.  
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the external dimension of EU policy, especially concerning human rights, development 
issues and the promotion of regional cooperation.  
The Charter furthermore reconfirms the EU’s historical aspirations to become a 
global power, even though, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, it is presented at first 
sight as a constitutional document for “internal use only”.  
The Charter is in fact addressing not only the member states of the Union but also 
EU institutions and bodies, meaning that the latter are equally legally bound by the 
Charter concerning their external and third-party relationships. 
The Charter’s external dimension is particularly evident when considered in the 
context of state applications for EU membership, as far as EU accession requires the 
complete adherence to the principles set out in Article 6 TEU76, which reads: 
 
Article 6 (TEU) 
 
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union 
as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing 
its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the 
Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.  
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties.  
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles 
                                                 
76 2007/C 306/01, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Article 49 EU subjects membership 
applications of European countries to the respect for the principles set out in Article 6(1) EU. 
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of the Union's law.  
States requesting to join the “European club” should therefore fully comply with 
the principles set out in this article, including the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Article 7 TEU provides for the suspension of rights of Member 
States if there is “a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred 
to in Article 2”.  
Even if the Charter do not require any additional standards to be met in order to 
claim membership rights, the human rights standards that must be attained by applicant 
states have been meanwhile increased and reinforced.  
It is evident that the Charter has the advantage of providing greater transparency 
and legal clarity both for the EU internal and external dimensions as well as for other 
external actors interacting with the EU, such as third countries, NGOs and international 
organizations. 
It is important to highlight that since the early 1990s, human rights have had an 
increasing importance in the external policies of EU.  
Even if the delimitation of the Community’s external human rights competences 
is still controversial, the emergence of human rights as a “transversal” Community 
objective is quite clear: human rights clauses have been included in all EU major 
international agreements with third countries, either through “special incentive” 
mechanisms or “conditionality requirements”.  
As recognized in the Charter itself (Article 51(2), member states’ constitutional 
traditions, the role of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECJ contributed to an already 
significant level of normative protection of human rights in the European Union, long 
before the adoption of the Charter.  
However, the contribution of the Charter can be still considered of great 
importance as it stands as the first written, codified catalogue of rights for the EU, and 
consequently contributes to the reinforcement of legal security and transparency as well 
as to an increasing legitimacy of the European Union both among its citizens and at a 
global level.  
Furthermore, the new mentioned Article 6 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates 
that clear steps have been taken for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. A 
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clear example of this commitment can be seen in the obligations placed on the EU to 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), (Article 6(2) TEU, Lisbon Treaty).   
Attempts have been made in this direction through the acquirement and use of 
symbols and instruments that are most commonly associated with the central 
characteristics of a traditional political identity.  
The attempted stipulation of an European Constitution (rejected by the French and 
the Dutch referenda in 2005) as well as the proclamation and following adoption of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, witnessed this willingness on the 
part of the EU to become a political, as well as an economic entity, thus overcoming the 
so called “functionalist approach” which advocated the idea that a common trade policy 
would have automatically instigated social and political integration.  
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights was therefore adopted into the 
framework of a specific strategy aimed at developing a European political identity 
through the recognition of a set of rights and common values.  
Such an identity would have favoured the construction of a common political 
system of ethics, making Europe stronger at the international level and attesting to the 
Community’s gradual transformation into a post-sovereign cosmopolitan entity. 
The central aim of the Charter is also explicitly mentioned in its Preamble, stating 
“the peoples of Europe, in creating an ever-closer union among them, are resolved to 
share a peaceful future based on common values” (First recital of the Charter's preamble). 
The Charter “presents itself as a fully up-to-date ‘Ius Commune Europaeum’ of human 
rights protection in Europe”77, and aims in particular, to establish a common ideology 
and a common idea of European citizenship.  
It was furthermore stressed the fact that the Union “is founded on the indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity” (Second recital of 
the Charter's preamble), which acts to reinforce the international understanding on the 
indivisibility of all human rights, democracy and the rule of law reached at the United 
Nations Vienna World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993.  
                                                 
77 Wouters, J., (2001), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Some reflections on its external dimension, 




It was however emphasized that “the Union contributes to the preservation and to 
the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and 
traditions of the peoples of Europe” (Third recital of the Charter's preamble), underlining 
the central idea of a compromise in which the elements of a “European identity” would 
mingle with both the cultural and political differences of the different member states 
composing it.  
Even the dynamics in which the Charter was drafted and the registered broad 
participation of civil society and non-state actors, evidences the contribution of different 
European “political families” and the necessary “balance of values” among them.  
In spite of this, even if at a European internal level the Charter does not extend the 
competences of the EU beyond the competences given to it in the treaties (Article 51(2), 
when considering the impact of the Charter on EU external relations, a risk may emerge 
that third countries may judge the European “Bill of Rights” as written from a 
“Eurocentric perspective”, acting as an instrument for exporting (or imposing) European 
cultural values and democracy outside the EU borders.  
Such a consideration leads us to the central question of whether the EU is or has 
ever been willing to promote a universal model of human rights standards throughout the 
world. 
The principle of universality and indivisibility of all human rights, which 
characterize the “Western vision” of the international system for the protection of human 
rights, has been consistently defended by the EU as the guiding principle for both its 
internal and external actions, in a view to promote basic rights and fundamental freedoms 
worldwide.  
As stated in the introduction to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2010: 
“2010 was the first full year in which the EU began to work under the provisions 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, which spelt out the principles underlying CFSP as follows: 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks 
to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations 
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Charter and international law.”78 
 
The EU has always declared that human rights clauses inserted in international 
agreements concluded by the EC, do not seek to establish new standards for the 
international protection of human rights and that the basic terms of reference are relate to 
the already existing international standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which is, at this point, customary law.  
Additionally, the human rights clauses do not seek to change the basic nature of 
agreements, simply constituting a “mutual reaffirmation of commonly shared values and 
principles” and a “precondition for economic and other forms of cooperation.”79 
Nonetheless, such standards should be re-analysed to conform with the new 
confines laid out by the Charter, and the indivisibility of human rights should be re-
defined in this new context.  
The Charter itself contains an argument for protecting diversity through Article 
22, which states that “the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”, 
applicable not only inside EU internal borders but also in its external dimension.  
However, a harsh criticism has already been put forward concerning the EU 
external policy on fundamental rights, with the EU having been accused of Western 
human rights imperialism, Eurocentrism, or European Messianism.80 
Such criticisms are predominantly put forward by those countries which do not 
share the same values and priorities of the EU and which do not have the same conception 
of human rights, dignity and democracy.  
Another harsh critique levelled against the EU is the accusation of adopting an 
“inconsistent and incoherent approach to fundamental rights protection.”81  
                                                 
78 European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
World in 2010. Published by the European External Action Service, p.6. 
79 Brandtner, B. and Rosas A., (1998). Human Rights and the External Relations of the European 
Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice. European Journal of International Law, 9, p.474. 
80 Sjursen, H., (2006). The EU as a ‘normative’ power: How can this be? Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13(2), p.242, and Gerrits, A (ed), Aggestam L., Manners I., Romanova T., Toje A., Wang Y., (2009). 
Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations. Clingendael European Papers no. 5. 
81 Mathisen, K. L., (2010). The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular Article 6 TEU, on Member States’ 
obligations with respect to the protection of fundamental rights. University of Luxembourg, p. 4. 
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This entails the idea that the strong focus on fundamental rights protection in EU 
external relations does not seems to correspond to an equally strong “internal” protection 
of fundamental rights, being the EU considered unable to properly protect the human 
rights of its own citizens (or persons residing in the EU territory), inside its own internal 
borders.  
In light of the EU’s aspirations to be recognized as an emerging global and 
democratic power, the EU should be willing and ready to respond to such criticisms. 
In conclusion, the Charter was identified as an effective vehicle to improve the 
political legitimacy and credibility of the Union as a global player in the field of human 
rights, effectively reconfirming human rights and the rule of law as two of the main 
cornerstones of the European Union.  
This is particularly significant if considered in the context of the contemporary 
debate on emerging global powers and in a time in which the democratic deficit of EU 
institutions is presented as a permanent defect.  
The reflections made aim to outline the importance of the value of the Charter 
within the global international scene as well as to reconfirm the EU’s aspirations to 
become a cosmopolitan, supra-national power in world politics and global order.  
The fundamental bases for such a power are (or should be) the values of “human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (Article 2 TEU), which have been 
at the heart of the European project since its nascence.  
Criticisms of the Charter’s impact and importance must equally be addressed and 
internalized, such as those which blame the EU for its weak or cautious standing in the 
international scene or those which accuse the EU in turn of “Western human rights 
imperialism”, “Neo-colonialism”, “Euro-centrism” or “European Messianism”.  
As has emerged from this paragraph, the EU continues to be criticized as a weak 
and internally divided entity, particularly concerning its role as a global actor in human 
rights, while many authors remain skeptical of the effectiveness of the EU’s burgeoning 
role as a “human rights organization”.  
Furthermore, the EU’s activity in this area remains politically constrained, 
existing predominantly in the realm of inter-governmental decision-making processes. 
 
54  
However, beyond the classical conception of nation-state and “global power”, the 
European Union may still be considered as having a unique role within the international 
arena, one that differs and surmounts “old-style” and traditional forms of power.  
Significant developments have also been reached in the field of human rights, 
especially if we consider that the total abolishment of the death penalty is now a reality 
in all the EU countries and that the EU has been granted special rights for participation in 
the work of the UN, while also giving its full support (technical but also financial) to the 
ICC and the UN treaty bodies.  
The EU manifests its power in a “non-traditional manner”, through its “legalistic 
approach”, its fundamental characteristics of normative and civilian power, and the use 
of soft-power instruments and legislations. The EU can therefore be effectively 
considered as a “world power”, even though its power mainly affects specific regions and 
policy fields.  
Furthermore, the complex structure of the EU, its post-national governance model, 
and multi-layered structure, should not be seen as an obstacle, but rather as an advantage, 
especially when addressing the interconnected contemporary challenges of today´s 
globalized world.  
The new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union may have a role 
in meeting those challenges, by pursuing, in parallel with a better protection of human 
rights at an EU level, a better promotion of regional cooperation, peace and good 
governance at a global level.  
An in-depth reflection on this topic and suggestions, in the academic field as well 
as in the institutional one, may certainly aid in addressing all major criticisms while 









 PART III  
 
Chapter 2 Cosmopolitan Theory and Human Rights Discourse 
 
 
III. Cosmopolitanism, Human Rights and Global Justice.  
 
The main purpose of this paragraph is to compare the cosmopolitan and human 
rights approach, in order to discover in which way they complement each other, 
evaluating the contribution of the cosmopolitan theory to the establishment and shaping 
of the existing international human rights regime. 
Cosmopolitanism, classically considered as a set of philosophical theories whose 
ideal is a world where all human beings are considered as members of the same 
community, has in fact several affinities with human rights considered as rights and 
freedoms to which all humans are entitled (see: UDHR Article 1).  
Human rights and cosmopolitanism are also often valued and criticized with 
similar arguments.  
Cosmopolitanism derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês (“citizen of the 
world”), from kosmos (world) and polites (citizen) and is a moral-political theory which 
can be traced back to Diogenes of Sinope, a philosopher who lived between the V-IV 
century BC. He was the founding father of the Cynic movement in Ancient Greece. To 
those who asked him what his country was, Diogenes replied that he was a "citizen of the 
world".  
It is however with the Stoic philosophy that a first conceptual articulation of this 
ideal took place, based on the idea of a common belonging of human beings to a universal 
law that governs the world.  
This idea is then taken up and developed in Rome by Cicero, in particular in his 
work  De Officis, where for the first time cosmopolitanism begins to transform itself from 
a political ideal to a political project.  
However, modernity and Enlightenment had to be awaited in order to re-launch 
the idea on philosophical ground, having had its major elaboration in the Kantian 
philosophy of the Enlightenment. 
 
56  
In major works such as Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose 
(1784) and Towards a Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant outlines for the first time a concrete 
project of a cosmopolitan political order, aimed at ensuring peace and rights to all citizens 
of the world.  
Cosmopolitanism is therefore a tradition of moral philosophical thought that sinks 
its origins in the beginnings of Western philosophy and considers all human ethnic groups 
as belonging to a single community based on a shared morality, regardless of ethnic, 
social or political affiliation.82  
The analysis of Immanuel Kant was essential for the speculation of many 
contemporary philosophers and scholars.83  
Many authors supported the Kantian idea of a federation of nations based upon 
principles of international right and suggest a “cosmopolitan community” as the “locus 
of a global democratic order and the necessary framework for the maintenance of human 
rights.”84  
On the other side a strong cosmopolitanism is in most cases considered as 
requiring the creation of an unrealizable world government, or as a consequence of “an 
imperialist project in which existing cultural differences are either nullified or 
privatized.”85  
Along the same lines, many authors still defend the ideal universal value of human 
rights principles, while others criticize their applicability, especially in terms of 
‘justiciability’, when it comes to some basic social and economic rights and to peoples 
often described as belonging to the “Developing World”.  
                                                 
82 Cfr. Kleingeld, P., Brown, E., (2013), "Cosmopolitanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
83 Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, Charles Beitz, David Held, Jack Donnelly, Ulrich Beck, Daniele 
Archibugi, Thomas Pogge, Martha Nussbaum, to name some of them. 
84 Cfr. Anderson-Gold, S. (2001), Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 
See also: Held, D., (2010), Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, Cambridge: Polity and Santos, B., 
(2007), Human Rights as an Emancipatory Script? Cultural and Political Conditions, in Santos, Boaventura 
de Sousa (org.), Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies. London: Verso. 
85 Miller, D., (2010) “Cosmopolitanism: a critique”, in Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 5:3, p.80. 
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On the other side the idea of human rights is often considered as a Western 
political construct, hiding a new form of imperial political power and culturally 
insensitive force behind an ethical mask.86  
Strengths and weaknesses of the cosmopolitan theory should be therefore 
analyzed, considering the contemporary tension between its global orientation, the needs 
of local communities and its prospect in a time of economic constraints.  
Cosmopolitan ideals will be considered as an essential tools for a 
reconceptualization of the human rights discourse and cosmopolitan ethics, necessary in 
a world where the challenges brought by multiculturalism and globalization have 
generated many obstacles (but also many positive inputs) to the application and protection 
of human rights as a universal concept worldwide. 
Taking into consideration the contemporary background of war and crises of 
human rights, it will be underlined the contradiction in terms of a supposedly 
cosmopolitan humanitarianism which, even when advocating for inclusion into a sphere 
of global justice, nevertheless continues to carry on exclusion from it, as far as many 
categories of persons still find themselves outside this framework of dignity and 
protection.  
Human rights, considered in their profound universal value, are often claimed to 
be a product of cosmopolitan ethics.  
Both concepts have gone through the same tensions and disruptions, having been 
in turn defended or criticized with similar arguments along the time.  
While retracing the history of the concept we come through the Kantian’s idea of 
a universal organization of nations where morality would eventually win over self-
interest.  
Kant’s reflection remains a major point of reference for all universalistic claims 
associated with cosmopolitanism and it is considered as fundamental for the speculation 
of all the subsequent discourse on cosmopolitanism and human rights.  
Citing Kant’s own words:  
                                                 
86 Gearty, C., (2008) Essays on human rights and terrorism: comparative approaches to civil liberties in 




“The people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal 
community, and this has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of 
the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic 
or exaggerated; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and 
international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this 
condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual 
peace” (Immanuel Kant, Towards a Perpetual Peace (1795).87 
 
This paragraph will analyze various conceptions and definitions of 
cosmopolitanism throughout the history of thought, underlying the fact that there is still 
no consensus about a clear definition of it.  
Following Poulsen’s definition we may define cosmopolitanism as a “discourse 
located in the West, problematising the local and the general, and squeezed in between 
(inter)nationalism and universalism.”88 
Besides all distinctions and contradictions in terms, it seems however already 
possible to recognize the contemporary cosmopolitan moral and political character as a 
fundamentally western liberal construct, even when this includes a positive recognition 
and auto-criticism of both neo-liberal globalization process and liberal nationalism, 
recognizing that  
“with present shifts away from Northwestern hegemony, with an emerging new 
world order in which liberalism is not a given, but a political project (for many, faltering), 
cosmopolitan theoretical engagements need to change gear and become more empirically 
driven in order to be persuasive.”89 
 
The question is  
“no longer one of working out cosmopolitan theory as such (in the context of 
globalization, extreme poverty, mass immigration, etc.), but of re-tuning this theory so 
that it can help shape empirical challenges in a globalized, but plural world.  Simply put, 
it is no longer today a question of doing normative cosmopolitan theory as such, but of 
normatively shaping empirical challenges besetting the world as a whole (in the context 
of a pluralization of power).”90 
 
                                                 
87 Cfr. Kant, I., 1991(c), “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, translated by Hugh Barr Nisbet, pp 
93-130 in Hans Reiss (ed), Kant, Political Writings, 2nd Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
88 Poulsen F.E., (2008), Element of an Archaeology of Cosmopolitanism in Western Political Thought. A 
Return to the French Enlightenment (1713-1795), Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science, 
University of Copenhagen, p.3. 




The cosmopolitan character of human rights principles cannot be yet denied as 
well as the need for a stronger application of the cosmopolitan theory to the human rights 
regime.  
The main aim is certainly the one of exploring the challenges brought to the 
cosmopolitan theory in a world where multiculturalism, globalization and multipolarity 
have generated complex patterns of cultural and political identity.91 
Cosmopolitanism and issues related to global justice have for the past decade 
unquestionably raised the level of attention in Western political thought, having the 
globalization process led to new actors and issues which transcend traditional state-
centered politics and require global means in order to solve global challenges and 
conflicts.92  
Much doubt and uncertainty persist on how to best categorize those new issues 
and actors according to traditional dichotomies: how to take into account ‘other’ political 
actors which are neither NGOs nor states and cannot be easily classified in any traditional 
manner?  
Cosmopolitanism has, as a matter of fact, always been considered as opposed and 
incompatible with the concept of nationalism and national sovereignty.  
However we can affirm that the classical Westphalian sovereignty model, based 
on nation states central authority and intergovernmentalism, still represents the dominant 
governance model of international law and relations, notwithstanding the recent rise and 
development of international global institutions and non-governmental actors, proposing 
an alternative and new model of “global governance”.  
Undoubtedly large part of the global legal order continues to keep on Westphalian 
intergovernmentalism, while the post-Westphalian supranationalism represents only an 
exception.  
Nation states are still holding an excessive executive power in the international 
arena nowadays.  
A contemporary definition of cosmopolitanism was already inaugurated dating 
back to 1970, when Hannah Arendt was referring to “the bankruptcy of the nation state 
                                                 
91 Cfr. Beck, 2000; Garrett and Held, 2010; Onuma, 2010; An-Na’im, 2012, Kymlicka, 2007. 
92 Like for example terrorism and environmental security but also economic inequalities, global wars, mass 
migration and refugees. 
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and its concept of sovereignty”93, declaring that a modern cosmopolitanism would be 
better suited for a contemporary world in which the sovereign state appeared as having 
lost his role as a guardian of citizen’s rights, failing in its task of protecting its own 
citizens.  
Human rights, on the other side, acquires a particular significance in a global era 
where the world is becoming smaller and even more interdependent, levelling distance 
and differences among individuals and peoples.   
Human rights became “cosmopolitan entities” because nothing better than them 
can represent global shared moral values, being human rights held by every human being 
everywhere, without distinctions of any kind; being cosmopolitanism a doctrine which 
consider human beings as bearing the same rights as equal citizens of a unique world. 
Danilo Zolo stresses for example the fact that: 
 “the human rights doctrine presents a cosmopolitan inclination since […] it 
assigns the nature of subjects to the international orders not just to states (or to collective 
subjects), but also to individuals”.94  
 
Anderson-Gold affirmed that: 
“human rights are by nature a universal or international concern and therefore 
are outside or beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of individual states” having human rights 
naturally an “international jurisdiction.”95  
 
All of this highlights the need for a stronger cosmopolitan legislation that would 
strengthen and reinforce human rights protection worldwide.  
But are state sovereignty and cosmopolitan principles reconcilable to some extent? 
Can states have a more “cosmopolitan thinking”? Being more inclined to apply and 
respect an international human rights regime, being less jealous as concerning their 
sovereignty, banning any restriction to human rights linked with membership? 
And, on the other side, is the increasing emergence of supra-state regions as the 
European Union, the African Union and others an indication of constitutionalization of 
the international order based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law; or are 
                                                 
93 Arendt, H., (1970). On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, p.6. 
94 Zolo, D., (1995), Cosmopolis: la prospettiva del governo mondiale, Milano, Feltrinelli, p.139. 
95 Anderson-Gold, S. (2001), Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.42 
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those supra-national institutions guided by an authoritarian if not imperialistic rule? Some 
scholars have indeed seen this as a matter of concern. 96 
From a moral point of view, philosophies and religions have been declaring the 
universality of human dignity for thousands of years. 
However, even if the formulations of human rights can be dated back to 539 BC 
when Cyrus the Great conquered Babylon,97 a positive formulation of human rights and 
dignity was concretized only with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
(UDHR, 1948).  
Documents asserting individual rights, such as the Magna Carta (1215), the 
Petition of Right (1628), the US Constitution (1787), the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and the US Bill of Rights (1791) are the written 
precursors to many of today's human rights documents, but it was only with the UDHR 
in 1948 that the inviolability of every human being was definitely stated. 
That means that in order to achieve a positive formulation of human rights through 
an internationally recognized declaration, there was the need of one of the worst human 
wrong ever, namely the enormous loss of life and atrocities committed during the Second 
World War.  
After the world’s catastrophe, the universality and indivisibility of all human 
rights was declared to provide a common understanding of what everyone’s rights are and 
establish the basis for a world built on justice freedom and peace.  
This is the historical background that led human rights to be as cosmopolitan as 
they are nowadays. 
In a more extreme vision, cosmopolitan thinkers have also declared an aspiration 
to practically realize a “world state” in which nation-states would be definitely abolished. 
The centrality of the states in international relations has been indeed seen as an 
hindrance to the realisation of mechanisms that would enhance human rights and has been 
therefore proposed a “de facto” transition from an international law, based on 
intergorvernamentalism and the centrally of states, to a cosmopolitan law and 
                                                 
96Kreuder-Sonnen, C., Zangl B.,(2015), “Which Post-Westphalia? International Organizations between 
Constitutionalism and Authoritarianism”, in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21(3) 568–
594. 
97 The Cyrus Cylinder has been recognized as the world’s first Charter of human rights. 
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“cosmopolitan democracy”, in which international non-governamental institutions, like 
the UN for example, could enhance their effective power and responsibilities.  
On the basis of what has been said so far, it is clear that in contemporary political 
philosophy we are witnessing the clash of two great trends: the "realist" and the “utopian” 
ones.  
Political realism, from Thucydides to Hobbes, from Schmitt to today's theorists, 
pursues a complete and comprehensive adhesion to the factual reality.  
It does not intend to outline possible futures scenarios, let alone indefinite utopias, 
but intends to analyse the actual political situations in order to identify viable solutions in 
a current scenario.  
On the other hand, the Kantian model of cosmopolitan philosophy outlines the 
traits of a future global democracy, believing that the task of political philosophy is not 
to identify the characteristics, possibilities and limits of an already existing situation, but 
to look for conditions and possibilities that are not yet real. In this way it strives to free 
the thought from the constrictions and limitations of the present.  
Political realism makes significant objections to transcendental utopias, stating 
that, for example, the extension of the criteria of justice from polis to kosmopolis, (ie. 
from the State level to the international sphere), could generate imbalances and conflicts.  
Doubts are put forward about the idea that solutions which are found for internal 
peace could possibly apply also to wider scenarios.  
However, while addressing plausible critiques of the Kantian model, realism fails 
to diminish its ideal charge, nor to reduce its persistent validity.  
In fact, even if realism severely limits the possibilities of manoeuvre in a given 
historical context, it does not diminish the meaning of a research of possible and better 
alternatives.  
Moreover, those who continue to be inspired by the Kantian model, still continue 
to ask:  why a world founded on peace and justice should be ideally impossible?  
Hence the various projects of a “reasonable”, or “realistic utopia”, in the Rawlsian 
style, which is a type of philosophy that, while not renouncing to the exploration of the 
possible, tries to avoid both the dream of a perfect society and the indifference to the 
actual context.  
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Such projects entail the commitment to take reality "as it is", investigating at the 
same time the objective possibilities it can offer.  
In this regard Salvatore Veca, an Italian scholar who has given much thought to 
these issues, says:  
"Accepting constraints means accepting that not everything is possible, but 
accepting that not everything is possible is not the same as saying that nothing is possible 
and that the space of the politically possible is an empty space "98    
 
In one of the most significant passages of The Law of Peoples, Rawls observes:  
“If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their power to 
reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not incurably 
cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human 
beings to live on the earth.”99 
 
In any case, avoiding war, safeguarding human rights at the same time, is only 
possible if there is a right that is global or at least trans-national.  
In Toward a Perpetual Peace, Kant proposed the realization of a "World State" as 
a remedy against the widespread conflicts between States. 
Assuming that a cosmopolitan project under the supervision of a single sovereign 
State would be dangerous for freedom, since it could originate the most horrible 
despotism (as it happened in the great supranational empires of Antiquity), Kant 
supported a federative perspective. 
 This model left open the possibility of opting for a joint federation of sovereign 
States or for a “post-national constellation”, that is for a political body founded on the 
overcoming of the pre-existing structure of national sovereign States.  
The first solution was adopted by John Rawls (the North-American perspective), 
the second one by Jurgen Habermas (the European perspective).  
The analogy between Rawlsian and Kantian positions, evident also in the 
preference given to a federation of States rather than to a World State (considered 
potentially despotic or intrinsically weak), must not eliminate the differences among 
                                                 
98 Veca, S., (2002), La bellezza e gli oppressi. Dieci lezioni sull’idea di giustizia, Feltrinelli, p.8. 
99 Rawls, J., (1999), The law of Peoples, with The idea of public reason revisited 





Contrary to the German philosopher, which in the society of peoples only 
welcomed the liberal ones, Rawls, in homage to the contemporary ideas of pluralism and 
tolerance, also includes the so-called "decent" peoples, indicating with this expression the 
peoples who, despite being “well-ordered people”, providing spaces for popular 
participation in political choices, are not liberal nor governed by Western-style 
democratic-constitutional institutions.  
He excludes instead all those peoples (starting with the "outlaw" states) who, for 
different reasons, fail to respect the principles of the Law of Peoples.  
In this way Rawls gives shape to the project of a confederation of liberal-
democratic States and of States that declare themselves committed to observe eight 
fundamental principles of international justice:  
1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence must be 
respected by other peoples; 
2) Peoples are bound to ensure compliance with its international obligations and  
treaties;  
3) Peoples are equal and must take part in the agreements that bind them;  
4) Peoples are bound to ensure compliance with the duty of non-intervention;  
5) Peoples have the right to self-defence, but have no right to start a war for 
reasons other than self-defence; 
6) Peoples are bound to respect human rights;  
7) Peoples are bound to ensure compliance with certain specific restrictions when 
conducting a war; 
8) Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples who are in unfavourable 
conditions, preventing them from having a just or “decent” social and political regime. 
These principles are susceptible to universal consensus, as every people can accept 
them on the basis of their different moral, religious or philosophical conceptions. 
Furthermore they are valid only as general guidelines, being not unconditional, 
while they should be interpreted: for example, the principle of non-intervention may be 




In any case, those principles constitute, according to Rawls, "the basic charter of 
the right of peoples".  
The project of a global society of free and "decent" peoples therefore stems from 
what Rawls calls a realistic utopia: 
 “The idea of realistic Utopia reconciles us to our social world by showing us that a 
reasonably just constitutional democracy existing as a member of a reasonably just 
Society of Peoples is possible. It establishes that such a world can exist somewhere and 
at some time, but not that it must be, or will be.”100 
 
In fact, remarks Rawls, as long as we have good reason to believe in the possibility 
of a just political and social order, we can reasonably (and kantianly) hope that someone 
(maybe us), one day, somewhere, will realize it.  
Jurgen Habermas, on the other hand, in his work  The post-national 
constellation101, reads the Kantian script Toward a Perpetual Peace in light of those 
important events, which transformed the world in the Twentieth century. 
 In the first place, he strives to define the concept of "cosmopolitanism".  
Is there any analogy between an internal or local conflict solution and an external 
or global solution?  
Is the transnational expansion of the social contract supported by Rawls possible?  
Though the Kantian arguments are not entirely anachronistic in this regard, their 
limitation, according to Habermas, consists in the insuperability of the notion of 
"Sovereign State",  now outdated due to the recent historical events.  
In other words, in the Kantian’s vision, the subject of politics could only be the State, but 
in the age of globalization the economy and the same politics are managed rather by trans-
national organisms.  
In the new historical context, it is a matter of reviewing the points characterizing 
the Kantian project, recovering the control and action capacity lost by the national States 
                                                 
100Rawls, J., (1999), The law of Peoples, with The idea of public reason revisited 
Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, p.127. 




and transferring it to increasingly large trans-national bodies capable of enunciating 
global rules and of progressively establishing a world politics dimension.  
Concretely, Habermas thinks of a trans-national democratic form of government, 
of which he sees a sort of partial prefiguration in the European Union. 
Such a political community must be able to develop its unitary collective identity 
that goes beyond national borders, so that citizens are integrated into an ever-wider 
context without however having to renounce to their usual forms of life, their traditional 
values and their consolidated relationship with the institutions.  
The "State of the World", the greatest extension of this perspective, is conceived 
by the philosopher as a real possibility, but without any certainty.  
In other words, the idea of a just world is realistic, even if there is no guarantee 
that it may one day actually subsist. 
The "post-national constellation" of Habermas is the best-known example of a 
series of proposals that, starting from the Kantian premise that some form of association 
among the peoples of the world is essential to safeguard human rights and to successfully 
resist their violation; arrive at the idea of a planetary democratic order.  
Such an order is conceived as the most advanced and rationally desirable response 
to the erosion of the sovereignty of States and to the weakening of democratic practice, 
which characterizes the era of globalization, in which Freedom seems to proclaim itself 
at the expenses of Equality and economic power at the expenses of Justice.  
In this horizon of thought, always in the framework of an European perspective 
aimed at safeguarding the primacy of politics on the economy, the proposal of a 
"cosmopolitan democracy" has taken on particular importance.  
First elaborated by the British political scientist and sociologist David Held, and 
his Italian fellow, Daniele Archibugi, has therefore been considered as the most up-to-
date postmodern and post-state version of democracy. 102 
Held and Archibugi aim to create a global order that finds its political apex in a 
World Parliament directly elected by the citizens of all nations (as already happens in the 
                                                 





European Parliament).  
Together with this Parliament, which should support the Assembly of the United 
Nations, in which the States are represented, they propose to establish also a 
Supranational Court with coercive power.  
At the same time, the UN Security Council is transformed into an executive body 
with a civilian and military peace force available.  
In this way, interpreting national sovereignty as an obstacle to trans-national 
cooperation and doubting whether democracy within states can be traslated into effective 
democracy among states; cosmopolitan democracy theorists intend to create a new world 
citizenship capable of going already beyond states and their conflicts.  
Welcomed by some, this project has aroused criticism and scepticism from others. 
If it is already so problematic to exercise effective control over politicians and "local" 
parliaments, it has been observed, how can one realistically imagine that this control 

















III.1. Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations. 
 
The analysis of how constitutional rights reasoning on fundamental rights is 
structured in the legal process of constitutional States is deeply linked with the very 
concept of democracy and of a democratic State. 
A substantive, structural theory of fundamental rights is in fact essential in every 
contemporary democratic society, being crucial for the basic legal structure of any 
modern society. 103 
Beyond any doubt, the dramatic facts with which we are actually confronted104 
prove that “the very survival of open democratic societies depends on taking fundamental 
rights seriously.”105  
Especially nowadays, when always more countries accede to international human 
rights treaties and agreements and adopt human rights legislations; a structural and 
applied conception of fundamental rights is essential. 
The European Union itself, for instance, has recently introduced its own Bill of 
Rights:  the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter “The 
Charter”), which shows how European Constitutional Law is the result of a progressive 
integration process, based on the progressive harmonization of core constitutional 
principles common to all Member States of the Union. 
As underlined in the Preamble of the Charter itself:  
“This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the 
Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in 
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human 
Rights”.  
                                                 
103 Cfr. Jürgen Habermas’s theory of democracy as developed in Habermas, J., (1996), Between Facts and 
Norms, The MIT Press, which illustrates the systems of rights within democratic constitutional States in 
the framework of modern complex societies. 
104 Striking government’s violation of international human rights legal standards have been widely reported 
by activists and independent NGOs worldwide, and also legally challenged, as for example in the case of 
U.S “war on Terror”, the reported cases of torture in Abu Ghraib, detention and extraordinary rendition in 
Guantanamo, which gave place also to a debate in favor of the juridification of torture and the defense of 
such governments actions as a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty in name of public security’s 
protection. These are only some of the most burning contemporary issues on human rights nowadays. 
105 Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.6. 
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It must be furthermore recognized that, in particular, the German constitutional 
law, which is the Alexy’s primary reference, is one of the national constitutions that has 
exerted the most pervasive influence upon the European constitutional asset and 
especially upon The Charter itself. 
The Charter stands in fact as the catalogue of fundamental rights of the EU, and 
allows bearing on EU’s institutions, providing citizens with effective means of enforcing 
their rights either in national courts or in the ECJ. 
However, the coexistence of different European and international agreements and 
this plurality of sources of law (legal pluralism), determines in some cases the struggling 
of judges when it comes to the concrete and consistent implementation of rights, and 
sometimes the legal reasoning behind those judicial deliberations seems lost.  
Judges as well as legislators are also often confronted with the challenge of 
conflicting rights106, which in some cases can represent real constitutional and, I would 
say, ethical dilemmas.107 
The main problem is therefore how to address these conflicts of rights: if through 
‘balancing’ and proportionality or otherwise, and also to establish whether balancing is a 
truly rational methodology or if it must be seen as a pure technical method of solving 
conflicts. 
In his book A Theory, Robert Alexy makes a great effort in trying to characterize 
Constitutional courts decisions as a rational process, offering a well-developed structure 
of the concept of balancing, his central thesis being that constitutional rights are principles 
and not rules, “optimization requirements” necessarily open to balancing. 
However, many scholars and philosophers reject such an approach contesting 
quantitative-like criteria such as those associated with ‘proportionality’, emphasizing 
other approaches to fundamental rights, which accentuate the moral foundation of 
rights.108 
                                                 
106 Situations in which two or more distinct human rights enter into conflict, in such a way that no rational 
solution seems to be possible. 
107 Cfr. Zucca, L.,  (2008), "Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas", in: Brems, Eva, 
Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, ed., Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, Intersentia, and Zucca, L.,  (2007), 
Constitutional Dilemmas—Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the US, Oxford: OUP, 
calling for a reform towards a more coherent, well-ordered architecture of European fundamental rights. 
108 Cfr. Möller, K., (2007), “Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights”, in: International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, Vol. 5, Issue 3, pp. 453-468, and Zucca, L., (2007), Constitutional Dilemmas— 
Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the US, Oxford: OUP. 
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In any case, Alexy’s A Theory  has managed to build up a substantial general 
theory of fundamental rights, the importance of which goes well beyond the interpretation 
of the theory of fundamental rights of the German Basic Law, providing a theory of 
general application which is relevant to most, if not all, European as well as non-
continental legal orders.109   
The  main aim is to delineate which are the limits of Alexy’s approach, testing the 
reasonableness of the proportionality principle in legal decisions and the increasing use 
of balancing as an essential argumentation technique for solving legal disputes in Courts. 
The main intention is to establish, through an analysis of the judicial practice of 
balancing fundamental rights, if the proportionality principle, sustained as a “rational 
practice” by Alexy in A Theory, can be classified as a moral and rational principle or if it 
must be considered just as a “purely pragmatic method”, useful to justify judicial 
discretion in legal argumentation. 
The key jurisprudential and philosophical issues at stake therefore concern: the 
definition and the concept of constitutional, human and fundamental rights; the definition 
of the structure and content of constitutional rights and the establishment of the limits and 
scope of fundamental rights. 
In order to determine whether the proportionality test and the judicial practice of 
balancing actually correspond to a necessary and rational process, it is important to 
ascertain whether such a right exists which has a purely “deontological value” and cannot 
be limited in any case, even when in conflict with other fundamental rights. 
Beyond purely philosophical and theoretical issues, there are also many ethical 
and key political questions at stake, which will be tackled in this study: the first political 
issue involved is the one of how to address problems in case of conflicts of rights, if not 
                                                 
109 Also UK, Canada or New Zealand. Julian Rivers, for instance, editor and translator of A Theory and 
Lecturer at the University of Bristol, gives an interesting demonstration of how Alexy’s A Theory can be 
fruitfully applied to legal systems other than the continental ones, in its interesting contribution 
“Fundamental Rights in the UK Human Rights Act”, in Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), 
(2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p. 141-154, and in its preface to Robert Alexy’s A Theory 
of Constitutional Rights: “A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution”. In those articles 
Rivers applies the Alexy’s theory of rights to the British fundamental rights practice, testing in particular, 
the impact of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 on the British legal system. However Alexy’s theory of rights 
could also be applied to European Union’s constitutional law in an interesting way (please refer to A.J. 
Menendez’s article “Some Elements of a theory of European Fundamental Rights”, in 




through proportionality and balancing. Which alternatives can be found to the balancing 
approach?   
A second political issue is: if balancing/proportionality is actually not a rational 
procedure, but just a pragmatic method, is it therefore correct to trust Judges to review or 
would it be better to find alternative methods of dispute resolution and rights 
adjudication? Should we trust democratically elected parliaments instead of Judges? 
Third, if the discretionality and impartiality of Judges is in doubt (the so called 
“danger of irrational ruling”110), a subsequent risk could be the one of a “jurist-made law”, 
the supreme court becoming the final arbiter of constitutional law, including the potential 
use of political ideologies and personal believes and even personal prejudices to justify 
sentences, fundamental rights losing their strict “deontological character” and normative 
power.  
Do Discourse Theory and the proceduralist legal method provide a better solution 
then Constitutionalism, as it seems to be suggested by Eriksen in his article?111 
An additional related implication would be the one which could lead to a 
relativistic and utilitaristic conception of justice and law, having fundamental rights 
balanced for example against collective goods, public interests, policies.  
This represents also a controversial issue, still open for discussion and at the centre 
of many theoretical debates. Is it in fact correct to balance subjective individual rights 
against public interests and collective goods? 
Although the most common fundamental right is a subjective, individual and 
negative right, fundamental rights embrace for Alexy not only subjective fundamental 
rights, but also collective goods.  
There is therefore the possibility of a conflict between an individual fundamental 
right and a public policy for example, aiming at safeguarding some collective interest.112 
                                                 
110 The danger of “irrational ruling” is one of Habermas’s main objections to Alexy’s theory of 
constitutional rights. For Habermas in fact “the weighing takes places either arbitrarily or unreflectively, 
according to customary standards and hierarchies”. See: Habermas, J., (2009), Between Facts and Norms, 
Cambrige: The MIT Press, pp.256-259. 
111 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, “Democratic or Jurist-made law?”, in Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.69-94. 
112 As for example in a case of conflict between right to privacy and public security, or freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion, just to mention some examples. 
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This is a case in which we are confronted with a conflict of rights that requires 
balancing and weighing in order to find a solution: it is not just sufficient anymore to 
affirm that the individual, subjective right should prevail on the collective interest, as 
would be the case in a traditionally liberal or libertarian conception of fundamental rights. 
113 
It is consequently essential to recognise as fundamental rights not only subjective 
rights but also collective goods and, at the same time, to make a further important 
distinction not only between principles and rules but also between principles and 
policies.114 
It is furthermore essential to deal not only with a problem of constitutional rights 
adjudication but also with a problem of democratic representation and participation, to 
better highlight which is the substructure of balancing: the importance of legal culture 
and common values, the positions about the Constitution, the role of States and the very 
concept of Justice in a society. 
Alexy might be read as holding Justice to be “a more important value then 
Democracy”, the direct application of law “reducing transactions costs and information 
problems” as “it establishes the right thing to do in practical contexts”.115  
This gives rise, in the words of Eriksen, to a risk of “assimilating law and morality 
and of overburdening the legal medium itself”.116  
An important point is whether it is possible or not to determinate which are the 
limits of fundamental rights and whether certain fundamental rights should or should not 
be limited, even when in conflict with other rights.  
The risk here is an utilitaristic one, the one of balancing fundamental rights against 
collective goods, public interests, policies, losing fundamental rights their “absolute” 
rights whatever, their “deontological character”.117  
                                                 
113 The liberal conception of fundamental rights entails that only civic and political rights can access the 
status of fundamental rights. 
114Alexy establishes in A Theory a clear distinction between rules and principles but fails to establish a 
further distinction between principles and policies. 
115 Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.5. 
116 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, “Democratic or Jurist-made law?”, in Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.69-94. 
117 In this respect particularly relevant are the two main objections of J.Habermas to Alexy’s approach 
(especially the “firewall” and “irrationality” allegations). Cfr: Habermas, J., (1996), Between Facts and 
Norms, Cambrige: The MIT Press, pp.256-259. 
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Beyond the distinction between principles and rules, a further important 
distinction must be made between principles and policies.118 
But is it possible to determine what fundamental rights are, if they are or should 
be consequently limited and in which way? 
In order to be able to define those limits and scope of rights it is essential first of 
all to clarify what fundamental rights are and in what way they should be distinguished 
from “constitutional” and “human rights” in its narrow sense, a differentiation that is very 
well analysed in Alexy’s work. 
The discourse on the theoretical foundations and definition of “constitutional”, 
“human” and “fundamental” rights is still open, highly contested and actually at the centre 
of many theoretical debates.  
It represents also a central theme in Alexy’s work and especially in A Theory, and 
a precondition for any further analysis concerning the meaning and functioning of 
constitutional rights and the role of proportionality principle in court-based adjudications. 
It is certainly true that there is still “very little agreement about what rights are, 
about why we use rights in our moral or legal theories, or about what to do when there is 
a conflict between rights”.119  
There is consequently a need for clarifying both the institutional, political and 
legal meaning of “fundamental” rights.  
Such an understanding is essential in the application of law for both theoretical 
and practical reasons: a correct use of these definitions can be useful in order to “clear 
some theoretical misunderstandings, improve our critical analysis and help in explanation 
of real processes”.120  
A definition of the structure and concept of constitutional rights is in fact closely 
related to an attempted establishment of the limits and scope of fundamental rights. 
                                                 
118 Kaarlo Tuori, among others, in his article ”Fundamental rights principles: disciplining the 
instrumentalism of policies” makes this further distinction contrasting Alexy’s and Dworkin’s theory of 
legal principles. Cf. Tuori, Kaarlo, “Fundamental rights principles: disciplining the instrumentalism of 
policies”, in Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, 
pp. 33-50. 
119 Rainbolt, W. George,  (2006), “Rights Theory”, in: Philosophy Compass 1 ET 003, 1–11, Blackwell 
Publishing, p. 1. 
120 Palombella, G., (2007), “From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights. Consequences of a Conceptual 
Distinction”, in:  EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/34, p.5. 
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 It is essential for an understanding of the concept of “rights” itself as well as for 
a better comprehension of the functioning of rights and proportionality principle.  
In his article “Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights”, Alexy tries to shed 
some light on the issue of the origin and philosophical foundations of fundamental and 
human rights, sustaining that Discourse Theory can be useful in order to provide for a 
justification of human rights, contributing to a theory of their foundation.121 
There is in fact, according to Alexy, a close relationship between discourse theory 
and fundamental rights, which comprises three dimensions: “philosophical”, “political” 
and “juridical”.  
The philosophical dimension concerns “the foundation and the substantiation of 
fundamental rights”; the political dimension is related to the “institutionalization of 
fundamental rights”, while the last dimension, the juridical, concerns the “interpretation 
of fundamental rights”.  
Rights in fact must for Alexy “be buttressed by reasons, transformed into reality 
and made vivid by way of interpretive practice”.122 
Discourse Theory represents one of the several attempts to provide a justification 
of human rights, essentially demanding their incorporation at the highest legal level (in 
the Constitution) and referring to a “deliberative” or “discoursive” democratic 
organization, which expresses the ideal of discourse in reality. 
There have been in history many other attempts to provide a justification and a 
theoretical foundation to fundamental rights (eight of those approaches are mentioned 
below).  
However, according to Alexy, the discourse theory approach is the only one really 
centred on the concept of reasoning, and the universal validity of human rights cannot be 
explained in another way then through reasoning.  
Generally speaking we can say that theories of justifiability of human rights can 
be distinguished in two main approaches: one which “denies the possibility of any 
justification”, such is the case of emotivism, subjectivism, relativism, naturalism or 
                                                 
121Alexy, R. “Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer,, p.15-29. For an overview of Alexy’s conception of 
fundamental and human rights, please refer to the Summary of Annex II. 
122 Ibidem, p. 15. 
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deconstructivism theories; and one which claims that “some kind of justification is 
possible”, through reasons that can assert objectivity, correctness or truth.  
Discourse theory’s view, which is naturally and necessarily connected with 
reasoning, belongs to this last category and it is the only one which can provide a 
justification for rights which is based on their rationality and universal validity. Based on 
“reasoning”, Discourse theory adopts an explicative approach by “making explicit what 
is necessarily implicit in human practice”. 123 
Going back to the philosophical dimension of rights, in order to define what 
fundamental rights are (foundation and substantiation), it is essential to elucidate the 
concept of fundamental rights: in Alexy’s words, “the question of what fundamental 
rights is the question of the concept of fundamental rights”.124  
On the other side, the problem of the foundation of fundamental rights is the 
problem of the foundation of human rights.  
If fundamental rights can be substantiated, human rights can as well: in other 
words, there is no foundation of fundamental rights without a foundation of human rights. 
Alexy therefore distinguishes three different conceptions of fundamental rights: 
“formal”, “substantial” and “procedural” and eight potential foundations of fundamental 
rights: religious, intuitionist, consensual, socio-biological, instrumental, cultural, 
explicative and existential.  
The three conceptions of fundamental rights are closely related and “an adequate 
theory of fundamental rights should address not only the three concepts but also the 
relations in which they stand to each other”.125 
The formal conception of rights is employed “if fundamental rights are defined as 
rights contained in a Constitution or in a certain part of it” and if they are “endowed by 
the Constitution with special protection”:126 Human rights become part of a positive 
constitutional law.  
                                                 
123 Cfr. Alexy, R., “Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p. 21. 
124 Ibidem p.15. 
125 Ibidem. p.17. 
126 Ibidem p. 15. 
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However, the formal concept is considered as “important but not enough if we 
want to understand the nature of fundamental rights”.127 
If we want to understand the real nature of fundamental rights we have to refer to 
a substantial conception of rights, which must include “criteria that go above and beyond 
the fact that a right is mentioned, listed or guaranteed in a Constitution”.128  
The substantial concept of fundamental rights is finally corresponding with the 
concept of human rights: human rights in fact do not need to be enshrined in a formal 
Constitution to actually exist and be “substantive”. 
In other words “it is not possible to raise the question of the substantiation or 
foundation of fundamental rights without raising the question of the foundation of human 
rights”:129 The foundation of fundamental rights implies the foundation of human rights. 
It seems then that the main difference between “fundamental” and “human” rights 
consists therefore in the fact that fundamental rights represent human rights transformed 
into positive law.  
We can also add that the above-mentioned theory is based on a distinction between 
moral and legal rights, which consider fundamental rights as constitutional legal rights 
belonging to a determinate political system.  
Following this theory, while human rights are considered as moral universal rights 
grounded on the notion of person and transcending any particular context, fundamental 
rights are considered as fundamental legal norms within a particular judicial and political 
system.130 
Catalogues of rights in different Constitutions can thus be considered as different 
attempts, more or less successful, to transform human rights into positive law.  
The existence of different Constitutions and different legal rights is then the result 
of a selection of values to which a society should give priority. 
                                                 
127 Ibidem. 
128 Ibidem p. 16. 
129 Ibidem p. 17. 
130 Cfr: Raz, Joseph, ( 2001), Value, Respect and Attachment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and 
Raz, Joseph, (2003),  The Practice of Value, Oxford University Press. 
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However there could be the case of human rights that are not included in a certain 
Constitution as well as Constitutions containing rights that cannot be really classified as 
human rights.131 
This shows that “there is an intrinsic connection between the philosophical and 
the juridical problems”: if a Constitution does not contain human rights that should be 
constitutionally protected “a critique can lead to a constitutional reform or to a change in 
the Constitution through constitutional review”.132 
The third concept of fundamental rights is in fact procedural and it is related to 
the “institutional problem of transforming human rights into positive law”.133 
It is interesting to notice in this framework the affirmation made by Alexy, which 
says that “fundamental rights are an expression of distrust in the democratic process”.134 
Alexy is here referring to the fact that incorporating or changing rights in a 
Constitution is generally a power attributed to specific courts with judicial review power, 
which are able, as a matter of fact, to revoke any act of a State which they find 
incompatible with a higher authority, as is the case of a written Constitution.  
In this way the judicial power is actually limiting the democratic power of national 
elected parliaments by subjecting both Legislative and Executive powers to review (and 
potential invalidation) by the Judiciary. 
Fundamental rights represent then for Alexy both “the basis and the boundary of 
democracy” because the procedural concept “holds that fundamental rights are rights 
which are so important that the decision to protect them cannot be left to simple 
parliamentary majorities”.135 
An analysis of the consequences of such an affirmation will be tackled more 
specifically in the last paragraph of this section. 
 
 
                                                 
131 Alexy, R., “Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 







III.2 Principles and Policies: Bargaining Rights Against Collective 
Goods? 
 
The second important question, which will be tackled in this section, is the risk of 
balancing fundamental/constitutional rights against policies, collective goods, public 
interests; a risk which could lead to a relativistic and utilitaristic conception of justice and 
law. 
Is it correct to balance subjective individual rights against public interests and 
collective goods? What are the theoretical foundations of rights, their limits and how 
should we address problems in case of conflict?  
Although Alexy recognises that the most typical fundamental right is a subjective, 
negative and individual right, he sustains that fundamental rights must embrace not only 
individual, negative rights, but also positive rights and collective goods.136 
Historically, the traditional liberal or libertarian conception of rights holds the 
most common connotation of fundamental rights.137  
Following this conception, the only authentic rights are the ones that are capable 
of immediate enforcement and full justiciability. Those rights should have the value of 
rules: they should be guaranteed at any time without limitations and without any 
exception.  
This idea is usually associated with civil and political rights (CPR) which are 
considered as negative, defensive rights, rights of the “first generation”, because they 
were the first to be historically expressed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen as well as in the American Bill of Rights of 1789.  
This class of rights is bound to protect individual freedom from unwanted 
interference by the States, private organizations or other individuals, ensuring 
individual’s personal freedom and the opportunity of freely participating to the civil and 
political life of their country.138 
                                                 
136 Alexy, R, (2002) A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 62.  
137 In modern philosophy the analysis of Immanuel Kant was of primary importance and it is fundamental 
for the speculation of many contemporary prominent philosophers. (Among others: Jeremy Bentham, 
Robert Nozick, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls and Thomas Pogge). 
138 Negative civil and political rights include rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, 
freedom of thought and conscience, private propriety right, right to privacy, freedom of religion, right to a 
fair trial and due process. 
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Negative rights such as civil and political rights are also the most easily 
enforceable as they only require the State to refrain from action, to refrain from interfering 
with individual liberties. 
On the other side, the term ‘principles’ could traditionally more properly be used 
to define economic, social and cultural rights (ESR).  
These rights have been called also ‘second generation’ rights because even though 
they may have an influence on the law and decision-making process; they do not create 
any directly enforceable right: they are considered as not capable of specific legal 
determination before a court. They can just provide a basis upon which to found more 
specific rights which could then become directly enforceable. 
Socio-economic rights should be considered as protective, positive rights 
(differing from civil and political rights which are considered defensive and negative 
rights).  
They require in fact a positive action from the State, and are also depending on 
the resources of the State in question, because guaranteeing them to everyone involves a 
consistent expenditure of resources. 
Rights such as the right to housing, to education, health, to an adequate standard 
of living must be respected, protected and fulfilled by the States which should take 
“progressive, gradual action” towards their fulfilment, but they are in practice not easily 
and not always enforceable everywhere. They depend on the adoption of social and 
political policies adopted by the States to ensure their implementation and protection. 
The distinction between positive and negative rights is then a distinction between 
‘programmatic’ (ESR) and ‘justiciable’ rights (CPR).  
This is the reason why many national Constitutions or Bill of Rights do not even 
include economic and social rights, containing instead only civil and political rights, 
considered the only capable of specific legal determination before the Courts. 
Liberals have therefore been “traditionally anxious to protect individuals from the 
tyranny of democratic authority by granting rights that can be used as “moral trumps” 
against the process of majority rule, while democratic theorists always defended the 
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application of rights in view of the realization of some common good and social 
objective.139 
To summarize in a few words the polemic of democratic theorists against liberal 
theories of rights, without entering into further details, we can assume that the main 
criticism moved against liberal rights is that they “cannot be rationally defended”. Many 
democratic theorists are in fact “skeptical about the possibility of articulating and 
rationally supporting a theory of fundamental rights”.140 
Going back to Alexy’s theory of rights, the legal philosopher considers essential 
to recognise as fundamental rights not only individual rights but also collective goods: 
both socio-economic rights and civil-political rights need protective and defensive 
actions, a conception which reunites the two categories of rights under an equal footing.  
Assuming that civil and political rights and socio-economic rights have to be 
considered on the same footing, means also assuming the possibility of a conflict between 
an individual fundamental right and a public policy aiming at safeguarding some 
collective interest.  
This could be the case for example in a conflict between the right to privacy and 
the protection of public security, or the right to privacy and the freedom of expression, 
just to mention some examples.  
It generally entails a conflict between classical individual rights and some 
collective interests, an opposition between individual rights and what is defined as a 
common good or public policy. 
If also collective goods have a fundamental status we are then confronted with a 
conflict of rights that requires balancing and weighing the conflicting positions at stake: 
it is in fact not possible anymore to affirm, as the liberal tradition does, that the individual 
subjective right should prevail on the collective interest in any case. 
This is however a controversial issue, still open for discussion. The main risk here, 
as previously stated in this study, would be the one of fundamental rights losing their 
“absolute”, rational and “deontological character”, their priority as “moral trumps” 
against the process of majority rule. 
                                                 
139 McGregor J. (1988), “Liberalism and Democracy”, in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 38, No. 3, Fiftieth 




I am referring here to the Dworkin’s famous metaphor of rights as “political 
trumps held by individuals” which cannot be altered, not even by consensus.  
Rights have for Dworkin a special normative power: “the reasons which they 
provide are particularly powerful or weighty reasons, which override reasons of other 
sorts: rights give reasons to treat their holders in certain ways or permit their holders to 
act in certain ways, even if some social aim would be served by doing otherwise”.141 
Dworkin considers in fact that there can be only very few cases of exemption 
which can ‘trump’ rights. 
The main concern is therefore to establish whether and how would be possible to 
overcome this conflict, typical of the liberal tradition, between human rights and common 
good, this conception by which individual fundamental rights should always have priority 
over any other social concern or political objective.  
In order to overcome this conflict it is important to understand the two different 
concepts. However this is in itself problematic because the general consensus on their 
meaning differs in different ideologies and cultures.  
A possible solution, suggested for example by Joseph Raz, could be the adoption 
of a so-called interest-based theory of right as opposed to a classic will theory of rights.142  
Will-theorists like for example H.L.A.Hart believe that a right makes the right 
holder “a small scale sovereign”143, considering that “the function of a right is to give its 
holder control over another's duty” to act in a particular way.  
To have a right is for a will theorist to have the normative power “to determine 
what others may and may not do, and so to exercise authority over a certain domain of 
affairs”.144 
                                                 
141 Cfr: Wenar, L., "Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.). See also: Dworkin, R., (1978), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, and Dworkin, 
R. (1984), ‘Rights as trumps’ in Waldron, J. (ed.) Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press. 
142 Will-based and interest-based theories are the two main theories of the function of rights. Each one of 
them presents itself as capturing the understanding of what rights do for those who hold them. Which theory 
offers the better account of the functions of rights has been the subject of spirited dispute, literally for ages 
(…). Influential will theorists include Kant, Savigny, Hart, Kelsen, Wellman, and Steiner. Important interest 
theorists include Bentham, Ihering, Austin, Lyons, MacCormick, Raz, and Kramer. Each theory has 
stronger and weaker aspects as an account of what rights do for right holders. Cfr: Wenar, L., "Rights", The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
143 See: Hart, H., (1982), Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p.183. 




However, the will theory of right seems to be unable to give an explanation of 
some rights that nevertheless exist such as the rights of “incompetents” like animals, 
children, or handicapped people which possess rights (for example the right not to be 
tortured) even though they do not exercise power over them because incapable of exerting 
their will and sovereignty. 
An interest-based theory, on the other side, seems to be more capacious than the 
will theory, considering instead that “the function of a right is to further the right-holder's 
interests”.  
It can therefore accept as rights “both unwaivable rights (the possession of which 
may be good for their holders) and the rights of incompetents (who have interests that 
rights can protect).”145 
In the specific case of a conflict between fundamental individual rights and 
common goods, interest-based theories can shed some light by giving a different 
definition of rights.  
Following this conception, rights are based on the interest and wellbeing of single 
individuals even though they are not limited to the interest of individuals alone but extend 
their interest to the general wellbeing of the community.  
Rights will be then characterized as common decisions regarding fundamental 
interests of individuals, which however will not be separate from concerns of collective 
interests and goals in a society. 
As illustrated by J. Raz in his article “Rights and Politics”: 
"the weight given to the interests of the right-holder in determining whether his 
interest is protected by a right, and how extensive that protection is, reflects not only our 
concern for the individual, but also our concern for the public interest that will be served 
by protecting the interest of the right holder (…), the right’s holder’s interests are only 
part of the justifying reason for many rights. The interests of others matter too. They 
matter; however, only when they are served by serving the right holder’s interests, only 
when helping the right-holder is the proper way to help others.”146  
 
In Raz’s opinion, collective interests and individual rights should exist in harmony 
and cooperate with each other: there is no tension or conflict between them.  
                                                 
145 Ibidem. 




In order to achieve a comprehensive conception of human rights it is in fact 
essential not to underestimate the importance of common good and its influence on values 
such as social justice, equality and freedom.  
Both individual human rights and collective interests are an essential part of the 
human dimension and the right held by an individual always entails a duty on others. 
What is important for an individual cannot be considered independently of the 
consequences upon other individuals in a society and the individual autonomy should 
promote the wellbeing of the entire society. Individuals have not only rights but also 
responsibilities vis á vis the society in which they live. 
Raz concludes by affirming that human rights are political and that human right 
theory should only focus on constitutional rights in specific political contexts. 
Going back to Alexy’s Theory, we should finally notice, together with Kaarlo 
Tuori in his article, “Fundamental rights principles: disciplining the instrumentalism of 
policies” that Alexy fails to establish a further important distinction between principles 
and polices, collective interests.147 
The last political issue, which will be tackled in this second section, concerns the 
question of whether in human rights adjudication the legal liberty and legal equality 
principle (in dubio pro libertate)148 should prevail over the democratic principle or vice 
versa.  
Should judicial activism and judge’s discretion become the final arbiter of 
fundamental rights adjudication at Constitutional level, or should the democratic principle 
prevail? 
It seems important to deal not only with a problem of constitutional rights 
adjudication in Courts but also with a problem of democratic representation and 
participation, better underlining what the sub-structure of balancing is, the importance of 
legal culture and common values, the positions about the Constitution, the role of states 
and the very concept of justice in a given society. 
In his article “Balancing, Constitutional Review and Representation” (2005), 
                                                 
147 See: Tuori, K., “Fundamental rights principles: disciplining the instrumentalism of policies”, in: 
Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, pp. 33-50. 
148 “Where there is doubt, Liberty should prevail”. According to this principle no principle opposite to legal 
liberty should prevail unless stronger reasons are put forward. 
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Robert Alexy affirms: 
“Balancing is one of the main issues in current debates on the interpretation of 
constitutional rights. Numerous authors have raised the objection that balancing is both 
irrational and subjective. Here it is argued that this objection is unjustified. To show this, 
balancing is grounded in a theory of discursive constitutionalism that connects the 
concept of balancing with the concepts of constitutional rights, of discourse, of 
constitutional review, and of representation. The main theses are these: first, balancing 
is based on a rational form of argument that can be made explicit by means of a ‘‘Weight 
Formula’’ and second, constitutional review complies with the requirements of 
democratic legitimation to the extent that it succeeds in becoming an argumentative 
representation of the people in supplying this formula with arguments”.149 
 
It appears from the above that in Alexy’s opinion there is not necessarily a conflict 
between the rationality of balancing (and its concretization through the “Weight Formula” 
adopted by Judges) and the “democratic legitimization” principle: namely there is not 
conflict between the rational method used by Judges in Court adjudications and the 
democratic principle, which foreseen a public argumentation and democratic 
representation of people.  
Judges are using for Alexy a rational method of adjudication through the balancing 
process and the recourse to the weight formula and, at the same time, an argumentative 
and democratic method of discussion and argumentation when supplying this formula 
with arguments. 
Such an understanding would also contradict O.E. Eriksen’s affirmation, which in 
his article “Democratic or Jurist-made law?” defines Alexy’s theory as “descriptively 
correct but normatively unacceptable”.150 
Eriksen distinguishes between a “jurist-made law” in which the Supreme Court 
become the final arbiter of constitutional law and a “democratic-made law”, of which 
“substantial factors can be tested democratically”.151  
He sustains that through his Theory Alexy is obliged to transfer the authorship of 
legal norms from democratic legislatures to judges and courts, with the consequent danger 
of “assimilating law and morality overburdening the legal medium itself”.152 
                                                 
149 Alexy, R., (2005) “Balancing, Constitutional Review and Representation”, in: International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 3(4), p. 572. 
150 Eriksen, Oddvar Erik, “Democratic or Jurist-made law?”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, pp.69-99. 
151 Ibidem p.70. 
152 Ibidem. p.83 
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Eriksen’s critique is therefore based on the assumption that “in democratic 
societies legal procedures are to ensure legally correct and rationally acceptable decisions 
that can be defended both in relation to legal statutes and in relation to public criticism”.153 
Eriksen doubts about the efficiency of a legal system in which normative questions 
are solved only by reference to the discretion of Judges. The real problem is in fact to 
ascertain “whether the judge’s interpretations of situations is correct”.154 
The main concern at stake here is that if both the rationality of balancing and the 
impartiality of Judges are put in doubt, implicitly acknowledging the objection that 
balancing is both irrational and subjective, a subsequent danger could be, beyond 
fundamental rights losing their strict normative power, the potential use of political 
ideologies, personal believes and even prejudices in order to justify sentences in Courts.  
Such a criticism could in my opinion be connected also with another substantial 
perplexity put forward by Kaarlo Tuori in his article “Fundamental rights principles: 
disciplining the instrumentalism of policies”. 
In Tuori’s view Alexy’s Theory results in a blind approach to the “central paradox 
of the modern conception of fundamental rights as limits to state power which are 
established by State power and limits to law there are legal in themselves”.155 
This “paradox of fundamental rights” is linked to the essential positivism of 
modern law, which is “based on conscious human actions and which is continuously 
amendable”.156  
It should be therefore recognized at least “an implicit danger of totalitarianism 
entailed by the positivisation of law”.157  
What “engenders this threat is not illegal or extra-illegal power, but power 
exercised through positive law: power in a legal guise”.158 
Therefore, protecting fundamental rights in our modern positive era also means 
“protecting the limits of law”, and such a protection system still lies mainly at the level 
                                                 
153 Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p. 7. 
154 Ibidem. 
155 Ibidem, pp.7, 8. 
156Tuori, K., “Fundamental rights principles: disciplining the instrumentalism of policies”, in: 
Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. (Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p. 40. 
157Ibidem. Please refer also to: Hayek, F. (1982), Law, Legislation and Liberty, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
158 Ibidem p.42. 
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of nation-states while international monitory mechanisms still play only a complementary 
role. 
Tuori considers possible to solve this central paradox of fundamental rights 
through a “deconstruction of the concept of Law”.  
He distinguishes then three levels of law: the surface level, the legal culture, and 
the deep structure of law and sustains that fundamental rights can only act as limits of 
State power if they are sufficiently sedimented in the deep sub-surface of law.159 
Going back to Alexy’s Theory, Alexy himself seems to recognize two different 
principles in balancing: the principle of legal liberty and legal equality (in dubio pro 
libertate) and the democratic principle (in dubio pro legislatore). 
In fact, talking about “burdens of argumentation”160, while in A Theory Alexy 
seems to support the principle of legal liberty and legal equality, in the Postscript to A 
Theory he align himself with the democratic principle affirming that an act of interference 
by the Parliament would not be considered as disproportionate or contrary to the 
Constitution. 
Even though this “double solution” seems to be contradictory, Alexy considers 
that it does not entails necessarily a conflict between the two principles, because there is 
no conflict between the legal liberty of Judges in Courts and the democratic principle, 
which foreseen a public argumentation and democratic representation of people.  
Nevertheless, elsewhere Alexy affirms that “fundamental rights are an expression 
of distrust in the democratic process”, that they represent both “the basis and the boundary 
of democracy” and that they are “so important that the decision to protect them cannot be 
left to simple parliamentary majorities”.161  
Such affirmations do not seem to solve the contradictory character of his 
propositions.  As underlined by Judge Robert Bork in his book “Coercing Virtue: The 
Worldwide Rule of Judges”, if judicial power can lead to the abolition of majorities 
                                                 
159 Ibidem. 
160 The burden of argumentation represent for Alexy the third stage of the Law of balancing and operates 
“only in cases in which the weight formula results in a stalemate, the weight of principles being identical”. 
Please refer to Annex I. 
161 Alexy, R., “Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.17. 
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decisions of the people’s representatives, the question arise if judicial discretion does not 
entails a corrosion of democratic governance.162 
Nevertheless, the importance of the judicial control in protecting citizens against 
unjustified interventions of the legislative power should also be recognized: 
Constitutional Courts can in fact exercise an important role in protecting citizens against 
unjust laws which are not excluded even in democratic parliaments. 
 Particular efforts have been made so far in order to establish if the balancing 
method should be recognized as a “truly rational method”, as defended by Alexy in his 
Theory, or just as “a pure practical and rhetorical method of solving conflicts”, as 
sustained by some of his main critics.   
The possibility of taking into account other approaches that accentuate the moral 
foundation of rights and sustain a more democratic principle have been taken into 
consideration while contextualizing “quantitative-like” criteria such as those associated 
with proportionality and the positivisation of law.  
The importance of Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights has been anyways 
recognized as relevant to most, if not all, European and international legal orders; first of 
all the European Union Constitutional order.  
Establishing whether and to what extent Alexy’s Theory can be useful in 
interpreting and applying fundamental rights provisions of the European Union law and 
especially, the now legally binding “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union”, is in my opinion of primary importance and deserves further investigations. 
Main aim of this section was also testing the limits of Alexy’s approach, the 
reasonableness of the proportionality principle in legal decisions and the effective use of 
balancing in Courts as an essential methodological tool for adjudication.  
More general philosophical considerations concerned a clarification of the 
concepts of “constitutional rights”, “human rights” and “fundamental rights”, trying at 
the same time to shed some light on the structure and content of rights and therefore on 
what can define their limits and scope.  
                                                 




That means to ascertain the “deontological and normative value” of rights, 
establishing whether such an inalienable core of fundamental, “non-derogable” rights 
exists, to which weighing and balancing should not apply because of their absolute and 
universal value (i.e. principles that are not subject to proportionality review).  
Contrary to most philosophical conceptions of moral rights, one central 
characteristic of most constitutional rights nowadays seems to be the possibility of being 
“normally” and usually subjected to a balancing approach. 
On the other side, important political questions have been raised such as the 
legitimization and the extent of Court’s judicial power in applying the proportionality 
principle, balancing rights and constitutional review. 
 Is this power limited or unlimited? Courts can in fact use the principle of 
proportionality in order to reach important public interest decisions interfering with the 
legislative functions and enhancing their discretionary power. 
The main issue at stake lies in a political resolution: whether to trust Judges to 
review, leave adjudication to democratically elected parliaments or find alternative ways 
of rights adjudication.  
It was then considered necessary to better highlight the substructure of balancing: 
the importance of legal culture and common values, the positions about the Constitution, 
the role of states and of international monitory bodies, the very concept of justice in a 
given society.  
Different legal systems can reflect a different legal hierarchy and different social 
values. 
One primary conclusion that has been reached is that even when a measure 
respects all proportionality’s criteria (necessary in a democratic society, in accordance 
with law and pursuing a legitimate aim), it should be nevertheless declared unacceptable 
and unconstitutional in case it is found in violation of a basic human right, which means 
violating the essential value and content of a human right.  
It is not possible to accept the proportionality of a norm in every case, even when 
it is in violation of a basic human right.  
It follows that a norm can be considered as proportional if and only if it does not 
influence or change the essential content of a human right.  
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In no case the evaluation of costs and benefits can be done without taking into 
consideration the essential content of rights. A norm should be considered as 
disproportionate and unconstitutional in case it alters the essential content of a human 
right or in case it lacks the sufficient justification for an eventual restriction of this right.  
This is the reason why it becomes fundamental to be aware of the limits, content 
and characteristics of human rights, analysing first of all the degree of alteration of a right 
in every single case. 
Another important political issue that has been raised in this analysis is the risk 
associated with a relativistic conception of justice and law, of having fundamental 
individual rights balanced against collective goods, public interests and policies.  
It has been shown as this fundamental rights conception of public good goes 
against all fundamental principles of a traditional liberal theory of rights.  
It has been therefore recognized that Alexy’s Theory lacks a further important 
distinction, which must be made, between principles and policies.  
It is in fact necessary to analyse and clarify not only the content and characteristics 
of each fundamental right, but also their relationship towards each other and towards 
fundamental rights “of the others”, meaning also the relationship between human rights 
and the “common good” of a community, considering also the degree of public interest 
involved in every case.  
The evaluation of such public interest should however be done always by referring 
first of all to the essential content of rights, in order to avoid the utilitarian risk.  
In a few words, the most important action that has to be taken in order to evaluate 
a norm is to determinate which the “inalienable” content of a right is. Only once 
determined this, would be it possible to proceed with further analysis and consideration 
of collective good, public interest or policy objectives, determining the level of 
interference of the measure taken into account.  
Judges with constitutional competence should be the ones performing this task 
through a faithful interpretation of the Constitution and an understanding of each human 
right in relation to his concept and essential content.  
It is therefore suggested a possible solution to overcome the conflict, typical of 
the liberal tradition, between human rights and common goods, by adopting a so-called 
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interest-based theory of right, as suggested by Joseph Raz in his works, and as opposed 
to a classic will-theory of rights.  
Such a theory is based on the recognition, on the one side, of core fundamental 
rights which should preserve their deontological and normative power and, on the other 
side, the exigency of recognizing and preserving cultural and collective rights and social 
policies aiming at safeguard collective interests and goods. 
Following this conception, rights are based on the interest and wellbeing of single 
individuals but are not limited to the interest of those individuals, extending instead their 
relevance to the general wellbeing of the community.  
Rights will be then characterized as common decisions regarding fundamental 
interests of individuals, which however will not be separate from concerns of collective 
interests and goals in a society.  
Following this theory, collective interests and individual rights should coexist in 
harmony and cooperate with each other avoiding conflicts (what is good for the single 
individuals is good also for the society as a whole).  
Both individual human rights and collective interests should be considered as an 
essential part of the human dimension and the right held by an individual always entails 
a duty and a responsibility on others. 
Lastly, I agree with what recognized by C.B. Pulido in his above-mentioned 
article: 
“The weight formula should not be regarded as an algorithmic procedure which 
produces the right answer in all cases. On the contrary there are diverse rationality limits 
that leave a margin of discretion to judges. In this regard, his ideology matters and plays 
an important role. This does not impair the analytical value of the weight formula. Despite 
its limits, the weight formula provides a clear argumentative structure that helps 
clarifying the different relevant variables when balancing conflicting principles. 
Therefore, it renders explicit all the elements the judge should take into account and all 








                                                 
163 Bernal Pulido, Carlos , “On Alexy’s Weight Formula”, in: Menéndez, Agustín J., Eriksen, Erik O. 
(Eds.), (2006), Arguing Fundamental Rights, Springer, p.109. 
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PART IV  
 




IV. Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights in a Globalized Era. 
 
This chapter aims at analyzing theoretical problems related to multiculturalism 
and human rights in Europe, understood in their broadest philosophical and 
anthropological dimension.  
Culture is without any doubt essential in the determination of the identity and 
singularity of every human being as an individual and as a member of  a community as a 
whole.  
The concept of "culture" was born with modernity, with the age of geographic 
discoveries and of colonial conquests. It indicates the collective system of ways of life 
and beliefs proper to a group or a people, which gives meaning to its existence and 
differentiates it from the systems of other groups or peoples.  
Modern philosophy, especially since the Eighteenth century, developed a rational 
reflection on the diversity of cultures. In the framework of this reflection, however, were 
operating more or less consciously, ethnocentric assumptions, which had the function of 
"scientifically" endorse the belief on the superiority of European cultures over those of 
other peoples, for centuries defined as barbarians or savages.  
The progressive influence of the Enlightenment principle of tolerance and of a 
more general critical spirit, favored eventually the idea of cultural comparison, but we 
must wait until the Twentieth century to develop a real critique of ethnocentrism, defined 
as the widespread tendency in all human populations to consider the behaviors and values 
of their own group and culture, better than those of other groups.  
The questioning of ethnocentrism has in turn involved the radical unmasking of 
Eurocentrism and social sciences imperialism, that is, the prejudice that makes European 
culture feel superior to all other cultures.164 
                                                 
164 Cfr. Mentan, T.. (2015), Unmasking Social Science Imperialism: Globalization Theory As A Phase Of 
Academic Colonialism,.Oxford: African Books Collective. 
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Still during the Nineteenth century, the affirmation of the evolutionary approach 
gave birth to an evolutionary conception of cultures, according to which European culture 
represents the most advanced point of human evolution, while non-European cultures 
constitute inferior degrees of development. 165 
Certainly an important difference compared to the past, lies in the scholars’ 
conviction that every human group possesses a more or less evolved form of culture.  
This is possible because the very idea of culture changed and was no longer 
coinciding only with the highest artistic and thought forms, but also extended to the 
everyday and less sophisticated human activities.  
The affirmation of the evolutionary approach also marked the birth of cultural 
anthropology as an autonomous discipline, which also becomes a teaching subject in the 
main European and North American universities. Anthropology was therefore configured 
as a scientific study of pre-modern cultures and communities. 
We must wait until late 1930s and '40s of the Twentieth century to have this model 
definitely questioned thanks to the new methodological perspective of Relativism, 
introduced by the German anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942). 
 According to Boas, every historical product is understandable only in relation to 
the space-time context in which it is conceived and therefore it is meaningless to establish 
hierarchies between the different cultural systems.  
Equally incorrect, according to Boas, is to think of such systems according to a 
linear historical development, since they possess peculiar characteristics that make them 
different from one another (theory of historical particularism). 
In order to set cultures and their products according to a hierarchical scale, it 
would be necessary, according to Boas, to possess a criterion of universal evaluation 
which we actually don’t have, since the criterion available to the anthropologist is always 
dependent on the cultural context in which he operates, hence on a particular perspective.  
                                                 
165 One example for all is: Frazer, J. G. (1890), The Golden Bough; a Study in Magic and Religion. 
Macmillan, London. The impact of The Golden Bough on contemporary European literature was 
substantial. It came however under tough critical scrutiny in the following decades, with many of its 
descriptions of regional folklore and legends considered less than reliable, having been  recognized that 





The processes of decolonization and globalization highlighted in an ever urgent 
way the problem of the representation of peoples and of non-western cultures, 
representations which were so far produced exclusively by scholars of European and 
North American origin. 
 The number of scholars born in former colonies and having their intellectual 
formation partly matured in the former colonial countries, became more and more 
relevant, imposing the so-called "postcolonial question".  
At the center of this question are the representation of Otherness and Alterity and 
the complex relationship with European culture held by those who have a double cultural 
affiliation, which allows them to unmask the ethnocentric gaze with which the Western 
observes his own culture of origin.  
Some of these scholars, such as the aforementioned Palestinian-born American 
Edward W. Said (1935-2003), have highlighted the relation between the imperialist 
policy and the distorted interpretation that the West has given of other cultures: assuming 
the superiority of the Western culture, they both silence the other, preventing him from 
describing his own culture and history.  
The work of scholars coming from cultures which were traditionally the subject 
of anthropological research, has raised awareness of the arbitrariness and partiality with 
which Western anthropology has so far worked in the description of the other.  
Anthropologists such as the Swiss-Tunisian Mondher Kilani, have contributed to 
advancing both the reconstruction of the history of anthropology ( including the history 
of "other ethnographies", in particular of Arab-Muslim culture), and the methodology of 
the discipline; conceiving the results of ethnographic research as the fruits of a negotiation 
between the anthropologist's point of view and that of his representatives in the field.  
The contribution of Kilani's work, as well as other contemporary anthropologists, 
also aims to de-essentialize key concepts of the anthropological lexicon such as 
"ethnicity" and "culture".  
In other words, showing the dynamic and non-static character of cultures, the 
constant biological and cultural interconnection of human groups; cultural anthropology 
emphasizes how ethnic groups and cultures cannot be considered as things, substantial 
entities with stable and permanent characters, separated by clear boundaries and 
impermeable barriers.  
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On the contrary, they are "cultural inventions" and therefore must be conceived as 
the product of a classification and not as their foundation.  
Likewise, individuals can entertain complex, plural and not univocal relationships 
with cultures: each of us can feel a sense of belonging to more than one culture and can 
possibly integrate and change his cultural identity in the course of his life.  
According to the already mentioned Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya 
Sen, the attempt to understand the multicultural components of our world entails a risk of 
“miniaturization of the individuals”: trying to attribute to a person or a group a determined 
and unmovable social identity, means to tighten it in a unilateral definition, that is to 
classify it according to a single criterion.  
This is the so-called "solitarist approach" to human identity, which Sen sharply 
criticizes, observing with humorous sagacity that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
"the same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizenship, of 
Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a 
long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, 
a believer in gay and lesbian rights (...) Each of these collectivities, to all of which this 
person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken 
to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category.” 166 
 
The problem of multiculturalism must be therefore faced in a perspective that 
values pluralism and the multiple identities of the human being.  
The same relationship between global identity and local identity must be 
conceived in an open way, so that the feeling of global belonging does not replace our 
national allegiances (and viceversa).  
As already highlighted elsewhere in this study, many attempts have already been 
made in order to re-conciliate the two concepts, many authors sustaining the potentiality 
of human beings to reconcile the loyalty to their own nation and relatively closed 
collectivity with a feeling of global and multilayered citizenship and belonging.167 
As remarked by Federico Lenzerini in his article “Multiculturalism and 
International Human Rights Law”: 
                                                 
166 Sen, A. (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Issues of our time. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co, p. 9-10. 
167 Ibidem, cfr. also Voronkova, A. (2010), “Are nationalism and cosmopolitanism compatible?”, in E-
International relations. Cfr Chapter 1. 
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“Since human rights are one of the main “tools” available to human beings to 
pursue their life expectations and dreams, their strict interconnection with culture is 
beyond question. Therefore, conceiving human rights in terms of a monolithic system of 
inflexible rules destined to be applied according to pre-determined and standardized 
criteria wouldn’t help much in ensuring their effectiveness in pursuing the well-being and 
happiness of human beings. On the contrary, the correct approach to international human 
rights law–in terms of understanding, interpretation, adjudication and redress for 
breaches–should be centered on the idea of multiculturalism, so as that in each concrete 
case the specific needs of the people specifically concerned should be taken into primary 
account”. 168 
 
The issue of multiculturalism and human rights must be therefore analyzed from 
an anthropology of law’s perspective.  
Indeed multiculturalism and relativism are often perceived as a threat for the 
liberal democratic understanding of universally recognized human rights, dealing to a 
clash between Western and non-Western cultural beliefs and legal systems.  
Following the general theoretical lines of the French anthropology of law (Alliot 
1983; Rouland 1994), a non-ethnocentric definition of human rights will be pursued in 
parallel with a non-ethnocentric definition of law, concentrating on the fundamental 
distinction between theory and practice of human rights.  
The main aim will be to demonstrate that the concept of law is not an abstract one 
but needs to be situated in a specific context and in the concrete structure of given 
societies.  
Potentials and limits of the concept of intercultural dialogue will be therefore 
explored, in its role as a possible solution to the dichotomy of universalism and cultural 
relativism.  
The question if a healthy pluralism is possible in a multicultural society, move 
towards a recognition of the Other, which opens the doors to a real dialogue and is not 
just assimilation or reduction to the unity.  
The concept of Otherness and Alterity, assumes a basic importance also when 
considering the thought of many contemporary philosophers, including what we may call 
the Wittgensteinian “intercultural perspective”.  
                                                 




Wittgnestein’s concepts of Lebensform(en) (forms of life), Familienähnlichkeit 
(family resemblance), Sprachspiel (language-games), Übersichtliche Darstellung 
(perspicuous representation); his ethnological approach to philosophy, result all essential 
for understanding the influence of our own language and culture on the explanation and 
perception of other cultures and the fundamental value of dialogue for an authentic 
recognition of the Other. 
The relation between human rights and intercultural dialogue will be analyzed 
considering the following structure: 
First of all the question of the Western conception of human rights will be 
addressed. The debates about universalism and cultural relativism, still at the central core 
of many contemporary discourses on human rights, will be analyzed with due 
consideration given to the criticism of both theories, including a short analysis of the main 
critics addressed to the “Western” conception of the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 more specifically.  
Following the general theoretical lesson of the French anthropology of law (Alliot 
1983; Rouland 1994; Eberhard 2002), the second part will put emphasis on the 
relationship between different philosophical and religious conceptions of the world and 
the related clash between Western and non-Western cultural beliefs, legal systems and 
structure in Western and non-Western societies.  
It will therefore concentrate on the fundamental distinction between theory and 
practice of human rights, demonstrating  that the concrete application of the law cannot 
prescind from the historical, social and cultural context of a given society.  
In theory human rights are universal and universally applicable everywhere. In 
practice different cultures can have different ways to apply and interpret the law in 
different contexts.  
Nevertheless this will not prejudice the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights, which will not be disdained.  
Can intercultural dialogue mediate conflicts arising from a too narrow or rigid 
definition of human rights meanings and perceptions? 
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What does intercultural dialogue mean and how can it be useful in solving the 
dichotomy posed by universalism and relativism of human rights? Is a healthy pluralism 
possible in a multicultural society? 
The moral status of rights, can be attributed to the fact that human rights  can be 
considered as judicial practices that go beyond the classical juridical border of states and 
therefore beyond nation-states boundaries. But human rights have de facto an original 
juridical nature.169  
James Silk affirms that “to have human rights at all is to say that there are certain 
standards below which no state or society can go regardless of its own cultural values.”170 
Such minimum standards can be considered as universal values, because they 
include the respect for the ontological human dignity of every individual.  
Intercultural dialogue must however mediate as an interplay among cultures to set 
juridical and not simply moral standards.  
The effective implementation of these standards presuppose that there must be a 
cultural recognition by the nation states which are going to settle such juridical norms. 
As sustained by Abdullahi An-Na’im: 
“culture, broadly defined, are the context within which human rights have to be 
specified and realized … Each culture has its share of problems with human rights as 
well as the potential to resolve these problems. Working within the culture, and receiving 
guidance and support from without, external standards should not been imposed to 
enhance cultural legitimacy. The inherent dignity and integrity of the human person, 
taken as the fundamental underlying value of all human rights, can be extended beyond 
barriers of sex, race, religion and so on, through the principle of reciprocity, namely that 
one should concede to others what one claims for oneself. Thus, the full range of human 
rights can gain cultural legitimacy everywhere in the world”171 
 
An intercultural dialogue should be useful in order to put in place and foster 
international mechanisms and instruments, in order to strongly legitimate the protection 
of universal human rights standards. 
                                                 
169 Cfr. Habermas, J., (1996), La pax perpétuelle. Le bicentenaire d'une idée kantienne, Translated by 
Rainer Rochlitz, Paris, les Editions do Cerf, p. 86. 
170 Silk, J.(1990), “Traditional Culture and the Prospect for Human Rights in Africa”, pp. 290-3238, in 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im and Francis. M. Deng (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, Brookings Institution Press, p. 316. 
171 An-Na`im, A. (1990), “Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Huma Rights”, in Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na`im and Francis. M. Deng (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 
Brookings Institution Press pp. 366-367. 
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Human rights can be furthermore considered  as dynamic cosmopolitan entities 
because they are subject to change, changing their effective validity too.  
Human rights emerged “from the concrete expectations, especially the suffering, 
of real human beings and their political struggles to defend or realize their dignity. 
Internationally recognized  human rights reflect a politically driven process of social 
learning.”172  
Even if we agree with the fact that human rights have mainly western origins, this 
does not mean to affirm that they have not value for the rest of the world. 
As highlighted by Onuma, in his article, “when ideas or institutions are expanded 
from their place of origin to other regions, their original nature or characteristic features 
are inevitably transformed in order to be accepted by the inhabitants of the regions to 
which they have spread.”173 
We can therefore assume that the same general principles can be institutionalized 
in different specific rules, which represent the cultural homeomorphic perspective of the 
general principles. 
Cultures can be considered as dynamic entities as well: they are active, evolving 
entities. They share some characteristics with other cultures but the role played by values, 
traditions, religions, politics, social practices, vary from one culture to another. 
Globalization has had an influence on cultures in a very innovative way: the mass 
consumption of goods, media and markets have been putting pressure on all cultures to 
use some common standards all around the world, creating a sort of homogenization. 
Human rights can be considered as a response to this process, safeguarding human 
beings in this process. 
As underlined  by Anna-Belinda  Preis in her famous article in 1996:  
 
“(human rights) increasingly form part of a wider network of perspectives which 
are shared and exchanged between the North and the South, centers and peripheries, in 
multiple, creative, and sometimes conflict-ridden ways. Human rights have become 
“universalized” as a valued subject of interpretation, negotiation and accommodation. 
They have become “culture.” 174 
                                                 
172 Donnelly, J., (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ED., New York: Cornell 
University Press, p. 58. 
173 Onuma, Y.( 2001), “Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights: for Universalization of 
Human Rights through Overcoming of a Westcentric Notion of Human Right”, pp. 21-81, in Asian 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 7, p. 47. 
174 Preis, Anna-Belinda S. (1996), “Human Rights as Cultural Practice: an Anthropological Critique”, pp. 
286-315, in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18, n.2, p. 290. 
 
99  
Nonetheless, culture cannot be considered as a mere imposition, because “human 
rights are not simply a matter of constant “pressure”  from the center towards the 
periphery, but of a much more creative interplay.”175 
 As in any culture, also the concept of human rights is made by contrasts and 
disagreements and “human rights are continuously in the process of reconstituting and 
reformulating themselves, They are always “at work.”176 
There is however, at the center of the human rights perspective a core concern for 
the dignity of human beings which cannot be eradicated. 
An-Na’im extends this concept noting that human rights need a “bottom up 
approach” which “seeks to initiate a global process of internal discourse and cross-
cultural dialogue to promote the universal legitimacy of human rights … by broadening 
and deepening global consensus on human rights.”177 
Certainly human rights standards would remain an empty list of formal rules far 
away from a real applicability if they were not to be realized and fostered by consensus 
and contextual sensitiveness.  
The “openness of cultural communication” is in fact “one of the most fundamental 

















                                                 
175 Ibidem, p. 306. 
176 Ibidem, p. 309. 
177 An-Na`im, A (1992), “Introduction”, in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives: a Quest for Consensus. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 7.  





IV.1 Universalism or Cultural Relativism? A Speculative Debate. 
 
The dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism in the human rights 
discourse has been present in legal scholarship and philosophy for decades.  
It was already present in 1948 when the UN General Assembly approved the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and is now gradually entering public 
discourse on international law and human rights. 
Universalism supporters suggest that the notion of human rights is universal 
because human beings are ontologically equals, and therefore it should universally apply 
to every individual, regardless of their culture or society. Human rights are considered 
invariable and not amendable. 
Cultural relativists, on the other side, sustain that human rights are culturally 
dependent and that there are no moral principles which can apply to all cultures, because 
each society has developed its own moral code and morality has its origins only in our 
own society and culture. 179 
These are the two poles of discussion, between them there is a wide range of other 
interpretations and opinions. According to Wilson for example,  two are the main issues 
at stake: 
“First, what concept of human ontology must be used, and what rights naturally 
extend from that view of human nature; and second, what significance should be given to 
the notion of “culture” in the construction of a normative moral order, and to what 
degree does global diversity in systems of justice undermine any basis  for the universality 
of human rights-”180 
 
We must say that both Universalism and Cultural Relativism can be defined as  
metaethical schemes, because they are not pretending to define what is wrong and what 
is right but to better explain the nature of morality and how it actually works, and if human 
beings should follow a single moral code or a variety of moral codes, each one 
corresponding to a different culture.  
                                                 
179 For a more accurate definition of cultural relativism cfr Donnelly, J. (2003), pp. 89-90. 
180 Wilson  R. A. (1997), “Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction”, in Wilson  Richard A, 




According to cultural relativists, the principles embedded in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) are only the product of Western cultural 
imperialism, attempting to extend the Western ideal to the rest of the world. 
The formulations of human rights can be dated back to 539 BC when Cyrus the 
Great conquered Babylon,181 but a positive formulation of human rights and dignity was 
concretized only with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
Certainly, the origins of the Universal Declaration are deep-rooted in Western 
political history and in documents such as the Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of  Right 
(1628), the US Constitution (1787), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen (1789), and the American Bill of Rights (1791), but it was only with the 
UDHR that the inviolability of every human being was definitely stated. 
The Universal Declaration was approved with no one single vote against but with 
eight abstentions. The majority of oppositions came from the Socialist bloc countries, due 
to the fact that they did not agree with certain parts of the Declaration.  
The main problem at that time was the “huge ideological-political East–West 
conflict between the United States and its Western allies on the one hand and the Socialist 
bloc led by the Soviet Union” on the other hand.182  
Each side tried to express his own idea of human rights reflecting two different 
models of conception of the society: the capitalist model (great emphasis on individual 
freedoms, political and civil rights), and the socialist model (emphasis on the role of the 
State and on economic, social and cultural rights). 
A group of non-socialist countries as well, such as Saudi Arabia and South Africa 
“expressed certain doubts based on its religious and family traditions” while South Africa 
“was completely against the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
Declaration.”183 
Many articles of the Universal Declaration, especially Art.16 an Art.18, were 
deeply questioned by these non-Western countries, mainly because of the different role 
                                                 
181 The Cyrus Cylinder has been recognized as the world’s first Charter of human rights. 
182 Oraa Oraa, J., (2009), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Gomez Isa, F. and De Feyter, K., 





played by religion in their society (a different vision of the role of man and women in 
society, a different conception of the family, of the property and so on…).184  
Islamic countries for example could not recognize the right to marry between a 
Muslim and someone of another religion, the right to change one's religion or belief, the 
right for women to ask for dissolution of marriage, the fundamental equality between man 
and women in society.  
On the other side, African countries were sustaining a completely different 
concept of family, which did not correspond at all to the Western concept of nuclear 
family.185  
The issue was clearly evident also in the Second World Conference on Human 
Rights, which was held in Vienna in 1993.  
One of the main objectives of this conference was to declare the universality, 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, civil and political as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
Despite this willingness, the issue of universality of human rights was again 
questioned by a group of non-aligned, non-Western countries.  
Islamic countries as well as a significant proportion of “third world” countries 
contested the theory of universality of human rights considering the UDHR of 1948 as 
having an exclusive Western character and wondering if it was to be considered as a new 
form of cultural imperialism and hegemony of the Western countries.  
They were, on the contrary, staunch supporters of cultural relativism, which 
should consider all the different circumstances of a given society, whether religious, 
cultural or historical. 
Cultural relativists’ criticism of the universalistic approach is that it fails to take 
into account of social, cultural and political diversity.  
                                                 
184 Art 16 states “the right of all men and women of full age to marry and to found a family without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution”. Art 18 states “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance” (UDHR, 1948). 
185 Oraa Oraa, (2009), pp. 193-196. 
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The debate about universalism and cultural relativism of human rights is still quite 
alive and many authors nowadays consider the concept of universalism as a Western-
ethnocentric concept. 
Cultural relativists sustains that there is no universal moral code which applies to 
all cultures, because what is moral for a society must not be necessarily moral for another 
society. What is right in one place could be wrong in another place because morality has 
its origins exclusively in society and culture.  
Each person is obliged to follow exclusively the rules of his own society and  
people from one culture should not try to import their own way of acting into another 
culture, because there is not such an objective criteria to judge the actions of people in a 
different culture. 
Cultural relativists state that morality is decided only on a group level and that it 
is therefore an inter-subjective matter. The right moral action is what is more traditional 
to do in our own society and such rules only apply to the people of that society, not to 
everyone else. There are not universal rules as cultural relativism accept moral 
discrepancy between different societies, which cannot be obliged to follow our rules. 
All different moral systems are equally worth, while a universal moral standard 
simply does not exist. It is not possible to sustain that the moral principles of a society are 
better or worse of those of any other society. 
Universalism, on the other side, appears exactly as the opposite view because it is 
affirming that moral actions are not based on society or cultural diversity at all.  
In the universalistic approach, moral rules transcend cultural boundaries and 
universally apply to everyone regardless of their society or cultural background. 
In this view, when a society is following a wrong moral code, disrespecting human 
rights and basic dignities of people, it must be judged and necessarily needs to be changed. 
 In the universalistic view, like in the scientific field, there are not such subjective 
factors linked to culture or traditions, while morality is objective for everyone, equally 
applying to all traditions and all people everywhere and in every space and time.  




This does not means that universalists are against cultural differences: while they 
may tolerate moral variations and different traditions of different cultures, they cannot 
deny in any case the basic fundamental rights of each individual, (such not to be killed or 
reduced to slavery for example), defending the liberal view by which a conception of 
human rights should not remain neutral on controversial questions of legitimacy and 
justice. 
The universalistic perspective is supported by a wide range of different schools of 
thought, claiming that morality must be objective, and therefore universal. 
For example, in the ancient Greece, Plato made a distinction between the material 
things, which are all imperfect and variable, and the non-material realm of the Forms, 
which are instead perfect and invariable. He assumed that moral truths came from the 
changeless Forms, which are resistant to change and human opinions.  
For Plato moral truths are mathematical truths, real and objective, defining what 
is good and what is not, and we can judge how good is a thing by how closely it is 
resembling to the original Form.  
The supreme form is the form of the Good, which defines goodness itself and 
permits impartial judgements about what is good and what is not. 
In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant sustained an universalistic conception by 
affirming that something can be defined as morally correct if and only if we can allow 
everyone in the world to do it.  
Kant based essentially his morality on rationality: whatever is right must be 
universally right, leading to a universal morality that is the same for everyone.  
We are furthermore all equal in being rational agents, and each person deserves 
the same treatment no matter who they are or where they live. 
The religious ethics also use to share a universalistic view, firmly believing that, 
having God created all of us, he was also giving us the rules which all humankind must 
be following, independently if belonging or not to a particular religion.  
Christians for example, will claim that there is a God who gave us rules, in the 
form of Commandments, which we are obliged to follow, whether we recognize it or not, 




Religious ethics share in fact the idea of a common human nature as the basis of 
their universalistic view: if we have a common human nature, sharing all similar hopes, 
we should also act in a similar way, admitting that everyone want to be happy, respected 
and educated, having the fundamental right not to be killed, abused or enslaved. 
Societal laws must conform everywhere in the world, to ensure collaboration and 
to avoid social conflict and chaos.  
Human rights are actually considered as a good reason for people to justify 
universalism, because every human being deserve respect just for being human, having 
right not to be imprisoned, killed or tortured, and not be denied education or free speech, 
receiving appropriate help, when possible, in case of basic needs such as shelter, food or 
healthcare.  
The presence of trans-cultural moral principles which can be found everywhere is 
an additional point in favor of universalism. For example, rules such as ‘do not kill’, even 
with differences, can be found in all societies, indicating a shared basic morality and a 
similar approach about the value of life. 
However, universalists are usually confronted with two main difficulties which 
seems particularly hard to tackle: the ontological problem, referring to where do these 
objective moral principles come from and the epistemological one, referring to how can 
we have knowledge of them. 
Universalists relies on the existence of a universal moral code, but they do not 
seem able to indicate a definitive source of objective morality.  
A potential source of morality could be God, but we cannot be sure about his 
existence, and even if he does exist, serious problems could be raised with the idea of 
holding him responsible for morality. The same problems can arise with other potential 
sources of an objective moral code.  
Since it seems not possible to definitely determine their foundation or origin, we 
may well assume that moral objective principles do not exist, or that they come from the 
society itself. 
Such an assumption would give empirical support to the cultural relativism’s 
theory while discrediting universalism. 
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Another major issue with universalism is the epistemological one, which is related 
to our knowledge: it is in fact possible to be confronted with two or more perspectives, 
which appear to be all perfectly valuable.  
In this case it could be difficult to determine which one of them should be the 
correct one. It seems in this case that we do not have such an objective standard of 
morality, as we only have access to opinions and points of view which are largely 
determined by society and culture, and therefore relative. 
Even if it is challenging to precisely define what a culture is, being a complex 
patterns of laws, lifestyles, religions and traditions; the position of cultural relativists 
seems to be the one more tolerant and based on the appreciation of other cultures.   
Many people furthermore support cultural relativism because of his standing 
against ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, the idea that one culture can be superior 
to another one, and that one culture’s principles can be forcibly imposed on another one. 
As a matter of fact, under cultural relativism each culture can follow its own moral 
code, which is leading to the right rules, equally valuable and valid, while outsiders have 
no right to interfere and no reason to think that other cultures must be “improved” or 
“changed”. 
Such authors see the Western human rights discourse not as a dialogue but as a 
sort of “monologue”186, not able to consider at the same time the complexity of our society 
and to recognize its alterity and plurality, without falling into a reduction to the unity, not 
recognizing the complementary role of Logos (Reason) and Mhytos, abstract and 
concrete. 
This monologue is considered as “potentially oppressive to those who do not share 
our values and conceptions” and the universalistic position is criticized as leading to a 
“globalized Western localism” which “does not permit the mutual enrichment of our 
culture (...) and “takes us from a logic of complementarity and of exchange to a logic of 
exclusion and of power.”187  
                                                 
186 Eberhard C., (2002b), Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue. An Anthropological Perspective. 




However, the relativistic approach is not less criticized. In its absolutization of 
differences it leads to the same result: the impossibility of a real dialogue, the non-
recognition of the Other and the final imposition of one’s own values on the others.  
Both positions can be seen as part of purely speculative debate, ending with the 
same negative result. For this reason, universalism and relativism can be finally 
considered as two sides of the same coin.  
In their extreme version, they lead to the same negative result, namely the non-
recognition of the Other and the negation of dialogue. 
The “Third Way” proposed by some authors (Eberhard as well as Panikkar), is an 
alternative to both universalism and cultural relativism, is the way of a “Dialogical 
Dialogue”, a pluralistic, intercultural and interdisciplinary way, which does not mean 
neither a depreciation of the universal value of human rights as universal principles nor a 
total deconstruction of the Western approach but rather “an enrichment of this approach 
through different cultural perspectives” and the movement from “a logic of exclusion of 
the contraries to a logic of complementarity of differences.”188  
In the language of Raimon Panikkar, the main interdisciplinary and intercultural 
methodology is conceived as a “Diatopical Heremeneutic” based on “Homeomorphic 
Equivalents”. 
To exemplify this concept Panikkar is using the metaphor of the windows. In this 
paradigm cultures are seen as windows: it is only through another window (another 
culture) that we are able to identify, recognize our own window (our own culture).  
In this sense the Other (other cultures) is essential in order to recognize ourselves 
(our own culture). If then we want to communicate we need a common language, a 
“mutually understandable language”, which does not mean exactly the same language 
but an “Homeomorphic Equivalent”. This means not just a mere analogy but “a peculiar 
functional equivalence discovered through a topological transformation.”189  
Following this perspective, different philosophical and religious conceptions of 
the world can be translated into different languages, legal systems and social structures.  
                                                 
188 Ibidem, p.116. 
189 Panikkar, R., (1984), Is the notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? Interculture, Vol.XVII, n° 1, 
Cahier 82, p. 164. 
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However, if we are willing to, we will always be able to share a common language 
without reducing one culture to the other, without falling into the trap of ethnocentrism 
and of the “encompassing of the contrary”190, recognizing other cultures as deserving the 
same value of our own.  
This idea of the necessity to share a mutually understandable language has been 
strongly supported also by Ken Tsutsumibayashi in his article “Fusion of Horizons or 
Confusion of Horizons?” where the issue of intercultural dialogue has been reformulated 
in terms of “global ethic”, “shared moral consciousness” and “intercivilizational 
dialogue” and the positive potential of intercultural dialogue has been discussed together 
with the implicit limits and risks that can be caused by an unreflective and unconscious 
way to approach cultural diversity and dialogue of civilizations.  
First of all intercivilizational dialogue is considered as essential not only in order 
to prevent conflicts and the risk of a “civilizational clash”, but also as a fundamental tool 
in order to address pressing global and regional problems.191  
The ever-increasing number of global problems highlights the ever-increasing 
need to find common solutions to these problems and this is a scope that can be achieved 
only through an enhanced global cooperation of states and non-state actors.  
By “global problems” we mean problems that affect the whole of the planet, and 
potentially all of the people who live on it, universal problems with universal 
consequences.  
Typical examples of global problems are the climate change and environmental 
degradation of the planet as well as terrorism and weapons of mass-destruction that affect 
the security of all human beings.  
“Bottom-up approaches” and civil society participation are fundamental in the 
achievement of these common objectives as well as voluntary collective will. Action of 
actors at the civil society level seems to be much more effective than the introduction of 
coercive measures from above. 
                                                 
190 Principle formulated by Louis Dumont explaining how the reference being our own values and 
conceptions make us to consider other’s values and conceptions as hierarchically inferior. See Eberhard,  
(2002), p. 108. 
191 Tsutsumibayashi, K., (2005), Fusion of Horizons or Confusion of Horizons? Intercultural Dialogue and 
its risks. Global Governance 11, p.103. 
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Along the same line of Panikkar and Eberhard, Tsutsumibayashi criticizes the 
“logo-centric approach” of our Western vision for which human rights discourse is 
centrally related with a “rational discourse aimed at articulating shared rational beliefs” 
and is sustaining on the other side a “fusion of horizons” centered on a “dialogical 
approach by which the interlocutors gradually come to achieve mutual understanding 
through the transformation or extension of their value criteria.”192 
 A fusion of horizons is therefore necessary in order for cultures and individuals 
to understand and better appreciate their reciprocal value and engage in a constructive 
dialogue.  
The main scope of the dialogue would be not an assimilation or reduction of one 
culture to another because a constructive dialogue does not mean that the two 
interlocutors will became identical or that they will lose part of their identities; but only 
that they will be finally able to understand each other and to share a “common ethos, a 
new moral vocabulary that is comprehensible by and attributable to both”.  
The main idea sustained by Tsutsumibayashi in his article is that the tension 
between Western and non-Western theories as regarding the universalist or relativist 
conception of human rights is caused not so much by the incompatibility of value systems 
as by “the lack of mutual recognition and understanding of how the various moral idioms 
are differently organized and expressed in different cultures.”193  
Only through this recognition of a mutual understandable language, a healthy 
pluralism will be possible in our multicultural society, one which will be able to preserve 
the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights for every human 
being, with due respect to cultural differences. 
As has been already underlined in this section, although there are many reasons to 
support cultural relativism, we must recognize that there also many problems with that. 
From different points of view, cultural relativism can be in fact considered as a worrying 
moral perspective. 
It is not a case in fact if the cultural perspectives towards human rights have often 
been used by authoritarian regimes to evade criticism of their oppressive policies, and 
                                                 




also as a vehicle of economic exploitation or military intervention in the name of cultural 
values, in order to justify or hide human rights violations. 
 The Dalai Lama affirms that “it is mainly the authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes who are opposed to the universality of human rights.”194 
On the one side, one of the most common argument against relativism is that it 
can judge as good and acceptable actions and criteria which are actually evil and 
unacceptable.  
Cultural relativists sustain in fact that what can be defined as good and correct is 
just what has been established and considered acceptable by our own society, while 
universalists will object that some actions are intrinsically evil and that cannot be 
considered as good, no matter if a society approves them or not. 
However, even if this is the most common objection against relativism, it appears 
to be also the weakest, as it simply presumes that there is an objective and universal 
standard or moral code, presuming to define what is right and what is wrong, without 
being able to indicate a definitive source of objective morality. 
Cultural relativists, on the other side, simply refuse any other standards and rules 
than the ones established by society.  
A stronger objection that can be made against cultural relativism is that it 
eventually leads morality to become inconsistent: if moral principles are not established 
once for all, they are just unpredictable and they can change every moment as public 
opinion changes too.  
This means, for example, that if a culture or society approves torture, murders or 
honor crimes, then such actions, which are evidently wrong, would become right and 
good, and it will not be possible to challenge them, just because this would be against the 
accepted morality. Therefore morals standards in that society would became fickle and 
inconsistent. 
Again relativists would object that such an assumption only presumes that 
universal moral standards actually exist and are the same for everyone, while this has not 
been demonstrated and moral principles remain subject to human feelings and opinions, 
                                                 
194 Dalai Lama (2001), “Human Rights and Universal Responsibilities”, in Patrick Hayden (ed.) pp 291-
297, The Philosophy of Human Rights, St. Paul, Paragon House, p. 294. 
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which actually represents for relativists the very foundation of morality, and are changing 
from place to place over time. 
Nonetheless, cultural relativists invoke always tolerance towards other cultures 
and societies as it was an universal moral rule that everyone should follow, even when 
they assume that universal moral rules do not exit, and certainly this sounds as a 
contradiction.  
They sustain that we must be tolerant and not interfere with other cultures, or try 
to change them, endorsing tolerance as an universal principle to be respected, but at the 
same time they do not admit the existence of any trans-cultural or universal principle. 
However, even if relativists sustain that morality is based upon culture, they do 
not intend to define as morality works within a society or among different societies: they 
are not able to define as a society should interact with another one or what we should 
impose to a society to be tolerant towards another one.  
In a few words cultural relativism is never pretending to dictate how a society 
should act, but just affirming that morality is in fact a product of culture and society, and 
that we should not judge other societies, based on our cultural principles and morality. 
We must admit however that we are living in multicultural societies, where each 
society is not a single entity with a single culture: mass migration has meant that in one 
single city it is possible to find people from every continent, every race and every religion. 
There are various indigenous cultures inside one single society and we struggle indeed to 
find uniformity. 
Cultural relativists can define as moral principles work within a society or a 
specific group but they are not providing any suggestions on how different groups and 
different cultures should behave and interact in a single society; not any concrete 
indications on how people from other cultures should be treated when they move from 
one society to another, if through assimilation or in another manner. 
The main problem is that cultural relativists probably assume that all cultures are 
homogeneous and uniform, while this is not the case. People can belong to the same 




In every democratic society, they can never be forced to blindly obey and follow 
the customs they were raised with, while they can make their own mind based on personal 
beliefs, emotions and point of views. 
In a few words, we could assume that, in its extreme perspective, cultural 
relativism could finally lead us toward subjectivism and anti-realism, basing moral 
principles only on personal opinions and feelings, whereby there are not real reason to 
follow a specific moral perspective except the one of enjoying some personal benefits in 
following it. 
It must also be said that often the moral principles of a community do not really 
correspond to the public opinion of that community but to the opinions of a privileged, 
dominant caste (public or religious leaders for example).  
 Society is actually composed of many different elements such as policies, culture, 
religion and traditions which are difficult to balance and the only way to make a society 
“homogeneous”  would be to impose a specific way of life. 
According to Cultural Relativism the right moral principles are the ones which are 
approved by the tradition of own our society, while the wrong ones are the ones which 
are disapproved by the same society. 
But for what reason should we be obliged to follow the rules of our own society, 
independently if we agree or not with that? Where does this obligation come from? 
A possible justification could be that we are obeying the rules out of gratefulness 
for our home country and traditions. Another possible justification can be identified on 
the Social Contract Theory.  
According to Thomas Hobbes, for example, we need to follow specific rules in 
our society because we have tacitly signed a social contract and because with no rules life 
in society would simply be impossible. Therefore we must follow rules because it is 
actually in our interest to do so: following rules in our society allows us to keep our lives 
safe and be granted protection.  
Still there is no reason why a person should be obliged to follow a rule imposed 
by society, even when he does not want to. 
We should therefore try to understand whether it is possible to find a compromise 
in a medium position which could be the pluralistic one.  
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In a pluralistic system in fact, many different moral codes and rules can coexist, 
as far as there is  a core of  minimum moral standards which must be met. 
Such minimum moral standards, we may call them fundamental human rights,  
must be common to all cultures and societies, eventually reinforcing the idea of a number 
of trans-cultural moral principles which are directly linked with the notion of an universal 






























IV.2 Multiculturalism and Human Rights: an Anthropology of Law’s 
Perspective. 
 
"Tell me how you conceive the world and I will tell you how you conceive Law" 
("Dis-moi comment tu penses le monde, et je te dirai comment tu penses le Droit"), said 
one of founding fathers and main representatives of French legal anthropology, Michel 
Alliot.195 
What questions does this statement raise about the theory and practice of human 
rights? What are the limits and the potentials of intercultural dialogue in addressing these 
questions?  
At least since 1960, French legal anthropologists are looking for a “non-
ethnocentric”, intercultural definition of law which can eventually break with the 
“evolutionist and ethnocentric prejudices of the preceding era”, allowing for a 
considerable progress in anthropological and epistemological research.  
Colonialism had indeed brought in the past century “a period of considerable 
ethnocentrism in law” where “the principle of assimilation went hand in hand with a lack 
of understanding of indigenous legal practices, and with the emphasis on Western law in 
general, and Napoleonic law in particular.”196  
It seems to be paramount in our “globalised society” to re-think a concept of 
modernity and law, which does not exclusively correspond to our own Western idea of 
law, state, and modernity.  
In this respect the contribution of anthropology of law can be considered as 
essential, especially if we are considering the phenomenon of globalisation as not only an 
economic one but as a multi-dimensional and multifaceted process that encompass the 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions.  
In his article “Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue. An Anthropological 
Perspective”, Eberhard defines the role of the anthropologist of law as “in between” and 
denounces the failure of the Western tendency to promote and transfer a Western model 
of law, state, sovereignty and democracy, worldwide.  
                                                 
195 Alliot, M., (1989), La Méditerranée et le Droit. Bulletin de Liaison du Laboratoire d’Anthropologie 
Juridique de Paris, n° 15,  p.31. 




The anthropologist of law can be considered for Eberhard as “in between”, 
meaning between the “top-down approach” of law considered as a “modern tradition 
associated with reason” which categories and solutions “seem universal and ready to be 
applied everywhere”; and the “bottom-up” perspective of the anthropologist of law, which 
tries to understand “how things are”, starting from the “grass roots perspectives” and the 
indigenous experiences and thus avoiding an “exotic construction of the other, freezing 
him/her in a faraway space or time.”197  
Alliot’s definition of law as the “the struggling and the consensus on the outcomes 
of the struggling in the domains a society consider as being vital” 198, as well as other 
anthropologic definitions of law, are all trying to avoid an abstract conception of law as 
a general set of rules universally applicable everywhere.  
Law, for French anthropologists, must be rethought in more pluralistic and 
complex terms, taking into account not only theories but also practices of actors, 
especially in non-Western contexts. 
Taking into account this perspective and the fact that different societies have and 
have the right to have different cosmovisions, Alliot elaborates his theory of “legal 
archetypes”.  
Three different archetypes are identified: the Chinese archetype or the “Archetype 
of Identification”, the African archetype or the “Archetype of 
Differentiation/Manipulation”, and finally the Western archetype or the “Archetype of 
Submission.”199  
The latter archetype reflects the general cosmovision of our Western, especially 
Christian society, in which the world is seen as being created by an external power 
imposing universal norms and rules from the outside.  
The external power in this case is God but it can be considered also as his 
“secularized avatar, the State.”200 The State is in this model represented as a rationalized 
version of God.  
                                                 
197 Eberhard C., (2002b), Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue. An Anthropological Perspective. 
Indian Socio-Legal Journal 27, pp. 104-105. 
198 Alliot, Michel, (1983), Anthropologie et Juristique. Sur les conditions de l’élaboration d’une science du 
droit. Bullettin de Liaison du Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Juridique de Paris n° 6, 83-117. 
199 Ibidem, pp. 83-117. 
200 Eberhard C., (2002b), Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue. An Anthropological Perspective. 
Indian Socio-Legal Journal 27, p.115. 
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In any case the emphasis is on the fact that our rules and laws are “universal” just 
because they come from a superior order and authority. The negative results of this 
archetype are for Alliot the consequent reduction of responsibilities of the society, the 
exclusion of the differences and the complete submission of the citizens to the laws of the 
State (or to the laws of God). 
The second archetype, the African one, is centered in the concept of 
differentiation/manipulation and reflects the African vision of the world and of a society 
based mainly on “animist” traditions. The African concept of the world results, following 
Alliot’s discourse, as completely opposite to the Western/submission one.  
Whereas in the Western tradition the origin of the world is to be found in the 
original God’s creation of the world, for the animist African societies there is not such a 
God creator because everything in the world basically derives from Chaos and from a 
circulation of different vital energies (anima). These energies in their corresponding 
interactions move towards the harmony and the equilibrium of the whole.  
Therefore as the Western archetype finally leads to a reduction in responsibilities 
for the society and to an attribution of the total responsibility and superiority to the 
State/God; the African people are perceived as totally responsible for the harmony of the 
society and of the whole. General immutable rules are rejected and people consider 
themselves responsible for their future. 
Finally the Chinese Archetype is the “Archetype of Identification”, illustrating 
another cosmovision with different consequences for the society that belongs to it.   
Also in this case the world seems not to be limited by any rule or external law 
coming from the outside. Neither can the world be defined as dominated by the chaos, 
the unstable and the unorganized as in the African case. 
In the case of the Chinese cosmovison the world is regulated spontaneously by 
itself and the individual has to self-regulate him/herself as a part of this world and of this 
cosmic harmony. The Chinese and especially the Confucian ideal is “an ideal of self-
improvement possible through education and self-discipline guided by the observance of 
the rites.”201   
                                                 
201 Eberhard C., (2002b), Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue. An Anthropological Perspective. 
Indian Socio-Legal Journal 27, p.113. 
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Anthropology of law therefore explicitly invites us to rethink the law from a 
pluralist and multilegal perspective and to open up the Western anthropocentric view.  
We are eventually invited to “recognize that our questions on human rights and 
the rule of law take a very different turn when it is not the Man, but the Cosmic or the 
Divine that plays the central structuring principle of worldview.”202 
In contemporary philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and especially the “later 
Wittgenstein”, can be considered as one of the main sources of inspiration as concerning 
the discourse on the cultural value of communication and language.203 
His ideas of ‘”form/s of life” (Lebensform/en), “language-games” (Sprachspiel), 
“family resemblance” (Familienähnlichkeit), “perspicuous representation” 
(Übersichtliche Darstellung), represent an important contribution to the current debate 
on language use and inter-cultural communication.  
Wittgenstein’s thought assumes indeed an important significance in the querelle 
concerning the dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism, when talking 
about the possibility (or impossibility) of cross-cultural understanding and dialogue, 
about the singularity or plurality of form(s) of life.204  
Even though Wittgenstein does not seem to provide any straightforward and 
consistent definition of the term “form(s) of life”205, the interest demonstrated in his 
writings concerning the issue of Alterity and Fremdheit (foreignness) is clear and 
unmistakable. 
Even if Wittgenstein is not trying to develop any specific theory or model for 
anthropologists and ethnologists, what we may call the Wittgensteinian intercultural, 
anthropological perspective, his “ethnological approach” to philosophy and in particular 
his harsh criticism on Frazer’s causal approach to ethnology, has an essential role in 
                                                 
202 Ibidem, p.116. 
203 Cfr. Nordby, H. (2008), Values, Cultural Identity and Communication: A Perspective From  
Philosophy of Language, Journal of Intercultural Communication, ISSN 1404-1634, issue 17. 
204 Thompson J. M., (2010), Form(s)-of-Life and the Possibility of the Other: Remarks on the Encounter of 
Alterity" in Form(s) of Life and the Nature of Experience, in Marques, A. / Venturinha, N. (eds), 
Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience (Lisbon Philosophical Studies), Peter Lang; 1 
edition, p. 98. 
205 Indeed the absence of a clear and positive definition of terms and concepts is something common in 




understanding the influence of our own language and culture on the explanation and 
perception of other cultures and values.206    
In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (hereafter RFGB),   
Wittgnestein  wrote:  
"Frazer is much more savage than most of his 'savages' [since] his explanations 
of [their] observances are much cruder than the sense of the observances themselves”. 
207 
According to him, the main mistake committed by Frazer, in his classic 
anthropological work The Golden Bough, was the one of considering ritual practices in 
scientific or rationalistic terms, disregarding their profound and symbolic dimension.  
It is a mistake, according to Wittgenstein, trying to give an explanation to the 
potent emotions evoked by traditional rituals by searching for their causal origins in 
history or prehistory.  
We should instead try to understand the troubling nature of such practices by 
referring to the inner meaning they already have in our lives. Scientific and causal 
justifications are necessarily limited when it comes to lightening many of our fundamental 
perplexities in the area of philosophy and of anthropology as well. 
The Wittgensteinian intercultural perspective is considered essential also in the 
perspective of recognizing the fundamental value of dialogue for an authentic recognition 
of the Other.  
Such recognition is not an assimilation or reduction of one culture to another, but 
a recognition of the fact that there is actually no cultural identity completely isolated, but 
rather an interconnection of different identities showing “family resemblances” 
(Familienähnlichkeit), allowing for a comparison and an understanding of other cultures 
which is not dissolving but respecting the differences.208  
                                                 
206 Cfr. Marques A. (2010), Forms of life: Between the Given and the Thought Experiment, in Marques, A. 
/ Venturinha, N. (eds), Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience (Lisbon Philosophical 
Studies), (pp. 143-154) Peter Lang, p. 147. See also Durt, C., (2007),Wittgenstein’s Ethnological Approach 
to Philosophy. In Kanzian, C. and Runggalier E., Cultures - Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of 
the 29th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg.  
207 Wittgenstein, L., (1987), Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, Brynmill Press Ltd. (first published 1967). 
208 Sbisà M., (2006), Against cultural identity: a family resemblance perspective on intercultural relations, 
in Kanzian, C. and Runggaldier E., Cultures - Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29th 
International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, pp. 295-297, and Durt, C., 
(2007),Wittgenstein’s Ethnological Approach to Philosophy. In Kanzian, C. and Runggalier E., Cultures - 
Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in 
Kirchberg, p. 53. 
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More than learning or pretending to teach something about other cultures’ customs 
and rites, Wittgenstein appears interested in methodological clarity (cfr. Übersichtliche 
Darstellung), understanding the influence of our own language and culture on the 
comprehension of other cultures and languages, of other “forms of life”.  
Understanding other cultures and concepts can be in fact first of all useful in order 
to enhance the clarity on our own culture and concepts, even when this process is not a 
simple one, even if does not mean an elimination of the tension in the relationship with 
the Other. 
Our experience of the Other is not in fact “neither an object to be described, nor 
a static situation involving distinct elements, but rather a relational disruption.”209  
The intransparency of another person’s thoughts reflects as in a mirror the 
foreignness of another peoples’ culture and tradition.210  
The task of philosophy is however for Wittgenstein not to solve scientific, 
empirical problems but to clarify concepts, to “do away with all explanation”, for 
“description alone to take place” (PI § 109).  
In order to better clarify our culture and concepts it is furthermore essential to 
clarify the way they are used in specific contexts, their significance and function. 
To understand the meaning and function of a specific custom or belief we must 
situate it in the specific context where it is practised, in the same way as, in order to 
understand the meaning and function of words and sentences, it is necessary to see how 
they are ordinarily used.  
The Wittgensteinian critique of the causal approach in ethnology appears therefore 
“mirrored in his critique of positivistic approaches to philosophy.”211 
As highlighted by Wittgenstein himself in his Philosophical Investigations: 
“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear 
                                                 
209 Thompson J. M., (2010), Form(s)-of-Life and the Possibility of the Other: Remarks on the Encounter of 
Alterity" in Form(s) of Life and the Nature of Experience, in Marques, A. / Venturinha, N. (eds), 
Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience (Lisbon Philosophical Studies), Peter Lang, p. 
109. 
210 Thompson J. M., (2006), The Significance of Interculturality for the Problem of (In)Transparency, in 
Kanzian, C. and Runggaldier E., Cultures - Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29th 
International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, p.351. 
211 Durt, C., (2007),Wittgenstein’s Ethnological Approach to Philosophy. In Kanzian, C. and Runggaldier 
E., Cultures - Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-
Symposium in Kirchberg, p.50. 
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view of the use of our words —Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A 
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing 
the connections." Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. The 
concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks 
the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a "Weltanschauung"?)”(PI 
§122) 
 
The same concept is reaffirmed in his Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough: 
“The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us. 
It denotes the form of our representation, the way we see things. (A kind of 'World-view' 
as it is apparently typical of our time. Spengler.)” (RFGB, Philosophical Occasions: 133) 
 
“This perspicuous representation brings about the understanding, which consists 
precisely in the fact that we "see the connections". Hence the importance of finding 
connecting links. But an hypothetical connecting link should in this case do nothing but 
direct the attention to the similarity, the relatedness, of the facts. As one might illustrate 
an internal relation of a circle to an ellipse by gradually converting an ellipse into a 
circle; but not in order to assert that a certain ellipse actually, historically, had originated 
from a circle (evolutionary hypothesis), but only in order to sharpen our eye for a formal 
connection. But I can also see the evolutionary hypothesis as nothing more, as the 
clothing of a formal connection." (RFGB, Philosophical Occasions: 133) 
 
Wittgenstein’s criticism is harsh: he describes Frazer as owing a “narrow spiritual 
life” in his impossibility to “conceive of a life different from that of the England of his 
time” (RFGB, 125), he accuses him of basing his reasoning not on scientific proves and 
explanations as he sustains, but rather on subjective biases and simple prejudices (RFGB, 
125), revealing himself “much more savage than most of his savages, for they are not as 
far removed from the understanding of a spiritual matter as a twenty-century English 
man” (RFGB, 131). 
In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer’s causal, 
evolutionary, positivistic approach to ethnology, his failed attempt to explain certain 
human practices and facts by means of causal hypotheses regarding their origin.  
Wittgenstein does not believe in substance that an empirical approach or an 
evolutionary theory (from the most primitive habits to the most developed ones) can be 
applied to ethnology.  
Frazer’s explanations of human practices are not really satisfying in Wittgenstein’ 
view because their meaning and function, as well as the impression they cause on us, is 
not due to any hypothesis about their origins and do not follow any evolutionary scheme 
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of progress (from “magic” to “science”, for example). 
The ethnological approach is seen by Wittgenstein as in open contrast and 
contradiction with the causal approach adopted by Frazer, which is considered as 
misleading because it suggests a description as it was the only possible one, while 
excluding in principle the possibility of other descriptions212, analysing facts as they 
should or are supposed to be and not as they actually are.  
This does not mean that the origin is irrelevant but only that the customs might 
respond to different purposes in different times, or might not even have any special 
purpose at all, and that the individuation of their original cause may not help in 
understanding their effective meaning and function.213  
Wittgenstein seems therefore to suggest that an ethnological approach would be 
more essential to philosophy then a causal one, allowing for seeing things more 
objectively, defending “the possibility of a human form of life that is against any 
mythology whatsoever.”214  
In Wittgenstein’s opinion it is eventually possible to achieve a better 
comprehension of human practices and customs through a “perspicuous representation” 
(Übersichtliche Darstellung): an understanding of facts, which does not aim to explain 
phenomena via hypotheses and causal explanations but offers a methodology of 
comparisons, allowing “to see the connections” between the facts of different phenomena. 
Perspicuous representation would then represent a method allowing for seeing 
“family resemblances”, not as just simple, superficial enumerations of connections, but 
as connections that are meaningful to us (cfr. Panikkar’s concept of “Homeomorphic 
Equivalent”).  
Such a method will not allow for a definitive explanation of phenomena and 
practices but will enable us to better see how they relate to each other. 
I consider this understanding of forms of life, which can be comprehended only 
by “seeing connections”, “family resemblances”, individuating specific “language 
                                                 
212 Durt, C., (2007),Wittgenstein’s Ethnological Approach to Philosophy. In Kanzian, C. and Runggaldier 
E., Cultures - Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue: Proceedings of the 29th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-
Symposium in Kirchberg, p.43. 
213 Ibidem, p.46 
214 Marques A. (2010), Forms of life: Between the Given and the Thought Experiment, in Marques, A. / 
Venturinha, N. (eds), Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience (Lisbon Philosophical 
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games” through a “perspicuous representation”, as very close to the view of the authors 
previously considered, as well as denoting a positive attitude towards a concept of 
intercultural dialogue which is not based neither in misinterpretations nor on a logo-
centric, ethnocentric approach to other cultures and believes; representing in the last 
instance an “implied critique of the relentless pursuit of the final or ultimate ground in 
Reason.”215   
The experience of the Other, which is always an experience of tension and 
disruption, is finally not necessarily to be found outside, in exotic and faraway lands but 
inside our own culture and “even within ourselves”216 and does not allows for definitive 
solutions, being a permanent paradox, a tension with which we must simply coexist in an 
always renewing effort to understand the Other. 
As it is has been underlined throughout this chapter, only an interdisciplinary 
approach to societies and cultures should be considered as a truly intercultural approach 
and should be the general perspective to follow when approaching different kind of 
societies, mentalities and legal systems.  
It is very important to be aware of the possible risks involved in certain attempts, 
especially from certain groups, to politically manipulate cultural contents of a nation or 
society, as for example in the case of a strong nationalism, when cultural comparison is 
only used to enhance a national sense of cultural superiority, setting criteria for inclusion 
and for exclusion which finally lead to a clear discrimination of certain groups of the 
society.  
In this era of globalization, economic as well as social, political and cultural 
globalization, Western societies are experiencing major economic, social and cultural 
challenges.  
One of the biggest challenges to face is a new multiethnic and pluralistic society 
and the main purpose of intercultural dialogue should be promoting a model of integration 
that does not include assimilation and permits a mutual cooperation, understanding and 
enrichment of different cultures in the same environment.  
                                                 
215 Thompson J. M., (2010), Form(s)-of-Life and the Possibility of the Other: Remarks on the Encounter of 
Alterity" in Form(s) of Life and the Nature of Experience, in Marques, A. / Venturinha, N. (eds), 





This is nowadays essential for a pacific cohabitation of people and cultures and 
for the realization of a real mutual enrichment through the dialogue between different 
cultures and traditions. The anthropological perspective of the authors here analyzed may 


























PART V  
 
Chapter 4 Universal Rights and/or Minority Rights? Towards a New 
Model of Integration. 
 
 
V. Universal Rights and/or Minority Rights? Individual Rights vs 
Group’s Rights. 
 
The period immediately after the First World War in Europe was characterised by 
a strong interest of the states in the protection of minorities rights, especially considered 
in their link with the maintenance of global peace and security and in the framework of a 
strategy aiming at preventing conflicts.217 
The main area of activity of the League of Nations, together with the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, was in fact the protection of minorities in certain countries. 
It consisted of a system of special minorities provisions and/or bilateral treaties, which 
the defeated states were compelled to sign.218 
The League of Nations was therefore trying to protect not only the individual 
rights of the members of minorities but also their group rights to exist as cultural, religious 
and linguistic entities against assimilation tendencies.219  
The protection of minority rights then led directly to the development of the 
universal system of protection of human rights.  
As underlined by Paul Sieghart in his book The Lawful Rights of Mankind “all 
human rights exist for the protection of minorities”220, and history highlights how 
                                                 
217 In 1914, in fact, the problems of minorities in South-East Europe proved to be one of the major triggers 
of the First World War, the immediate cause of which having been the assassination of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and Austria–Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia, linked to Austria’s inability to address the 
claims of the Serbian minority in Bosnia. Cfr. Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), (2007), 
Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention, by Clive Baldwin, Chris Chapman and Zoë Gray., p.4. 
218 The League of Nations (LON) was an inter-governmental organisation founded as a result of the Treaty 
of Versailles in 1919–1920, and the precursor to the United Nations. The League's primary goals as stated 
in its Covenant included preventing war through collective security, disarmament, and settling international 
disputes through negotiation and arbitration. Other goals in this and related treaties included labour 
conditions, just treatment of native inhabitants, trafficking in persons and drugs, arms trade, global health, 
prisoners of war, and protection of minorities in Europe. See Article 23, The Covenant of the League of 
Nations. 
219 Schechtman, J. B. (1951), “Decline of the International Protection of Minority Rights”, in The Western 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 2. 
220 Cfr. Sieghart, P., (1986), The Lawful Rights of Mankind—An Introduction to the International Legal 
Code of Human Rights. Oxford University Press. 
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minority rights are not a marginal human rights question, solely of concern of the 
individual or group involved, but a question of concern for the society as a whole.  
The post-Second World War period however, has been characterised by a general 
more “cautious approach to minority rights” and by “a reluctance to agree on a definition 
of minorities.”221  
It was a period characterised by the failure of the League system, which 
demonstrates inadequate in solving the issue of minorities in Europe; due to the rise of 
the universal system of protection of human rights and to the triumph of the concept of 
Nation-State.  
The international human rights system appeared therefore with the establishment 
of the UN in 1945. At that time the general approach that prevailed was essentially against 
the recognition of minority rights, even though UN proclaimed the rights of minorities as 
a matter of international concern.  
The dominant view was that individual human rights were enough to provide for 
the interests of minorities as well. It was assumed that through the general non-
discrimination principle and the principle of equality before the law, individuals 
belonging to a minority could be sufficiently protected.  
Minority rights were considered as “running counter to the aspiration of 
international human rights law to protect universal, not contingent, features of human 
identity.”222 
While considering the assumption that linguistic, religious and cultural affiliations 
are essential features of what it means to be a human being, they were also believed to 
“possess the capacity to divide people into different communities, create insiders and 
outsiders, put ethnicity against ethnicity, and threaten the universal aspirations.”223  
The attention was therefore focused on policies of equality for all citizens 
indifferent to any specific group’s membership.  
The apprehension of state actors as well as the resentment of majorities in regard 
to minorities allegedly having a privileged position, was in this way overcame by 
                                                 
221 Vijapur, A. P. (2006), “International Protection of Minority Rights”, in International Studies, vol. 43, 
p.367. 
222 Macklem, P., (2008), “Minority rights in international law”, in International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, Oxford Journals, Oxford University Press, Vol. 6,  n º 3-4, p.533. 
223 Ibidem, p. 532. 
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conferring equal human rights to each individual regardless of his/her affiliation to a 
specific group.  
Consequently, during the post-World War II period, the emphasis was almost 
exclusively on individual rights and only by the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, the 
need for a more tailored approach to minorities, in addition to the recognition of 
individual human rights, was recognized under international human rights law.  
This acknowledgment was mainly driven by a series of violent and serious ethnic 
conflicts, which have been dramatically characterizing the post-cold War period, and 
have prompted international law to develop mechanisms to respond to these issues, 
reconsidering the international law’s position on minority rights and the urgency of 
developing the necessary framework for resolving such conflicts.224 
It became obvious that one of the main reasons for present and past ethnic conflicts 
worldwide was the low participation level of minorities in the power-sharing and 
decision-making process of their countries and that “besides according them legal 
protection and practicing tolerance towards them, peace is not possible in these multi-
ethnic states.”225  
As underlined by Vijapur, among others, in its article International Protection of 
Minority Rights, shortcomings in the international protection of minority rights are mainly 
due to “the apprehension of state actors fearing that the abuse of the right to self-
determination and the rights of indigenous people will endanger the existing socio-
political order.”226  
Various scholars recognize that States are refusing to take minority rights 
seriously because they are afraid that it would encourage outside interference, threaten 
the cohesion of the State and discriminate against majorities and the rights of individuals. 
                                                 
224 Ethnic based conflicts in the 20th century ranged from those involving Jews as well as Roma people with 
their attempted extermination by the Nazi regime during World War II, to the diverse racial groups in South 
Africa and Namibia, longstanding tensions between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, 
genocidal fighting between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, violence in Basque region and 
Algeria, separatist movements in Quebec, Senegal, Kurd and East Timor and civil wars in the Balkans, 
Sudan, DRC and Cote d’Ivoire. UN reported that in the first half of the 1990s alone, nearly five millions of 
people died as a result of civil wars and ethnic conflicts. For a detailed analysis of ethnic based conflicts in 
the 20th century see: Gurr, T.R  (2000), People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 
225 Vijapur, A. P. (2006), p.368. 
226 Ibidem, p. 367. 
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The last two hundred years of European political history, have in fact witnessed 
the formation and the legitimization of Nation-States which have “a tendency to become 
“ethnic states”, that is to say “States which belong to an ethnic majority”.227 
The process of nation building and legitimization of Nation-States went through 
the idea of “state unity”, which was often put into practice through a policy of socio-
cultural homogenization and forced integration of the population of a state.  
Such policy has been frequently imposed by hegemonic political elites in order to 
subordinate social groups which were considered as “dangerous” or socially marginal. 
The tension between the homogenisation processes of the nation-state and the 
reality of ethnic diversity was then expressed in terms of the problem of minorities.  
Thus the new international system created after 1945, even providing a good 
framework for democratic changes in many parts of the world, “by denying any legitimate 
space to group claims, simultaneously offered a framework legitimating the pursuit of 
homogeneity and suppression of diversity.”228  
Diversity has been perceived as “an obstacle and a threat not only to achieve 
homogeneity but also to the achievement of equal rights by all without regard to their 
group membership”.229  
This “national culture” appears in contrast and sometimes violent competition 
with “aliens” and “strangers” and eventually “those people and groups who are less 
successful in creating their own nation-state and who are incorporated into the nation-
states of other people become “ethnic” or “national minorities.”230  
Groups which are not able, not successful or maybe not willing, to create their 
own nation-state are subjected to rejection or assimilation policies which mainly result in 
a complete denial of their identity. 
Roma people, for example, as well as other marginalized people, could be 
considered as one of these groups, not able, not successful or maybe not willing, to create 
                                                 
227 Gheorghe N and Acton T. (1994), “Dealing with Multiculturality: Minority, Ethnic, National and Human 
Rights”, in ODIHR Bulletin no.2 , vol.3, p.29 
228 Dersso, S. (2007), "Minority Rights under International Human Rights Law: From Liberal Individualism 
to Multiculturalism and Beyond", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society 
Association, TBA, Berlin, Germany, p.10. 
229 Ibidem. 
230 Gheorghe N and Acton T. (1994), p.29. 
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their own nation-state and, for this reason, subjected in different times in history to 
rejection or assimilation policies throughout all of Europe. 
Such policies mainly resulted in a complete denial of those people’s identity, as a 
group and as individuals as well, an almost complete denial of their human rights as well 
as the rejection of their culture, language and lifestyle, of their specific ethnic, linguistic 
and cultural roots and values. 
As concerning the official definition of minority, although individual scholars 
have attempted a number of definitions, “a universally agreed-upon definition of 
“minority” still does not exist today.”231  
As underlined by Schechtman in his article Decline of the International Protection 
of Minority Rights: 
“ This lack of progress is, however, hardly the result of lack of good will on the 
part of the Sub-Commission. It reflects the general deep reluctance on the part of the 
United Nations to revive, even in a revised and "softened" form, any positive system 
destined to perpetuate the distinctive group existence of the minorities and to establish 
an international legal machinery for enforcing this system. While willing and ready to 
take measures securing prevention of discrimination against individual members of 
minority groups and even paying lip service to the principle of collective minority rights, 
the major powers in the United Nations have consistently avoided any definite 
commitments in this field.”232  
 
However, of all the definitions suggested the one given by Francesco Capotorti in 
the UN Study on Minorities in 1991, is the more cited and accepted: 
“A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population 
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their 
culture, traditions, religion or language.”233  
 
Notwithstanding the absence of a universally agreed-upon definition of 
“minority” and of an international legally binding treaty on minorities’ protection, the 
international community now recognizes that: 
 
                                                 
231 Vijapur A. P., (2006), p. 371. 
232 Schechtman, J. B. (1951), p.8. 
233 Capotorti, F.,(1991), Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, Geneva: United Nations Centre for Human Rights, p.96. 
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 “It is not sufficient merely to ensure that there is no discrimination against 
minorities. Special measures are essential to protect and promote the rights of minorities, 
particularly those necessary for minorities to preserve their identity and culture. Only 
over the past decade has the international community taken such measures. These include 
the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Minorities Declaration) in 1992, 
and the subsequent creation of the UN Sub-Commission Working Group on 
Minorities.”234 
 
The importance of supplementing individual human rights mechanisms with 
minority rights has been recognised to some extent also by the European system of 
protection of human rights. 
It has been proven in fact that individual rights violations have arisen from the 
rejection of collective rights,235 that is why the latter should be regarded as a supplement.  
The protection of human rights in general and of minority rights in particular is 
necessary to promote international and regional security and to prevent ethnic conflicts 
and tensions and the terms “minority rights” and “human rights” should be considered as 
complementary and not contradictory. 
Positive obligations of the states along with negative obligations, non-
interference, protection of individual as well as collective rights, should be considered for 
the safeguard of minorities. 
This is even more necessary nowadays when we are experiencing a change in 
model of our society switching from the old concept of Nation-State to societies that are 
always more multi-ethnic.  
The issue of minority rights becomes fundamental to preserve the stability and 
prosperity of the multi-religious/multicultural modern nation-states system.  
That is the reason why, as underlined by Dersso in its article Minority Rights under 
International Human Rights Law: From Liberal Individualism to Multiculturalism and 
Beyond, a new “multicultural conception of minority rights” is now necessary, namely a 
                                                 
234 UN Guide for Minorities, Pamphlet No. 2, “Minorities and the United  Nations: the UN Working Group 
on Minorities”, p.1. 
235 O’Nions, Helen, (2007), Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe, 
(Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations), Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 33. 
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new conception of a modern multi-ethnic state composed of different overlapping ethnic 
groups and opposite to the classical concept of nation-state.236 
Collective rights as well as liberal individual rights and entitlements are necessary, 
that is to say not only a general negative principle of non-discrimination against minorities 
but also positive actions in order to guarantee them with full participation in social life 
and political decision-making, a recognition of minority cultures through institutions and 
symbols of the state and a more equilibrate distribution of resources. 
The thesis is that, since we are living in a time of multiculturalism and 
globalization where largely homogenous societies are becoming ethnically diverse; a 
new, inclusive definition of national identity is required, which recognise this change in 
Western states and the diversity of multi-ethnic societies, which recognises members of 
minorities as an integral part of the whole and not as simply “others” or inside-outsiders.  
Such measures are necessary for the benefit of the whole society in order to 
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V.1 The International System of Protection of Minorities Rights. The 
Example of Roma/Gypsies’ People. 
 
 
V.1.1 Minority Rights Protection at UN level. 
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights237 at its first session appointed a special 
“Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities”.238  
The Sub Commission was working on a formulation of a definition of minorities 
while considering a draft Declaration on Minorities, but after fifteen years of discussions 
the Members decided not to include any definition and up to now no effort has been made 
towards a comprehensive legally binding minority convention at the UN level.  
Notwithstanding the issue of minorities protection was significantly discussed 
during the drafting process, the draft text for Article 31 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), was not included in the declaration.239 
All that the General Assembly of the UN managed to do at that time was to transfer 
the matter of minorities to the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities in order to undertake “a thorough study of the problem of 
minorities.”240 
Even though the proposed draft of the declaration enshrined rights of minorities 
to their own religious, educational and cultural institutions as well as minority language 
protection, these provisions were omitted from the final version adopted by the General 
Assembly.  
                                                 
237 Known as Human Rights Council since 2006. 
238 The “Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities” was first formed 
in 1947. It was the main subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights. It was composed of twenty-
six experts whose responsibility was “to undertake studies, particularly in light of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and make recommendations to the Commission concerning the prevention of 
discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, 
national, religious and linguistic minorities”. It was renamed, after 1999, “Sub Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights”. A brief history of the Sub-Commissionis is contained in U.N. 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2, September 1947; also United Nations Yearbook of Human Rights, Lake Success, 
1947, p. 425. 
239 Draft Article 31: “In States inhabited by well-defined ethnic, linguistic or religious groups which are 
clearly distinguished from the rest of the population, and which want to be accorded differential treatment, 
persons belonging to such groups shall have the right, as far as is compatible with public order and security, 
to establish and maintain their schools and cultural or religious institutions, and to use their own language 
in script, in the press, in public assembly and before the courts and other authorities of the State, if they so 
choose”. (E/CN.4/52). 
240UN, G.A. Res.217C (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), “The Fate of Minorities”. 
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In the end all its thirty articles do not contain any special mention of minorities 
and their rights. Almost every right in the UDHR is in fact expressed as an individual 
right even though the Declaration does have some collective features and individuals have 
the right to participate in some collective activities: Article 16 gives families the right to 
protection by society and the State, Article 20 states the right to freedom of assembly and 
association, Article 21 establishes the “will of the people” as the basis of authority of 
government, Article 26 gives parents the right to choose the kind of education that shall 
be given to their children while Article 27 affirms the right to participate in the cultural 
life of a community.  
The UDHR furthermore expanded the principle of non-discrimination enunciated 
under the Charter of the UN. Accordingly, its Article 2 proclaims:  
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”.241 
 
Prior to the proclamation of the UDHR in 1948, the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide was adopted during the same year. Article 2 of this 
Convention defines “genocide” as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.”242  
The Convention can be said to cover physical, biological and cultural genocide 
but does not, though, states categorically that a group has the right to exist, as it formulates 
the norm in negative connotation, i.e., the prohibition of the destruction of a group. 
 However, in international law the “right to exist as a group” is generally inferred 
from this “prohibition of genocide.”243 Furthermore, the term “genocide” does not 
encompass only the total destruction of a group but extends to the infliction of “serious 
bodily or mental harm” and “the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the physical destruction of all or part of a group.”244  
                                                 
241UN General Assembly, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948. 
242 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78,, Art. 2. 
243 Galenkamp, M., (1991), “Collective Rights: Much Ado about Nothing”, in NQHR, no.3, pp.53-55. 
244 Measures such as “preventing births within a group and the forcible deportation of a group’s children” 
also fall under this definition. See Galenkamp, (1991), p. 55. 
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The greatest weakness of the Genocide Convention, however, is the complete 
absence of any enforcement provision.245 
On the other side Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and political 
Rights (ICCPR) reads:  
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language”.246 
 
This is the first international norm and the only legally binding on the ratifying 
states, on the rights and protection of minorities under international law.247  
It is the first one explicitly referring to minorities, even though it frames minority 
rights in mainly individualistic terms. At the time of the drafting process of the Covenant 
an Indian member of the Sub Commission, suggested to attach a draft convention or a 
draft protocol to the Covenant specific for the protection of minorities, but this proposal 
was rejected.248  
In any case, minority rights in this Covenant are considered “not as minority rights 
qua minorities, but only as entitlements to persons belonging to minorities, and hence as 
individual rights.”249  
The choice concerning the utilization of this terminology in the ICCPR underlines 
a “deliberate decision designed to avoid giving to these groups an international 
personality. Such international personality, it was feared, might have given a minority 
the capacity to secure enforcement of its rights before the Human Rights Committee”,250 
and, in fact, the first Protocol to this Covenant gives the right to submit petitions only to 
individuals and not to groups.251  
Furthermore it applies only to those states in which minorities exist, encouraging 
the states to deny the existence of minorities in their territory252 and imposing on states 
                                                 
245 Vijapur, (2006), p. 374. 
246 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
247 Dersso, (2007), p.13. 
248 Vijapur, (2006), p. 372. 
249 Dersso, (2007), p. 13-14. 
250 Vijapur, (2006), p. 375. 
251 In contrast with Article 1 of the ICCPR, which guarantees a right of self-determination to all “peoples”: 
“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (Art 1.1 ICCPR). 
252 For example in the case of France, which at the time of its accession to the ICCPR, declared that “in the 
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only “negative” duties of non-interference while not requiring them to assist, through 
positive actions, the members of minorities living in their jurisdiction.  
However it must be noted that the General Comment n.23 of the Human Rights 
Committee on Article 27, attempts to conceptualise this provision constructively as 
imposing positive obligations on States, stating that: 
“Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does 
recognise the existence of a "right" and requires that it shall not be denied. Consequently, 
a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise of this 
right are protected against their denial or violation. Positive measures of protection are, 
therefore, required not only against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its 
legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other 
persons within the State party”.253 
 
Articles 18, 25 and 20.2 of ICCPR are also related with group rights, in particular 
concerning the freedom to profess a religion, the right to worship and the right to live in 
accordance with religious beliefs (Art. 18), safeguard against acts of violence or 
persecution directed towards religious minorities (Art. 20.2), and groups rights 
participation in public life (Art. 25).254 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)  
also contains several provisions related to the protection of persons belonging to 
minorities, mainly Article 13, 14 and 15 concerning the right to education and the right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life.255 
Nevertheless the most UN representative document for the protection of 
minorities is the “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 18 
December 1992, as it represents the first international human rights instrument 
                                                 
light of Article 2 of the Constitution of French Republic, Article 27 of the Covenant is not applicable so far 
as the Republic is concerned”, denying in fact the existence of minorities in their own territory. 
253UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of 
Minorities). 
254 ICCPR, 1966, Art. 18, Art. 20.2, Art. 25. 
255UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In 
particular Article 13 establishes a scale of state obligations in the sense that primary education shall be 
compulsory and free for all, secondary education available and accessible, and higher education equally 
accessible to all (Art. 13.2). Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article recognise the right of persons to choose for 




exclusively devoted to minority rights and the recognition of the need to deal with 
minority rights through specific instruments.  
As underlined by S. Dresso: 
 “it can be said that the adoption of the Declaration ushered in the beginning of a 
new period in the development of international norms on minority issues, although the 
instrument still reflects the individualist orientation of the UN. As the first human rights 
instrument of the UN on minorities, the Declaration reflects, although not fully, an 
acknowledgement by the international community of the need to recognize the rights of 
minorities and provide for normative frameworks that respond to ethnic tensions that 
threatened peace and stability within states.” 256 
 
The Declaration restates the rights under Article 27 (ICCPR) but it also provides 
for additional special rights, underlying which measures States should take for the 
protection and promotion of minority rights, as for example the promotion of knowledge 
concerning minority cultures amongst the majority population, provisions for minority 
language instruction and more specifically states in Article 2: 
 
1. … the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and 
to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any 
form of discrimination.  
2. … the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and 
public life.  
3. … the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where 
appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions 
in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.  
4. … the right to establish and maintain their own associations.  
5. … the right to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful 
contacts with other members of their group and with persons belonging to other 
minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they 
are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.”257 
 
Although the declaration marked a significant advancement in the elaboration of 
norms on minority rights, it must be recognised that minority representatives did not have 
a role in the drafting process and that, as with article 27 of the ICCPR, the declaration 
casts these rights still in individualistic terms.  
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Furthermore and most importantly, the declaration as such is not legally binding 
and it does not have any serious monitoring mechanism attached. The provisions of the 
declaration are replete with vague or negative phrases like “encourage conditions”, 
“appropriate”, and “in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.”  
The questions relating to collective rights are finally left unresolved except for the 
phrase about enjoyment “in community with other members” of the group.258  
Finally, what the declaration requires in terms of positive measures of the states 
is far from clear, requiring states simply to “adopt appropriate legislative and other 
measures to achieve those ends.”259 
It is worth noting however the establishment by the UN Sub Commission on 
Human Rights of a “UN Working Group on Minorities” with the task of promoting 
dialogue between minority groups in society and between those groups and governments, 
examining peaceful and constructive solutions to situations involving minorities and to 
provide recommendations to the Sub-Commission and to the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.260 
The UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 1965 also contains an implicit acknowledgment of minority rights by 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, descent, national or ethnic 
origin.”261 
 Article 14 (1) of the Convention provides an optional procedure for an individual 
petition system under which any individual or groups of individuals can petition the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination claiming to be victims of a 
violation by the State party of the human rights included in the Convention.  
Similarly, religious minorities benefit from the provisions of the UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief (1981), and children of minorities and indigenous populations are the subject of 
Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which states that their 
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children shall not be denied rights to enjoy their culture, to profess and practice their 
religion or to use their own language.  
Furthermore the “1503 procedure”, established in 1970, is still likely to be useful 
to minorities in certain situations. It is possible in this way for individuals and NGOs to 
make complaints to the United Nations about widespread human rights abuses in any 
country.262  
It must be however acknowledged that despite a considerable advance in the cause 
of minority rights by international organizations, in reality states, as recognized in Part II 
of the Covenants, remain the guarantors and protectors of human/minority rights of the 
individuals residing in their territory. 
As concerning the case of Roma/Gypsies, which we are taking into consideration, 
they are mentioned for the first time in a UN document in 1977 when the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities through a 
resolution adopted on 31 August appealed “to those countries having Roma (Gypsies) 
living within their borders to accord them, if they have not yet done so, all the rights 
enjoyed by the rest of the population”.263 
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) took also a 
very important step in March 1979, by recognising the International Romani Union 
(IRU)264 as an NGO representing Roma/Gypsies. The IRU acquired then Consultative 
Status in 1993, thus recognising greater weight to its contributions. 
In 1991 then the Sub-Commission, recalling its resolution of 1977, drew attention 
to the fact that, in many countries, various obstacles exist “to the full realisation of 
persons belonging to the Roma community of their civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, and that such obstacles constitute discrimination directed specifically 
against that community, rendering it particularly vulnerable”.265 
It also recommended a draft resolution for adoption by the Commission on Human 
Rights.  
Finally, the Commission on Human Rights, during its session on 4 March 1992, 
                                                 
262 Vijapur, (2006), p. 381-382. 
263 Resolution adopted on 31 August 1977, document E/CN4/Sub2/399, p.47. 
264 The International Romani Union (IRU) is an organization active for the rights of the Roma people. The 
IRU was officially established at the second World Romani Congress in 1978.  
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adopted Resolution 1992/65, entitled “On the Protection of Roma (Gypsies)”. 
The problems faced by Roma/Gypsies in different states are considered in the 
activities carried out by specialised UN departments: in particular the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNESCO and UNICEF.  
UNHCR published a report in 1993 on the situation of Roma/Gypsy communities 
in some Central and Eastern European states, aiming at protecting Roma/Gypsies from 
persecution; ensure equal treatment for those seeking asylum; engage the attention of 
NGOs; particularly those of a humanitarian nature, in order to be able to understand and 
improve the situation.  
UNESCO has mainly been involved in literacy and education related projects in a 
number of states, as well as a pilot project focusing on Roma/Gypsy culture. It has given 
support to a number of short-term projects related to research, teaching, and/or 
publication, especially in connection with the Romani language. It has also provided 
financial support for two summer schools organised by the IRU.  
Finally UNICEF has turned his attentions to the situation of Roma/Gypsies 
children, particularly with regard to education, in several states. The situation of 
Roma/Gypsies in different states has also been highlighted by special rapporteurs of the 
Commission and Sub-Commission on Human Rights.266 
 
V.1.2 Minority Rights Protection at European Level. 
 
Since the East-West divide in 1989 an increased concern has arisen with the 
treatment and protection of minorities in Europe, whether they be national, ethnic, 
religious or cultural.  
The main reason for this increased concern was the integration of former 
communist States into a wider “Europe” and the focus on possible security threats coming 
from the East.267  
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The minorities‘ interests, cultural and political claims, are now officially 
recognised not only by the most important European organisations, but also by the 
legislative bodies and governments of most European States.   
While the issue of protection of minorities at international level (UN level), has 
been discussed in details in the previous paragraph, the European system of protection of 
minorities will be now taken into consideration. 
 
V.1.3 The Council of Europe (COE) 
 
Like their UN counterparts (e.g Article 27 of ICCPR), European human rights 
instruments and institutions, include minority rights protection “primarily in universal 
and individualistic terms.”268  
Minority protection is recognised especially for security concerns and for 
communities that are “historically and territorially concentrated both within and across 
adjacent state boundaries.” As with international initiatives, “what European minority 
protection requires of states in terms of positive measures is ambiguous at best.”269 
Like in the UN system, almost all the international instruments on human rights 
at European level, promote minority rights indirectly through general provisions on 
equality and non-discrimination.  
For example, as with the UDHR at UN level, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) does not contain any special mention of minorities and their rights. 
Drafted in 1950 by the then newly formed Council of Europe, the convention entered into 
force on 3 September 1953. All Council of Europe member states are party to the 
Convention and applications for redress under the Convention are heard by the Court and 
may result in a legally binding judgment.  
However “its text is thoroughly individualistic in nature and devoted 
overwhelmingly to the protection of civil and political rights”.270  
The Convention includes only a general anti-discrimination article (Article 14).  
                                                 





Article 14 of the ECHR states that:  
 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.” 
 
It “does not prohibit discrimination against the membership of a national minority 
‘per se’; but it “prohibit discrimination as regards the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention”.271  
However, even in case of absence of a violation of one of the right contained in 
the Convention, Article 14 applies in case it is possible to demonstrate “the existence of 
a real and unjustified discrimination in the way certain individuals are permitted to enjoy 
that right.”272 
There was also a proposal involving the promotion of a separate protocol 
specifically dealing with national minorities issues but advancement in this respect has 
been disappointing. The creation of a Sub-Committee on Minorities in 1957 led in fact to 
a proposal in 1959 for an additional Protocol on Minorities.  
The text of the proposed Protocol contained many specific principles for 
minorities, including the principle of equality before the law, the right to use the minority 
language in relation with public authorities and in education, the right to express, preserve 
and develop the group’s own identity.  
Nonetheless, since that time there were no further developments on the adoption 
of this Protocol even if the Parliamentary Assembly became ever more insistent about the 
need for its adoption.273 
On the other hand, even if the Convention does not expressly enshrine minority 
rights, rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination may reflect many minority 
concerns and “several if not all civil and political rights, such as freedom of religion, 
expression, association, as well as the right to a family life, the equality guarantee and 
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the right to free elections, are all textually capable of protecting various interest of a 
minority community.”274  
Numerous decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in fact suggest an 
attempt to develop the ECHR to a point where it effectively protects the rights of 
minorities.  
Furthermore, as underlined in Pamphlet No.7 of the UN Guide for Minorities, 
“Minority Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights”: 
“discrimination is not limited only to those cases in which a person or group is 
treated worse than another similar group. It may also be discrimination to treat different 
groups alike: to treat a minority and a majority alike may amount to discrimination 
against the minority. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has held that if a 
State takes positive measures to enhance the status of a minority group (for example, with 
respect to their participation in the democratic process), the majority cannot claim 
discrimination based on such measures. In general, a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant 
position. 275 
 
The ECHR together with the 1st, 4th and 12th Protocols, may protect many of the 
rights and freedoms of importance to minorities. In particular, Article 3 concerns the 
prohibition of degrading treatment and, as the East African case (3E.H.R.R.76) 
demonstrated, a degrading treatment can occur when a group of persons is publicly 
singled out for different treatment.276  
Article 8 concerns the “right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence”. It has been invoked in many cases involving Roma, seeking respect for 
their existing home, caravan or other vehicle. In fact, according to the Court, “a minority 
group is in principle entitled to claim the right to respect for the particular lifestyle it may 
lead as being ‘private life’, ‘family life’ or ‘home.”  
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Article 9 concerns the right to freedom of religion, which allows a minority the 
necessary degree of control over community religious matters. Article 10 protects the 
right to freedom of expression for which minorities have the right to use their own 
language, publish their own newspapers or other media without interference from the 
State or others.  
Article 11 safeguards the right to freedom of association and of assembly against 
unjustified State’s interference. This Article is also of special interest for Roma people 
used to have reunions and assemblies at fairs, family weddings, funerals and other 
occasions characteristic of Roma culture.  
Protocol 1 with its Articles 1, 2, 3, is of specific interest for minorities and 
especially for Roma people. In particular, Article 1 concern protection of property, the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, prohibiting arbitrary confiscation or other 
deprivation of possessions.277  
Article 2, protect the right to education against unjustifiable interference of the 
State in parental choice and unreasonable discriminatory provisions. For example, in the 
case of the traveling Roma children a difference must be recognised between parental 
choice over when to move on and precipitous moves resulting from forced evictions. 
Furthermore unduly restrictive state attendance at schools that interfere with 
traditional Roma traveling could also amount to a violation of Article 8, as well as 
“refusing to approve schoolbooks written in the minority’s kin-State might be a breach of 
the right to freedom of expression (Article 10)”.278  
However, there is no right to mother tongue education under the ECHR, unless it 
previously existed and the state then tries to withdraw it. Protocol 4 (Articles 2 and 3), 
protect the right to freedom of movement within a State (Article 2) and the right not to be 
refused entry (or expelled) from a state of which the person is a national.  
As underlined by Clements, L., Thomas P. and Thomas R. in their article The 
Rights of Minorities-A Romany Perspective:  
“These two rights are of importance, not only to traditional traveling Roma, but 
also in relation to inter-state Roma movements (forced or otherwise). Roma who are 
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citizens of a European Union state have separate rights of free movement within the 
EU”.279 
 
The very limited impact of Article 14 in the race discrimination field has been 
criticised and determined the entering into force of Protocol 12 in 2005 after the 10th 
required ratification was fulfilled.  
Protocol 12 removed the demand for the discrimination to be “within the ambit” 
of a substantive convention right. Nonetheless it only applies to the activity of public 
authorities and according to Article 1 it does not require a positive obligation on the 
parties to take actions to prevent or remedy all situations of discrimination among private 
persons. This protocol was perceived by states to be too vague and broad to be justifiable. 
Hence, the number of ratifications remains low.280  
What is more, indirect discrimination is not covered under article 14, as still the 
Court gives to the states a wide margin of appreciation, reaching an important limitation 
on the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination provision (by which a particular policy or 
law has disproportionately negative effect on members of a particular group).281 
The centrality of language as a minority right is expressed in the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), approved by the Council of Europe in 
1992. The preamble of the Charter consider necessary and legitimate to take special steps 
to preserve and develop languages that in Europe “are in danger of eventual extinction, 
to the detriment of Europe’s cultural wealth and traditions”. 282 
The preamble further declares the use of a regional or minority language in private 
and public life an “inalienable right” and lists a wide range of measures to promote the 
use of regional or minority languages in different spheres of public life: education, the 
judicial process, public services, the media, cultural activities and facilities, and economic 
and social life.  
By identifying different options, the Charter leaves governments with 
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considerable discretion in implementing the right to use regional or minority languages 
in public. Nonetheless, the document unequivocally recognises the need for special 
measures to preserve and develop minority languages in Europe and charges governments 
with the responsibility for doing so. 
Nonetheless, at the regional level, the most comprehensive instrument devoted to 
minorities rights in Europe, after the European Convention on Human Rights, is the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), which is the 
first multilateral treaty and the only legally binding instrument for the protection of 
minority rights within the European region. It was adopted by the Council of Europe on 
1994 and entered into force on 1998. 283 
The FCNM was designed to create a legally binding instrument to promote 
tolerance throughout societies by protecting national minorities for the construction of a 
stable and inclusive Europe.  
The protection of minorities was considered as an essential tool for the security, 
peace and stability of a pluralistic and truly democratic society, contributing in fostering 
dialogue and tolerance among its members and in promoting intercommunity harmony.284  
The Convention, however, does not give an explicit definition of “minority” and 
applies only to “national minorities”, deliberately narrowing the scope of protection 
compared with the 1992 UN Declaration.285  
Furthermore, it contains many limitation clauses and has been criticised for the 
lack of an effective control mechanism and for its weak and vague wording.  
Many states for example have introduced Declarations to the Convention allowing 
them to identify the specific groups to whom the Convention will apply, arbitrarily 
identifying minorities that are entitled to protection, thus implying the rejection of other 
groups. For example Germany and particularly Denmark have entered Declarations 
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attempting to limit the potential beneficiaries of the Convention (excluding non-citizens 
and migrants). 
The aim of the FCNM is “to specify the principles which States undertake to 
respect and ensure the protection of national minorities”, setting out objectives that states 
must fulfil. Many substantive provisions of the Convention cover a wide range of issues, 
many of which may require that states adopt special measures not to be considered as 
discrimination themselves.286  
However states possess a measure of discretion in the implementation of the 
objectives that could be used by them in order to escape their obligations. This is the 
reason why the FCNM is called “Framework Convention” containing a series of 
“programmatic” principles worded in general terms.287  
Furthermore, like the ICCPR, the FCNM refers to the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities, suggesting “an emphasis on individual as opposed to collective interests”288 
and the Explanatory report makes it clear that “no collective rights of minorities are 
envisaged.”  
In fact as stated in the Explanatory Report, Section I, Article 1(31):  
“the article refers to the protection of national minorities as such and of the rights 
and freedoms of persons belonging to such minorities.  This distinction and the difference 
in wording make it clear that no collective rights of national minorities are envisaged 
(see also the commentary to Article 3). The Parties do however recognize that protection 
of a national minority can be achieved through protection of the rights of individuals 
belonging to such a minority”. 
 
What is more, being only a “framework convention”, the instrument “is not 
directly applicable in the domestic legal orders but requires implementation by legislation 
and appropriate government policies”.289 In this way, “the prospect of the FCNM being 
accepted as part of EU law or acquis communitaire is far away”.290  
The FCNM has been criticised also because it does not have any hard enforcement 
mechanism attached, not being subject to the review of the European Court of Human 
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Rights and not allowing individual complaints.  
The Convention is primarily monitored on the basis of state reporting one year 
after the entering into force and every five years thereafter. Article 26 establishes the 
Advisory Committee, which will draft a public report every five years on the 
implementation of the Convention by the ratifying countries followed by a Committee of 
Minister’s Resolution.  
The FCNM has eventually been defined as “a frame of an incomplete painting”291, 
“intentionally blurred since the beginning since the word ‘framework’ is intended to 
indicate flexibility in national implementation”.292  
The Committee of Ministers, in particular, as a political body, should not be able 
to have a final say on monitoring by the Advisory Committee293 and the states should not 
be able, through unilateral declarations or reservations, “to withhold protection by 
denying the existence of a minority through the use of different labels or through 
additional criteria”, as for example the criteria of citizenship.294  
For these reasons Alfredsson underlines in his article the importance of an 
independent and strong Advisory Committee, while the Committee of Ministers “should 
scrupulously respect and follow up on the Advisory Committee’s recommendations.” 
Only in this way in Alfredsson’s opinion, the Council of Europe will be able to 
play a meaningful role in the field of minority rights, even though the best solution would 
be the adoption of an additional Protocol to the European Convention, including special 
measures and group rights, currently omitted, for the realisation of minority rights in 
Europe in both law and fact.295  
Furthermore, minorities should not be treated only as objects for observation but 
consulted and included as active members in the Advisory Committee meetings.  
In spite of this, it seems that, in general, “a constructive, trusting relationship has 
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developed between the AC and CoM. This can be seen by the way the CoM has endorsed 
without amendment several AC’s proposals”.296  
Minorities and non-governmental organisations have also been able to present, in 
writing and orally, pertinent information and points of view,297 and “country visits had 
become one of the most valuable parts of monitoring the implementation of the 
FCNM”.298  
However it has been noticed in the last years a tendency to use a “double standard” 
focusing more on Central and Eastern European States while ignoring minority problems 
in Western Europe and this tendency should also be corrected, as well as transparency 
and availability of documents should be further encouraged.  
One of the most important point finally is the “arbitrary identification by States 
of minorities entitled to protection under the Convention”: the Advisory Committee 
“should take a strong stand against these practices and stipulate instead that the existence 
of a minority is a question of facts, not law or government recognition.”299  
This is even more important in the case of Roma people, which, as highlighted by 
Francesco Capotorti in his study300, are seldom recognised by states as a legal minority.  
For this reason they are rarely protected by the states through special measures 
targeting equality and non-discrimination. In fact, although in what concerns the Roma 
their minority status is problematic as do not have a specific territory, they should still be 
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V.1.4 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)302 has played 
since the beginning an important role especially addressing the main problems faced by 
Roma. Since its first meeting in 1975, CSCE (then OSCE), focused on questions of 
minority rights linked to human rights and military security.  
The first document where Roma were specifically mentioned was the document 
of the Copenhagen Meeting (1990), in which rights of persons belonging to minorities 
were recognised and the specific situation of Roma was highlighted.  
Participating States declared their firm intention to take affective measures against 
Roma’s discrimination and, in particular, in Article 40, Chapter IV, Roma were the only 
minority explicitly mentioned: 
“The participating States clearly and unequivocally condemn totalitarianism, 
racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone 
as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds. In this context, they also 
recognise the particular problems of Roma (gypsies). They declare their firm intention to 
intensify the efforts to combat these phenomena in all their forms and therefore will.”303 
 
Roma continued to be an issue of interest being reiterated in paragraph 40 of 1991 
Geneva Meeting Experts, 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting and at the Human Dimension 
Seminars in Warsaw in 1993 and 1994.  
A decisive step was taken at the Budapest summit in December 1994, when, with 
the Budapest Declaration, participating states decided to appoint within the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (hereafter ODIHR), a Contact Point for Roma 
and Sinti issues, facilitating contact between states and non-governmental organisations 
on Roma issues and providing information on the initiatives and programmes concerning 
them.304  
In 1999 an important step was the appointment of Nicolae Gheorge 305, a Rom and 
                                                 
302  Previously Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
303 CSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE 
(Copenhagen Document), 1990, p.21.  
304 CSCE, 1994 Summit Budapest, 5-6 December 1994, Budapest Document 1994 “Towards a genuine 
Partnership in a new era”, p.33. 
305 Coordinator of the Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani CRISS) in Romania and 
member of the Project on Ethnic Relations Council for Ethnic Accord, Mr. Gheorghe is also the vice-
president of the International Romani Union.  
 
149  
a sociologist, as adviser on Romani issues and head of the Contact Point for Roma and 
Sinti issues.  One of the main tasks undertaken by the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti 
issues was the launch in 2003 of a broad exercise in consultation involving Roma/Gypsies 
organisations and experts in the preparation of an “Action Plan on Improving the 
Situation of Roma Within the OSCE Area”, addressing racism and discrimination, socio-
economic issues, questions of access to education and participation by Roma in public 
and political life.  
A ODIHR Status Report in 2008, marked the initial effort to provide information 
and analysis on the state of implementation of the Action Plan, highlighting the actions 
undertaken by participating states and the structures of the OSCE, especially ODIHR’s 
Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues, to implement the tasks assigned by the Action 
Plan.  
As underlined by Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, ODIHR Director, in this Report: 
“While many governments have succeeded in developing and adopting national 
strategies for improving the situation of Roma and Sinti, there are substantive 
shortcomings with regard to their effective implementation, in particular at the local 
level. One area of particular concern is the absence of institutional mechanisms to 
provide sustainable support for Roma and Sinti integration programmes. This includes 
insufficient funding, lack of political will at the national level, and apathy or neglect to 
implement policies at the municipal or local levels through targeted and coherent 
programmes”. 306 
 
The Report highlight as well as “in spite of the rather large number of 
international and national Roma-related initiatives, these have not alleviated, in 
proportion to the resources invested, the continuing social and economic inequalities, 
marginalisation, racism, and discrimination experienced by Roma and Sinti”.307 
It must be noticed as well that a “High Commissioner on National Minorities” was 
established by OSCE since 1992, focusing on disputes involving national minorities that 
have an international character and pretension to cause inter-states tension, providing 
early warning and, as appropriate, early action as soon as possible with regard to tensions 
involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning 
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stage but, in the judgment of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into 
a conflict within the OSCE area.308 
The High Commissioner acts essentially through a confidential dialogue with the 
governments involved, has wide latitude of discretion as to procedures and his approach 
is mainly one of “quiet diplomacy”.  
The reports and recommendations made by the High Commissioner are not legally 
binding but “have a strong political influence and may prove more use then the 
Framework Convention”.309 
A special report on Roma was published by the High Commissioner in 1993, 
advocating special measures for Roma, including special government policies for 
addressing Roma-related issues in such areas as employment, education, health care and 
general welfare.310 
 
V.1.5 The European Union (EU). 
 
The genesis and development of attention and concrete support on the part of the 
institutions of the European Union can be summarised in different stages. 
As from 1993, the EU considers the improvement of minority conditions, and 
especially Roma minorities, as a key condition for accession to the European Union and 
for example the “Gypsy question” became a question of importance at national and 
transnational level and in connection with the candidacies of Central and Eastern 
European states applying for EU membership.  
The accession criteria, known as well as “Copenhagen criteria”, were established 
by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European 
Council in 1995.  
They established that “any country seeking membership of the European Union 
(EU) must conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in 
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Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union”.  
To join the EU, a new Member State must meet in particular three criteria:  
1. Political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (emphasis added); 
2. Economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
3.Acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
In order to access the European Union, the future member states will have to put 
into practice all the measures on non-discrimination provided by the EU, improving laws 
and policies: bilateral agreements and initiatives with strong political voices.311   
At the EU level in fact, each country within its legislative borders regulates  
minority rights always in compliance with the related EU guidelines.  
Discrimination and racism, including discrimination against the Roma minority, 
are dealt with through Article 13 of the “Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC)” and the following 2000’s directives: the “Racial Equality Directive”312 and the 
“Employment Equality Directive”313, legally binding on all Member States. 
Recently, with the entering into force of the “Lisbon Treaty” on the 1st December 
2009, the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU)”, became legally 
binding although it was already a reference document for the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) when interpreting Community law.  
The principles set out in the Charter guides the development of policy in the EU 
and the policy implementation by national authorities. 
According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, reaffirmed by the proclamation 
in December 2000, Europe, as a multicultural society, advocates and guarantees the 
protection of minorities and emphasises the establishment of the conditions for preserving 
cultural diversity, strengthening the commitment to the principle of non-discrimination.   
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Article 21 of the Charter bans discrimination on the six grounds listed in Article 
13 of the EC Treaty, as well as seven additional grounds (social origin, genetic features, 
language, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, property and 
birth). Like Article 12 TEC, Article 21 of the Charter also prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of nationality and Article 20 sets out the general principle of equality before the 
law.314 
Among the many programs developed, the most conspicuously successful has 
been the education program, with a specific Roma element.315  
The European Parliament in particular, since 1975, has always been sensitive to 
the difficult situation of Roma/Gypsies, showing a concern to improve their situation 
through several questions and recommendations to the European Commission as well as 
to the Member States.  
One of the most important Resolution was adopted in March 1984 concerning the 
education of children of parents of no fixed abode, together with another on the situation 
of Roma/Gypsies, in which it suggested to the governments of the member states to 
coordinate their actions, and called on the Commission to develop Community-funded 
programs aimed at improving Roma/Gypsies’ situation without negating their cultural 
values.316 
The Commission then appointed the Gypsy Research Centre of the René 
Descartes University in Paris, to undertake a critical analysis of the situation regarding 
school provisions for Roma children within the Community.  
Different meetings were set up with experts to coordinate the study and to discuss 
recommendations. Eventually, a final report, School Provision for Gypsy and Traveller 
Children, was published at the end of 1986, culminating on 1989 with the adoption by 
the Council and the Ministers of Education of a Resolution on school provision for 
Roma/Gypsy children.  
This text became one of the most basic gains made for the Roma’s communities, 
outlining a set of measures adopted by the ministers to be developed by the Member States 
at national level and recognising how Roma/Gypsies’ culture and language have formed 
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a part of the Community’s cultural and linguistic heritage for over 500 years. 
This research and the interest generated in the issue led in turn to a wide range of 
initiatives and actions both at European Union and Member States’ level: networking of 
pilot projects, meetings, support for publications, newsletters in several languages, inter-
school exchanges, assistance to enable Roma organisations to hold meetings on school-
related questions, etc.  
The European Parliament remained always attentive to the Commission’s work 
and progress and gave an active support in the field of education also through the adoption 
of a budgetary line enabling the implementation of the Resolution of 1989. 
Education-related questions were the first to engage the interest of the 
Commission’s services, but subsequently more and more actions have been undertaken 
also in other fields: many ongoing programs include actions of relevance to 
Roma/Gypsies. For example, the “Second Combat Poverty Program” assisted teams in 
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. The third program, “Poverty 3”, also entails action for Roma 
communities: of its 39 projects, four directly involve Roma.  
Other actions have been developed within the framework of the European Social 
Fund and the “Horizon” and “Equal” programs, enabling numerous associations working 
with Roma to develop projects of their own. Other activities are being expanded, notably 
in connection with aid programs for Central and Eastern Europe, as for example the 
“Phare” Program.317 
Interest in issues of relevance for Roma broadened during the 1990s with a 
growing number of measures and texts adopted. In 1991 a hearing was held on request of 
Roma organisations reuniting a large number of Roma representatives, giving the 
commission an opportunity to familiarise itself with the proposals and view of Gypsy 
organisations.  
In 2003, the European Commission’s Directorate for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities, jointly with the EU anti-discrimination program, carried out a 
study on The situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union.  
The study served as a basis for discussion by the European Commission, Member 
States and their partners on how EU measures should best target Roma inclusion. It 
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examined the conditions that Roma, Gypsies and Travellers face in a range of fields, 
including education, employment, housing and healthcare, setting out both good and bad 
practices in policies and programs for Roma, as well as recommendations on how to 
improve existing policies in order to tackle the widespread discrimination and social 
exclusion which Roma, Gypsies and Travellers face.  
On 28 April 2005 the European Parliament adopted another resolution on the 
situation of Roma in the European Union and recommended a series of measures aiming 
at ending all types of discrimination and facilitating the involvement of Roma in decisions 
concerning them.  
As concerning the most recent events focusing on the “Gypsy question” in Europe, 
the European Commission hosted a first “EU Roma Summit”, which took place in 
Brussels on 16 September 2008, under the joint patronage of the Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso and the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
The Summit promoted “a firm commitment to tackling concrete problems and to 
creating a better understanding of the situation of Roma across Europe, helping to 
identify ‘policies that work’ in promoting inclusion and highlighting the plight of Roma 
communities”.318  
The event brought together more than 400 representatives of EU institutions, 
national governments and parliaments and civil society including Roma organisations, 
recognising that the integration of Roma communities is a joint responsibility of Member 
States and the European Union.319 
This first Summit, however, “produced neither conclusions nor concrete 
proposals”.320  
The conditions of Roma were even worsening in some parts of Europe: the past 
years have seen “an increasing in racist attacks - shootings of families, homes set on fire 
- as well as forced evictions and the building of walls around settlements”.321 Millions of 
Roma are still living today in shanty-towns on the margins of the European society.  
Following this first Summit in 2008, in the framework of the “2010 European 
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Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion” and as a key event of the Spanish 
Presidency of the Council, a “Second European Summit on Roma inclusion” took place 
in Córdoba (Spain) on April 2010, on the occasion of the International Roma Day.322  
The aim of the Summit was to take stock of the achievements undertaken at EU 
level for Roma inclusion, over the past two years, and to renew the commitments. 
Approximately 400 representatives of EU institutions, national governments, regional 
and local public authorities and civil society (including Roma organisations), took part 
again in the Summit.  
The Summit placed a particular focus on the 10 Common Basic Principles for 
Roma inclusion, annexed on 8 June 2009 to the Council of Ministers in charge of Social 
Affairs’ conclusions, inviting Member States and the Commission to take them into 
account when they design, implement and evaluate policies. 
Four workshops were run in parallel in order to debate on the principles of 
"explicit but not exclusive targeting", "awareness of the gender dimension", "use of 
community instruments" and "involvement of civil society". 
Particular attention was devoted to the issue of Roma health, to which a plenary 
discussion was fully dedicated on the second day of the Summit: Roma health was 
considered as one of the most important issues for Roma inclusion. 
Eventually, the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies adopted a 
declaration affirming the “joint commitment for the mainstreaming of Roma issues into 
all relevant policies, a roadmap for the actions of the European Platform for Roma 
inclusion, the effective use of the EU Structural Funds to this end and the follow up of the 
Summit in Council”.323 
One of the main achievements of the Summit has been the publication of two very 
important and far-reaching policy documents: the Communication on the social and 
economic integration of the Roma in Europe, and a Progress Report on the 
Implementation of the EU instruments and policies for Roma inclusion 2008-2010.  
The Policy Communication (COM(2010)133) outlines “an ambitious mid-term 
program to meet the biggest challenges for Roma inclusion”, including three main 
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objectives: “mobilising the Structural Funds, including the European Social Fund, to 
support Roma inclusion”, “taking Roma issues into account in all relevant policy areas 
at national and EU level, from employment to urban development and from public health 
to EU expansion”, and “harnessing the potential of Roma communities to support 
inclusive growth as part of the Europe 2020 strategy”. 324 
The second document, the Progress Report 2008-2010, evaluates the progress 
achieved in integration over the past two years. Following the results of this Report: 
“Although the situation of many of Europe's Roma people remains difficult, 
important progress has been made at EU and national levels. In the last two years, the 
EU and Member States have focused on making anti-discrimination laws and EU funding 
more effective in promoting Roma inclusion. This includes fighting discrimination, 
segregation and racist violence as well as supporting programs to address the vicious 
circle of poverty, social marginalisation, low school achievement and poor housing and 
health. For example, the Commission launched legal proceedings against 24 Member 
States to make sure that EU anti-discrimination law on the grounds of race is correctly 
transposed into national legislation. Out of these cases, 12 are still open while 12 were 
successfully” 325 
 
As underlined by Heather Grabbe, director of the Open Society Institute in 
Brussels; and by Nicolas Beger, director of Amnesty International's EU office, in their 
recent article Ending Europe's Exclusion of Roma, the EU can play a critical role in the 
process of full inclusion of Roma people into European societies.  
The Commission has developed a range of useful tools, even though they are still 
scattered across policy areas and their effect is hard to measure. 
 The policy of “explicit but not exclusive targeting of the Roma” is a sound action 
because “it obliges municipal authorities to provide matching sums and to take measures 
such as providing school buses for Roma children from isolated communities”, but “more 
money should be earmarked and the approach should be extended to deliver similarly 
practical results for the Roma in terms of education, health, housing and jobs”.326  
Progresses for the Roma communities in Europe could be done only through “a 
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comprehensive framework strategy for the Roma at the EU level, a proposal made by the 
European Parliament that has yet to elicit a response from the Commission”.327  
The EU should also help at the strategic level: “it should develop benchmarks, 
spread best practice and persuade member states to join up their strategies. It also needs 
to make its own efforts more cohesive”.  
Without a concerted policy response, concludes the article, “the challenges posed 
























V.2  Roma/Gypsies: a true European Minority? 
 
Following a general introduction to the main political approaches and to the main 
legal instruments and mechanisms, at European and international level, for the safeguard 
of minority rights; this paragraph will analyse the example of Roma’s minority, 
concentrating on the definition of Roma as a minority and their current legal status in 
Europe, trying to define which concept of minority is being applied to them.  
It has been already clarified, in fact, in the previous paragraphs, which are the 
main legal texts adopted for the international protection of minority rights as well as the 
specific ones concerning Roma rights, elaborated by the most important international and 
regional organisations: the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Council 
of Europe (COE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
It has been analysed until which extent they result effective in protecting the rights of 
minorities in general and the ones of Roma people, in particular. 
Roma will be eventually defined as a cultural, linguistic, transnational minority; a 
non-territorial people whose members are linked by culture and language and deserve 
international acknowledgment, respect and protection on the same foot as other well-
recognised minorities in Europe. 
As previously underlined in this study, since the early 1990s, Roma people have 
been the subject of an intense debate, as a consequence of the rapid social, political and 
economic changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of 
Communism, the recent wars in Yugoslav and especially in Kosovo, and the enlargement 
first of the Council of Europe in the early 1990's, and then of the EU, having been 
Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia the last countries of the former East Bloc acceding the 
European Union. 
Roma represents in fact the largest minority in Europe, therefore the issue of their 
social inclusion came into focus as a primary concern for both the UN human rights 
institutions and the major European regional organisations.  
European organisations as well as non-governmental organisations have started to 
put pressure upon East European States to first recognise the Roma as a distinct ethnic 
minority and more importantly to implement policies and action plans to reduce 
discrimination, promote tolerance and to protect their culture.  
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However, the legal status of Roma people appears to be different in the different 
States of the European Union and their position depends both on the states ratification of 
international conventions and on the adoption of domestic and intrastate legislations.   
Although according to documents Roma should be considered as a true minority 
group with specific rights, in some countries they are still not recognized as a national or 
linguistic minority, even though all European countries recognize and guarantee the 
protection of individual rights against discrimination and racism. 
In the majority of new Member States of the European Union, from Central and 
Eastern Europe (e.g.: in Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia), Roma 
people officially enjoy a legal status of “national or ethnical minority” but “confession of 
this status does not guarantee real equality and does not improve their social status. Many 
Roma people don’t declare their own nationality (on the basis of negative historical 
experiences and present social prejudices) and many of them even deny their origin and 
don’t want to identify with in some situation”.329 
The official status of “national minority” for Roma people is recognized in some 
other Member States of the European Union as well, like Austria, Germany, Finland and 
Netherlands.   
In some other countries instead (e.g.: France, Greece and part of Spain) the 
presence of ethnical minorities is simply de jure not recognised.330 Finally, in some other 
States, the existence of minority groups is legally accepted but does not include Roma 
people, which tend to be considered more as a “socially excluded community”. 
The historical events of the last 20 years witnessed a considerably increase of the 
number of Roma who moved from the Balkans to Western Europe in search of relief, 
asylum, temporary or permanent residence in Western Europe. 
                                                 
329 Vojtová P., Davidová E., Lhotka P., “The Roma Minority in some countries of the European Union in 
connection with their international provisions”, in: Journal of Health Sciences Management and Public 
Health, p.167. 
330 France, for example, denies the existence of national or ethnical minorities in its territory declaring that 
“since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinctions between citizens on grounds of origin, race or 
religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities”(UN Documents CCPR/C22/Add.2 and 
CCPR/C/46/Add.2). Consequently Article 27 of the ICCPR, for example, is considered as not applicable, 
offensive to the principle enshrined in Article 2 of the French Constitution. For the same reason France, 
together with other States (as for example Greece, Belgium, Andorra, Luxembourg) did not ratify the 
European Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  
 
160  
As underlined by Zoltan D. Barany in its article Orphans of Transition: Gypsies 
in Eastern Europe: 
“For the approximately six million Roma (Gypsies) who live in Eastern Europe, 
the transition from communism has been an altogether deplorable experience. Though 
entire sections of society (unskilled laborers, pensioners, and so on) have been hurt by 
the marketization processes that began nearly a decade ago, none has been more 
adversely affected than the Roma. A wide variety of long-marginalised groups whose 
exclusion had been based on ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or other grounds had 
greeted the fall of the ancient regime enthusiastically, expecting an end to state-
sanctioned discrimination and societal prejudices. On the whole, marginal groups -- and 
especially ethnic minorities -- have been more successful in acquiring rights and stopping 
discriminatory practices in countries where democratisation has advanced rapidly than 
in countries where the process has been sluggish. One feature common to all East 
European states, however, is the desperate situation of the Gypsies.”331 
 
A new preoccupation with immigration in general, and a fear of “Roma/Gypsies 
invasion from the East” in particular, have given rise to the realisation of many studies 
commissioned by the major European organisations in response to the sudden increase of 
Roma in Europe.  
However, as underlined by Liegeois J-P and Nicolae Gheorghe in their report, the 
deterioration of the situation in which Gypsy communities live in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of Communism and the consequent increase of migration in Western 
Europe, is perceived by the European organisations “primarily from the angle of real or 
potential migration, as a “problem” which may give rise to difficulties, a problem with 
an “international dimension”.332  
This situation has at the same time given rise to much discussion and the 
involvement of the media in this sense was particularly high: the issue of massive 
migration of Roma/Gypsies in Europe and the relative consequences for local populations 
has often been exaggerated and little or no accurate information has been provided for 
understanding the real reasons of these movements. 
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As underlined by Nicolae Gheorghe and Thomas Acton in their article Dealing 
with Multiculturality: Minority, Ethnic, National and Human Rights: 
“ (…) the former communist countries of Eastern European (…) are countries 
where the discussions on ethnic specificity and ethnic rights have more than an academic 
interest. The geopolitics of the region are closely tied to ethnic politics which are fiercely 
promoted through persistent, and even bloody, group conflicts. This is the region of the 
world where the majority of the Roma population is concentrated and where the 
prejudiced perceptions of Gypsies tend to voice themselves violently, resulting in pogrom-
like attacks on Roma communities, the expulsion of Roma groups from localities of legal 
residence, the waves of refugees towards the West and a policy of forced repatriation 
from Western countries and "reintegration" in their countries of origin where Gypsies 
are rejected as foreigners”.333 
 
This policy of forced repatriation from Western countries and "reintegration” in 
the countries of origin, as well as the general mistrustful attitude of European 
Governments towards the increase of Gypsies migration in Western Europe; has been 
highlighted by Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human 
Rights, in is Viewpoint on Roma European migration policies. 
As stated by T. Hammarberg in his article: 
“European governments are not giving Roma migrants the same treatment as 
others who are in similar need of protection. Roma migrants are returned by force to 
places where they are at risk of human rights violations.”334 
 
Discriminatory practices against Roma migrants have been examined also in a 
recent study published in April 2009 by Thomas Hammarberg and Knut Vollebeck, the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.335 The study provided a set of 
recommendations for action in order to enhance effective protection of the human rights 
of Roma migrants in Europe.  
In some European countries in fact, as underlined by Hammarberg, Roma 
migrants have been given “tolerated status”, a form of temporary protection against 
expulsion which however does not confer residence or social rights. There are also 
“credible allegations that Roma from outside the EU are more likely to be provided with 
tolerated status rather than a more durable status, compared with non-Roma third 
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country nationals”.336  
The issue of forced returns of Roma, Askhali and Egyptians to Kosovo in 
particular, was considered by the Commissioner during its visit in Kosovo in March 2009. 
The result was a report in which Hammarberg concluded that “Kosovo does not have the 
infrastructure that would allow a sustainable reintegration of the returnees and that “this 
went all the more for the Roma”.337 
As reported by Hammarberg in the already mentioned Viewpoint: 
“In Kosovo itself there are still about 20.000 internally displaced persons since 
1999 who have not been able to return to their original habitats since 1999. The 
unemployment rate in Kosovo is about fifty per cent and there is just not sufficient 
capacity now to give a further number of returnees humane living conditions. The 
reintegration strategy endorsed by the authorities in Pristina is not being implemented, 
the responsible actors at the municipal level are not aware of their responsibilities and 
there is not even a budget allocated for the strategy (…) The offer to them must also 
respond to their fear for their own safety – they have not forgotten the events of 1999 
when they were chased away – and to their concern about schooling for their children in 
a language they understand. Also, there should be a possibility to find jobs. This should 
be the priority, also for the international community, which has part of the responsibility 
for the present crisis. The relationship between the Kosovo authorities and the European 
governments is not one between equal partners, it is in fact widely asymmetric. When the 
reception of returnees is made a condition for talks about visa liberalization or opening 
for other privileges, the authorities in Pristina have to give in and the fate of the refugees 
becomes secondary”.338 
 
Commissioner Hammarberg concludes that for the time being and for the reasons 
explained above,  “only voluntary returns – genuinely voluntary – should be pursued”. 
Proposals of “readmission agreements” now largely requested by European 
governments, should, in the Commissioner’s view, foreseen individual assessments of the 
protection needs,  considering the particularly vulnerable situation of Roma.  
European governments, continues Hammarberg, seem not to accept that Roma 
could have protection needs and expulsions of Roma have been carried out in 
contravention of EU law. 
 Destruction of Roma dwellings has also been used as a method to persuade Roma 
to leave “voluntarily” and discrimination of Roma in migration policies has met with little 
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or no opposition in almost every country. 
 The return policy pursued by European Governments is eventually defined as 
ineffective: “of those forcibly returned to Kosovo no less than 70-75 per cent could not 
reintegrate there and moved to secondary replacement or went back to the deporting 
countries through illegal channels” as well as “expulsions between EU countries have 
also failed in a great number of cases as the Roma have used their right as EU citizens 
to move within the European Union area”.   
As concluded by Hammarberg: 
“States now spending considerable amounts to return Roma to their countries of 
origin, would make better use of this money by investing in measures to facilitate these 
persons’ social inclusion in their own societies”.339 
 
As highlighted by Harold J. Laski in its classic work in 1925, “A Grammar of 
Politics”: “every state is known by the rights that it maintains” and European democratic 
societies will never be considered truly democratic as far as their minorities, and 


























The main purpose of this research was to pinpoint the key advancements in 
promoting social cohesion and integration both at European and international level, 
supporting a philosophical model of integration of diversity and minorities, which does 
not forcibly involve homogenization or hegemonization, taking into account the 
multicultural transformation of our reality in a globalized world. 
The main purpose has been the one of founding out whether is possible to allow 
universal protection of human rights, while preserving cultural values and different 
identities; whether the values and principles enshrined in the UDHR in the first place and 
in other important treaties and declarations of the post–World War II period, can be 
considered as really universally applicable, besides all relativisms and cultural 
differences. 
The first chapter analyzed three concepts which are crucial to the development of 
a human rights theory sensible to differences and cultural values: the concept of 
cosmopolitanism,  multiculturalism and sovereignty.   
I find out that the classical Westphalian sovereignty model still represents the 
dominant governance model of international law and relations, notwithstanding the recent 
rise of international global institutions and non-governmental actors, proposing an 
alternative model of “global governance”.  
The role of a supranational institutions like the European Union has been analyzed 
and considered as essential in this respect, representing the EU a real alternative to the 
classical Westphalian sovereignty model, even though EU policy is nowadays based 
essentially on policies of “soft coordination” and there is a concrete risk to remain 
subjected to national egoism and particularisms.  
The second chapter addressed possible interconnections and affinities between the 




I did find connections and affinities between cosmopolitanism and human rights 
theories and I do believe that they might and should complement each other, also in order 
to reach some of the main objectives defined by global justice’ theorists.  
In order to do so it is however of foremost importance to find out which are the 
theoretical foundations of fundamental rights and how those fundamental rights are 
actually applied in the main constitutional States where there is a presence of a Bill of 
Rights and Constitution, even in different legal systems.  
The work of the jurist and legal philosopher Robert Alexy has  been analysed as 
essential in this respect, highlighting a substantive, structural theory of fundamental rights 
which is intimately connected to the very foundation of democracy. 
The third chapter analysed the conflict between two famously conflicting 
ideologies of human rights: universalism and cultural relativism, also to find out whether 
is possible to find affinities between them.  
Interculturality and pluralism will be finally recognized as the key concepts in 
order to overcome this opposition and to realize a human rights dimension closer to the 
multiethnic reality of post-Westphalian nation States. Final aim of this section was an 
effort to reconcile universalism and cultural relativism by taking inspiration from both 
ideologies.  
Thanks to the anthropology of law’s perspective and to the clever analysis and 
investigations of a fine philosopher and observer as Ludwig Wittgenstein, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights will be finally reinforced and not diminished. 
The fourth and final chapter eventually connected these issues to the actual issue 
of the international and European system of protection of minorities and cultural 
diversity, which developed on a parallel although different line.  
Merits and faults of this system have been explored, analyzing different models 
and mechanisms of protection of minority rights in the European and international 
context.  
The main intention here has been the one of analyzing the new concept and 
definition of minorities in the European Union context, the European Union competences 
in this field and the possible mutual cooperation between the EU and other international 
actors acting for the protection of minority rights.  
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Even if there is still no internationally agreed definition as to which groups 
constitute a minority, it is always stressed the fact that the existence of a minority should 
be recognized as a matter of fact and that any definition must include both objective and 
subjective aspects (race, ethnicity, language or religion but also identity and sense of 
belonging). T 
This has been demonstrated also in the case-study taken into consideration in this 
study, the one of Roma people in the European context, which represent one of the most 
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THE STRUCTURE OF BALANCING 
 
 
1. Law of Balancing: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one 
principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other”. 
 
It is divided in 3 stages: 
 
      1.1 Intensity of interference of the 1st principle (degree of non-satisfaction or 
detriment to the first principle). 
 
      1.2 Degree of importance of the 2nd principle (importance of satisfying the competing 
principle). 
 
      1.3 Their relationship to each other (whether the importance of satisfying the latter                   
principle justifies the detriment to or non-satisfaction of the former). 
 
 
2. Weight Formula: Rational procedure to determine the concrete weight of principle Pi 
in relation to principle Pj in the light of the circumstances of a specific case. WF is a 
complement to the law of balancing. 
 
It contains 3 variables: 
 
     2.1 Importance of the principles at stake. 
 
     2.2 Abstract weight of the principles (derives form the different legal hierarchy of the 
legal body from which stems the principle or might be established by reference to positive 
social values). 
 
     2.3 Reliability of the empirical assumptions (factual premises under the    
circumstances of the specific case). 
 
 
3. Burden of Argumentation: it “operates only in cases in which the weight formula 
results in a stalemate, the weight of principles being identical”. 
 
Two different solutions: 
 
3.1 Stalemate cases to be solved in favour of the legal liberty and legal equality principle 
(in dubio pro libertate), (in A Theory). 
 
3.2 Stalemates cases to be solved by resorting to the democratic principle (in the 






Triadic Scale of interference 
 
1. Light = 1 
2. Moderate = 2 
3. Serious = 4 
 
 
Triadic Scale of Reliability of Empirical Assumptions 
 
Reliable = 1 
Plausible =  ½ 






































DISCOURSE THEORY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Comprise three dimensions:  
1. “Philosophical”: the foundation and the substantiation of fundamental rights. 
2. “Political”: the institutionalization of fundamental rights. 
3. “Juridical”: the interpretation of fundamental rights. 
Three different conceptions of fundamental rights: 
1. “Formal”: if fundamental rights are defined as rights contained in a Constitution 
or in a certain part of it. 
2. “Substantial”: include criteria that go above and beyond the fact that a right is 
mentioned, listed or guaranteed in a Constitution. The substantial concept of 
fundamental rights corresponds with the concept of Human Rights. Human Rights 
are substantive even when not included in a formal Constitution. Fundamental 
rights represent human rights transformed into positive law.  
3. “Procedural”: institutional problem of transforming human rights into positive 
law. 
Fundamental rights = Human rights transformed into positive law.  
 
Eight potential foundations of fundamental rights:  
1. Religious: God creates Human Rights in his own image.  
2. Intuitionist: Human Rights are self-evident. 
3. Consensual: congruence of beliefs, collective intuitionism. 
4. Socio-biological: human rights derive from altruism, altruistic behaviour for the 
survival of the genetic pool of individuals.  
5. Instrumental: acceptance of Human Rights is indispensible to the maximization 
of individual utility.  
6. Cultural: Human Rights as an achievement of the history of human culture, the 
work of centuries has established a solid core of human rights. 
7. Explicative: discourse-theoretical approach, makes explicit what is necessarily 
implicit in human practice.  
8. Existential: necessity of discursive practice: human beings are “discursive 
creatures”.  
 
 
 
 
 
